MQM facing extinction

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Diversity of political forces is an element of strength for political culture while monopolization of political space by dint of force initially begets fear and ultimately leads to widespread discontent. The survival of a ‘political’ entity that has developed private militias and established links with armed groups to display its strength through spreading terror is a source of serious concern as it jeopardises the flourishing of a democratic ethos- tolerance and peace. For the furtherance of the democratic project, there are two options: either such entity must mend its ways and adopt the ways of genuine political struggle or it would face extinction in due course. Over the past two decades, MQM has refused to go down the first path and the grinding wheel of time has now caught up with it.

Read more on MQM: http://pakistan-posts.blogspot.com/2011/08/letter-by-patriotic-pakistani-leader.html

The difficulties for the party started when Imran Farooq was murdered in London and the Scotland Yard took up the investigation of the matter. Then followed separate investigations into allegations of money laundering, raids at the Edgware headquarters of MQM, the arrest of Mr. Altaf Hussain, his interim bail and extension on two occasions. The most vulnerable point of an organisation built around the cult of a personality, is that the whole structure collapses when the ‘strong man’ is seen as falling. Another weakness is that there is no second tier leader who has been trained to legitimately take over in the event of vacuum of leadership. Therefore, the embattled Altaf Hussain in London failed to maintain his grip over the party as his feet of the clay exposed. In September 2013, Declan Walsh published in New York Times, reporting, “For two decades, Altaf Hussain has run his brutal Pakistani political empire by remote control, shrouded in luxurious exile in London and long beyond the reach of the law. He follows events through satellite televisions in his walled-off home, manages millions of dollars in assets and issues decrees in ranting teleconferences that last for hours — all to command a network of influence and intimidation that stretches from North America to South Africa. This global system serves a very localised goal: perpetuating Mr. Hussain’s reign as the political king of Karachi, the brooding port city of 20 million people at the heart of Pakistan’s economy. Now, though, his painstakingly constructed web is fraying.”(Italics for emphasis)
At home, the MQM always claimed itself to be and it really was the third largest political party in the parliament, controlling the financial hub of the country. The successive provincial and national governments found it expedient to include MQM as coalition partner because they were apprehensive of the latter’s blackmailing tactics in case of exclusion. In developing countries, because of patrimonial political culture, participation in government is considered as having access to a pie of resources that could be used at will without any chance of accountability. Thus the consistent strategy of PPP and PML-N during the 1990’s has been to secure peace in Karachi through handing over the city to MQM, which gradually strengthened its hold. General Pervez Musharraf found a natural ally in MQM as he excluded the two mainstream political parties out of active politics. It became proverbial that not a sparrow could stretch its wings in Karachi without permission from nine-zero. The capacity of diehard followers of Altaf Hussain to close down the city at a single call was on display every other day. During the lawyers’ movement, the party let loose a reign of terror and killed above 40 people in different parts of the city to block the entry of then deposed Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhary.
The political realities for MQM changed in the wake of 2013 general elections. The PTI replaced it as the third big political party by securing 35 seats in National Assembly. Imran Khan and his party men did what was earlier considered unthinkable. They openly talked on national media about the intimidating tactics of MQM employed to secure his support base and urged Karachites to come out to bring to end the atmosphere of fear. For the first time in bye-elections of NA-246, the MQM felt the need of door-to-door canvassing to ensure its victory. Thus the role of PTI in challenging MQM on its turf is laudable.
Besides a diminution of its political clout, because of the rise of PTI, the MQM landed in serious trouble with the decision of the federal government to cleanse the city of Karachi of network of criminals and militants. MQM raised hue and cry against the arrest of its affiliated criminals but the operation went on with unabated intensity. The PPP supported the operation at initial stage, as Asif Zardari could not foresee the clean-up operation against its maladministration and corruption.
Now when the BBC report reinforcing the public perception of MQM to be receiving funds from India and engage in terrorist activities, has come to the fore, MQM’s current leadership is in dire straits. The possible handing over of three people involved in planning and executing murder of Imran Farooq at the behest of Altaf Hussain, will add to the worries for him in London and consequentially the influence of the MQM will further weaken. The party might survive but, without the present leadership, it will only be a shadow of its former self.

The writer is a Rhodes Scholar and a graduate of law from the University of Oxford.
naumanlawyer@gmail.com
http://nation.com.pk/columns/30-Jun-2015/mqm-facing-extinction

Read more on MQM: http://pakistan-posts.blogspot.com/2011/08/letter-by-patriotic-pakistani-leader.html

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12 Signs of Anxiety Disorder By Amanda MacMillan

What's normal?

Everyone gets nervous or anxious from time to time—when speaking in public, for instance, or when going through financial difficulty. For some people, however, anxiety becomes so frequent, or so forceful, that it begins to take over their lives.

How can you tell if your everyday anxiety has crossed the line into a disorder? It's not easy. Anxiety comes in many different forms—such as panic attacks, phobia, and social anxiety—and the distinction between an official diagnosis and "normal" anxiety isn't always clear.

Here's a start: If you experience any of the following symptoms on a regular basis, you may want to talk with your doctor.

Excessive worry
The hallmark of generalized anxiety disorder (GAD)—the broadest type of anxiety—is worrying too much about everyday things, large and small. But what constitutes "too much"?

In the case of GAD, it means having persistent anxious thoughts on most days of the week, for six months. Also, the anxiety must be so bad that it interferes with daily life and is accompanied by noticeable symptoms, such as fatigue.

"The distinction between an anxiety disorder and just having normal anxiety is whether your emotions are causing a lot of suffering and dysfunction," says Sally Winston, PsyD, co-director of the Anxiety and Stress Disorder Institute of Maryland in Towson.

Sleep problems
Trouble falling asleep or staying asleep is associated with a wide range of health conditions, both physical and psychological. And, of course, it's not unusual to toss and turn with anticipation on the night before a big speech or job interview.

But if you chronically find yourself lying awake, worried or agitated—about specific problems (like money), or nothing in particular—it might be a sign of an anxiety disorder. By some estimates, fully half of all people with GAD experience sleep problems.

Another tip-off that anxiety might be involved? You wake up feeling wired, your mind is racing, and you're unable to calm yourself down.

Irrational fears
Some anxiety isn't generalized at all; on the contrary, it's attached to a specific situation or thing—like flying, animals, or crowds. If the fear becomes overwhelming, disruptive, and way out of proportion to the actual risk involved, it's a telltale sign of phobia, a type of anxiety disorder.

Although phobias can be crippling, they're not obvious at all times. In fact, they may not surface until you confront a specific situation and discover you're incapable of overcoming your fear. "A person who's afraid of snakes can go for years without having a problem," Winston says. "But then suddenly their kid wants to go camping, and they realize they need treatment."

Muscle tension
Near-constant muscle tension—whether it consists of clenching your jaw, balling your fists, or flexing muscles throughout your body—often accompanies anxiety disorders. This symptom can be so persistent and pervasive that people who have lived with it for a long time may stop noticing it after a while.

Regular exercise can help keep muscle tension under control, but the tension may flare up if an injury or other unforeseen event disrupts a person's workout habits, Winston says. "Suddenly they're a wreck, because they can't handle their anxiety in that way and now they're incredibly restless and irritable."

Stage fright
Most people get at least a few butterflies before addressing a group of people or otherwise being in the spotlight. But if the fear is so strong that no amount of coaching or practice will alleviate it, or if you spend a lot of time thinking and worrying about it, you may have a form of social anxiety disorder (also known as social phobia).

People with social anxiety tend to worry for days or weeks leading up to a particular event or situation. And if they do manage to go through with it, they tend to be deeply uncomfortable and may dwell on it for a long time afterward, wondering how they were judged.

Self-consciousness
Social anxiety disorder doesn't always involve speaking to a crowd or being the center of attention. In most cases, the anxiety is provoked by everyday situations such as making one-on-one conversation at a party, or eating and drinking in front of even a small number of people.

In these situations, people with social anxiety disorder tend to feel like all eyes are on them, and they often experience blushing, trembling, nausea, profuse sweating, or difficulty talking. These symptoms can be so disruptive that they make it hard to meet new people, maintain relationships, and advance at work or in school.

IPanic
Panic attacks can be terrifying: Picture a sudden, gripping feeling of fear and helplessness that can last for several minutes, accompanied by scary physical symptoms such as breathing problems, a pounding or racing heart, tingling or numb hands, sweating, weakness or dizziness, chest pain, stomach pain, and feeling hot or cold.

Not everyone who has a panic attack has an anxiety disorder, but people who experience them repeatedly may be diagnosed with panic disorder. People with panic disorder live in fear about when, where, and why their next attack might happen, and they tend to avoid places where attacks have occurred in the past.

Flashbacks
Reliving a disturbing or traumatic event—a violent encounter, the sudden death of a loved one—is a hallmark of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), which shares some features with anxiety disorders. (Until very recently, in fact, PTSD was seen as a type of anxiety disorder rather than a stand-alone condition.)

But flashbacks may occur with other types of anxiety as well. Some research, including a 2006 study in the Journal of Anxiety Disorders, suggests that some people with social anxiety have PTSD-like flashbacks of experiences that might not seem obviously traumatic, such as being publicly ridiculed. These people may even avoid reminders of the experience—another symptom reminiscent of PTSD.

Perfectionism
The finicky and obsessive mind-set known as perfectionism "goes hand in hand with anxiety disorders," Winston says. "If you are constantly judging yourself or you have a lot of anticipatory anxiety about making mistakes or falling short of your standards, then you probably have an anxiety disorder."

Perfectionism is especially common in obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD), which, like PTSD, has long been viewed as an anxiety disorder. "OCD can happen subtly, like in the case of somebody who can't get out of the house for three hours because their makeup has to be absolutely just right and they have to keep starting over," Winston says.

Compulsive behaviors
In order to be diagnosed with obsessive-compulsive disorder, a person's obsessiveness and intrusive thoughts must be accompanied by compulsive behavior, whether it's mental (telling yourself It'll be all right over and over again) or physical (hand-washing, straightening items).

Obsessive thinking and compulsive behavior become a full-blown disorder when the need to complete the behaviors—also known as "rituals"—begins to drive your life, Winston says. "If you like your radio at volume level 3, for example, and it breaks and gets stuck on 4, would you be in a total panic until you could get it fixed?"

Self-doubt
Persistent self-doubt and second-guessing is a common feature of anxiety disorders, including generalized anxiety disorder and OCD. In some cases, the doubt may revolve around a question that's central to a person's identity, like "Do I love my husband / wife as much as he loves me?"

In OCD, Winston says, these "doubt attacks" are especially common when a question is unanswerable. People with OCD "think, 'If only I would know 100% for sure, either one would be fine,' but they have this intolerance for uncertainty that turns the question into an obsession," she says.

Source: 12 Signs You May Have an Anxiety Disorder: http://flip.it/r3S4Z

Why India has never seen a military dictatorship?

A true story: In 1957, the then Indian prime minister Jawaharlal Nehru, visiting the office of general Thimayya, the chief of the army staff, saw a steel cabinet behind his desk, and asked the general what it contained.

The general replied that the top drawer contained the nation’s defence plans. And the second drawer contained the confidential files of the nation’s top generals.

And what about the third drawer, enquired Nehru.

Ah, said the general with a straight face, the third drawer contains my secret plans for a military coup against you.

Nehru laughed, but there was apparently a tinge of nervousness to his laughter.

Military dictatorships have been a common phenomenon in the post-colonial states of Asia and Africa, and in the 1950s and 1960s, a dictatorship in India was not an impossibility. In fact, while covering the 1967 general elections, The Times correspondent, Neville Maxwell, prophesied that these might well be the last elections ever in the country. And he was not the only one who believed that sooner or later, India would fall under military rule.

But that eventuality, of course, never happened.

Why not?

The question why the Indian Army never attempted to seize power has sometimes been attributed to the fact that it is disciplined, highly professional, and steeped in proud 250-year-old traditions inherited from the British. But this theory doesn’t work, because the Pakistani army was born out of the same traditions and that didn’t seem to stop it from assuming power.

Indeed, one could argue that it was precisely because the Pakistan army was such a highly professional force that there came a time when it felt it could no longer stand by and watch the country slide into chaos, and felt it was its duty to step in.

So clearly this is a question one needs to look at more closely. Which is what political scientist Steven Wilkinson has done with his excellent new book, Army and Nation.

In order to understand what didn’t happen in India, it is perhaps useful to first look at what did happen in Pakistan. The military dictatorship in Pakistan has had an interesting pre-history. It begins in undivided India, where the largest single component of the army was drawn from the undivided Punjab. Hence at the time of Partition, of all the institutions that Pakistan inherited, the most substantive was its army.

Moreover, while in India the Congress Party was a highly evolved, durable organisation, in Pakistan the Muslim League was not much more than “Jinnah and his Private Secretary.” Hence, there was a dangerous structural imbalance in Pakistan, especially after Jinnah’s death in 1948.

Mashallah ho gaya

The military dictatorship in Pakistan did not come out of the blue. In the early 1950s, for example, there were riots in Lahore that raged on because the civilian authorities were unable to control them. Finally the army was called out, and it swiftly and firmly put down the trouble.

Then the commanding officer made an unusual request: He asked for another couple of days before withdrawing his troops to the barracks. In those few, quick days, the army proceeded to clean up the city, paint public buildings, repair roads, pull down unauthorised structures and plant trees. Then, having performed all these long neglected civic tasks, the army quietly withdrew, leaving Lahore looking as clean and well-ordered as an army cantonment.

This earned the army a great deal of respect among the public: It had managed to do for the city in a few days what the civilian authority had failed to do over the years. Hence, when in 1958, the governor-general of Pakistan responded to a state of political chaos in the country by declaring martial law, and calling out the army, there was a section of the public that rejoiced at the news. In fact, a saying that went around at the time was, “Pakistan mein ab toh mashallah ho gaya,” playing on the term ‘martial law,’ and translating, roughly, as “By the grace of God, things in Pakistan are well now.”

What followed over the next few years was a period of remarkable national development in Pakistan, under the presidency of General Ayub Khan—before the military government began to get corrupted by its own power (as always, inevitably, happens in such a system).

Ring-fencing the Indian Army

The Indian Army was born out of the same tradition as Pakistan’s. In British India, the army enjoyed a prominent position in Indian life, and even played a role in policy matters. The commander-in-chief, was also the de facto defence minister, and was the second most powerful person in the hierarchy after the viceroy himself. But after Independence things began to change.

Prime minister Nehru believed that the new India needed to rethink the role of the army, and initiated a policy that would firmly subordinate it to the civilian authority. One of the first things that happened after Independence, for example, was that Teen Murti House, traditionally the grand residence of the army chief, was assigned instead to the prime minister: A small matter by itself, perhaps, but a clear indicator of the way the wind was blowing.

Next came a series of budget cuts (resulting, among other things, in hefty cuts in army officers’ generous Raj-era salaries). And when India’s first army chief, field marshal Cariappa, publicly criticised the government’s economic performance, he was immediately rapped on the knuckles, and told not to meddle in matters that did not concern him.

Over the years a systematic programme was pursued to ring-fence the armed forces, and their influence in Indian society—a programme that was given fresh urgency in 1958 by the military coup in next-door Pakistan (an occurrence that was worryingly praised by field marshal Cariappa, who had recently retired as army chief). A highlight—or, rather, lowlight—of that ring-fencing programme was the appointment of Krishna Menon, a powerful, abrasive, leftist intellectual, as defence minister. It was an attempt to put the armed forces unambiguously in their place. Unfortunately, it also had the unintended side effect of leading to the stinging defeat of 1962, but that is a different story.

An unrecognised achievement

By the 1970s, the Indian armed forces had finally been rendered ‘coup-proof’ by a comprehensive system of checks and balances that had been put in place. And that might be considered to be one of the major achievements of the Nehru era: Ensuring the durability of Indian democracy. It’s an achievement that is not sufficiently recognised; an achievement underscored by the fact that all our South Asian neighbours—Pakistan, Bangladesh, Burma and Sri Lanka—have experienced military coups, actual or attempted.

Wilkinson explains how this ‘coup-proofing’ was implemented, through a package of carefully thought-out measures, ranging from diversifying the ethnic composition of the armed forces to setting up rugged command and control structures, re-casting the order of precedence between civil and military authorities, paying close attention to promotions, disallowing army officers from making public statements, creating a counter-balancing paramilitary force, and topping off this entire effort with little touches like ensuring that retired chiefs of staff are usually sent off as ambassadors to faraway countries.

The end result of all this is that when, in 2012, newspapers breathlessly reported that there had been a coup attempt, with army units being surreptitiously moved towards Delhi in the wake of the general V. K. Singh affair, people like you and I, merely shrugged, said, “What nonsense,” and turned to the sports page.

"We perhaps don’t realise what a luxury that kind of certainty is.
Why India has never seen a military dictatorship"by Anvar Alikhan, qz.com

America's Pakistan Policy Is Sheer Madness

This week, the Congressional Research Service published a list of all major U.S. arms sales and grants to Pakistan. Washington claims that these transfers enable Pakistan to be better a partner in the U.S.-led war on terrorism. The evidence belies these claims. In fact, Pakistan undercuts key U.S. interests in the region and it perdures as a source of Islamist terrorism at home and abroad. The items that Washington has conveyed to Pakistan have little utility in fighting insurgents and terrorists; rather, they enable Pakistan to better fight India, a democratic American partner that has long endured Pakistani predations. A new American policy towards Pakistan, rooted in sober realism, is long overdue.

Since 9/11, the United States has lavished Pakistan with nearly $8 billion in security assistance, $11 billion in economic assistance, and $13 billion in the lucrative program known as Coalition Support Funds (CSF). Since then, Pakistan has availed of significant U.S. weapons systems and armaments, including: a used Perry-class missile frigate; 18 new and 14 used nuclear-capable F-16s; an array of munitions (i.e. 500 air-to-air missiles, 1,450 2,000-pound bombs);  1,600 kits that allow Pakistan to convert gravity bombs into laser-guided smarter bombs, 2,007 anti-armor missiles, 100 Harpoon anti-ship missiles, 500 Sidewinder air-to-air missiles, seven naval guns, 374 armored personnel carriers, and much more. A transfer of 15 reconnaissance unmanned aerial vehicles is also under way. This list suggests that Pakistan’s insurgents have developed air, naval and ground-force capabilities.

What tangible benefits has Washington secured for these emoluments? Very few it appears. Victory in Afghanistan was long ago lost. Pakistan is more unstable than ever. Even though Washington justified this largesse in terms of securing Pakistan’s cooperation in the Afghan war, Pakistan unrelentingly supports the Afghan Taliban, which has killed 2,356 U.S. military personnel, and is responsible for 677 coalition military deaths, as well as the deaths of thousands of civilian contractors (for whom there is no official count), more than 21,000 Afghan civilians since 2001, and more than 20,000 Afghan police and army personnel since 2003. Insurgents killed more than 5,000 ANSF in 2014 alone. Pakistan continues to support the Jalaluddin Haqqani network, which launches sophisticated suicide operations against U.S., NATO, Afghan and Indian targets in Afghanistan. Without Pakistan’s direct military, diplomatic, political and financial support—as well as secure sanctuaries—in Pakistani territory, the insurgents would not be as lethal or as capable as they are. And, of course, Osama Bin Laden was discovered a short distance from Pakistan’s famed military academy at Kakul. Pakistan has not even bothered to investigate who facilitated his tenure in the country. Apparently, this is what cooperation looks like.

These U.S. policies towards Pakistan have guaranteed a more dangerous world for several reasons. 

First, this assistance better situates Pakistan to wage war against India while doing nothing to shape Pakistan’s will or capabilities to target terrorists and insurgents. This should vex Americans, Indians, Afghans and even ordinary Pakistanis who are the terrorists’ most common victim.  

(Recommended: 5 Indian Weapons of War Pakistan Should Fear)

Second, U.S. efforts to bolster Pakistan’s ability to fight its rebelling clients are stymied by the simple fact that Pakistan continues to create terrorists while fighting a selective war against others. Pakistani soldiers and citizens are dying at the hands of recalcitrant elements of the Pakistani Taliban, yet the deep state continues to churn out “good terrorists” such as Lashkar-e-Taiba (now operating under the names of Jamaat-ud-Dawa and Filah Insaniyat Foundation) and Jaish-e-Mohammad. It even tolerates sectarian killers who reliably mow down any Shia who may be suspected of being a “fifth column” for Iran.
Keep reading  http://nationalinterest.org/feature/americas-pakistan-policy-sheer-madness-12894

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Economic corridor challenges

THE lack of political consensus and insecurity would be two major challenges towards the implementation of the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) project. Failure to address these irritants will continue to affect Pakistan’s trade and economic engagement with countries in the region, thus negatively impacting national development.

The need to address these challenges has never been so important as now, when Pakistan is set to join the race for economic development and regional connectivity. Chinese scholars see this emerging regional connectivity as tantamount to reshaping the region’s outlook, with Pakistan holding a central position.

In that regard, a consensus reached among Pakistan’s political leadership to set up a special bicameral parliamentary committee for regular oversight of the CPEC project is a positive move. If the committee becomes an active forum, it will certainly help address the concerns of all the provinces and political parties. As the government has a history of setting up ‘non-delivering’ committees, one can only hope that things will be better this time. A non-functional oversight committee will also be detrimental for policy and the execution sustainability of the CPEC project. The corridor will take at least two decades to be completed and during this time several governments will change in Pakistan.

There is hope that the CPEC will change the regional economic and strategic environment.
This writer’s recent interactions with Chinese scholars and officials suggested the latter are extremely enthusiastic about the CPEC project. They see it as a flagship project of China’s vision of ‘Belt and Road’ — a brief version of the Silk Road Economic Belt and the Maritime Silk Road. They anticipate that a successful implementation of the corridor project will encourage other regional countries, including Central Asian states, to engage in similar projects with China. The next target for China would be to pursue India, Bangladesh and Myanmar for the East Asian corridor. According to some estimates, these routes will benefit more than three billion people of the South and Central Asian regions.

During President Xi Jinping’s recent visit to Pakistan, nine of the 51 signed projects were linked to Gwadar. The Chinese regard Gwadar as the Tilbury of Pakistan. The port of Tilbury, once a strategically important deep-sea port of England, still carries huge economic and trade significance. The CPEC and Gwadar port will bring the same prosperity for the whole of Pakistan, which will become a conduit to multiple regions.

Gwadar is the tail of the silk belt, which will connect at Kashgar through different communication networks. The security of the whole corridor and Gwadar is a real concern for China. They are less worried about political differences in Pakistan, which they believe will be resolved with the passage of time.

Both Gwadar and Kashgar are facing multiple security challenges. The Chinese expect that the establishment of five economic zones in Kashgar will completely transform the region and minimise the security risks such as the separatist and militant movements of the Uighurs. While they hope for the same about the separatist movements in Balochistan, their focus is on short- and medium-term security measures for the safety of their workforce and threats to the route and other projects in the country.

Though a declining trend in the number of terrorist attacks in Pakistan continued in April 2015 for the fourth month in a row, major actors of violence are still active. During the month, 50 terrorist attacks took place in the country, 10 less than in the previous month which claimed 70 lives and inflicted injuries on another 89 people. Although Balochistan appeared the more volatile region in recent months, the situation has gradually improved there; compared to 37 in February and 24 in March, 14 terrorist attacks took place there in April this year.

The military operations in parts of the tribal areas and surgical operations by paramilitary forces in Balochistan and Karachi have helped curtail certain violent trends. The increase in sectarian and communal attacks also indicates that the operational capacity of certain violent groups has not been reduced. The terrorist infrastructure still exists inside and outside the borders, which will continue to pose a threat.

After work starts on the CPEC, internal security sensitivities will increase where even a single terrorist attack after a lull will increase the level of insecurity and damage the gains on the security front. The bigger challenge for the security establishment will remain the rooting out of the terrorist infrastructure in the country.

As far as the safety of the Chinese workforce is concerned, Pakistan can meet this challenge. The army has already announced the creation of a 10,000-man special force for protecting the development projects to be carried out under the CPEC. According to media reports, the new force, named the Special Security Division, will comprise nine army battalions and six wings of paramilitary forces — the Rangers and the Frontier Corps. A two-star general will head the special force.

There is hope that the CPEC will change the regional economic and strategic environment. Specifically, in the Pakistan-Afghanistan perspective, better understanding on security and geo-economic issues is required for the safety of the corridor, protecting it from local, regional and global non-state and state actors. There are major concerns about the Kunar and Nuristan provinces of Afghanistan, where multiple terrorist groups — including Al Qaeda, the self-styled Islamic State, the Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan, the Movement of Islamic Uzbekistan and the Turkestan Islamic Party, etc — are concentrated. These groups can pose a direct threat to the CPEC in Pakistan’s northern region.

A better understanding between Islamabad and Kabul is also imperative to achieve border security. At the same time, peace and stability in Afghanistan are also needed if China and Pakistan want to maximise the benefits of the CPEC. Prime Minister Mian Nawaz Sharif and army chief Gen Raheel Sharif visited Kabul just after President Ashraf Ghani returned from India. That indicates that both sides want to keep the trust and optimism intact. The prime minister’s statement denouncing the Afghan Taliban’s spring offensive is a positive gesture. Perhaps this is also a positive sign for the prospects of peace and reconciliation between the Afghanistan government and the Taliban.

Economic corridor challenges
by Muhammad Amir Rana, dawn.com
The writer is a security analyst.

Why Pakistan needs to support Saudi Arabia

Recently, PM confirmed that a “threat to Saudi Arabia will evoke strong reaction from Pakistan” during a meeting with the top defence-related brass, which was convened after the Kingdom’s offensive against the Houthi rebels in Yemen started.

While a lot of Pakistanis are not in favour of going into what they perceive as a sectarian conflict, they fail to recognise both the strategic and economic implications if Pakistan does not support the Saudi Arabia-led offensive against the Houthi rebels.

Firstly, the PML-N led government has every right to take this decision based on the number of representatives it has in parliament. However, what needs to be understood is that it’s not just the government, but also the military establishment which is backing the whole offensive due to strategic compulsions.

The two arguments against the engagement of Pakistani troops in Yemen and Saudi Arabia are:

1. Why engage our troops in a foreign country when we are fighting our own war; and

2. Why be part of a sectarian conflict?

The truth is that a nation’s foreign policy is not driven by emotions but is based on long-term economic and strategic security concerns.

Pakistan has taken part in Arab conflicts  in the past. Fighter pilots from the Pakistan Air Force had flown Royal Saudi Air Force jets to repel an incursion from south Yemen in 1969.

One should also remember that there are 400 Pakistani military trainers present in the Kingdom, already training Saudis on border management against the Islamic State on the Iraqi border.

The recent decision to support Saudi Arabia in this conflict is backed both, by the military and civilian leaderships, which see the stability of Saudi Arabia in Pakistan’s interest for two reasons:

1.  Millions of Pakistanis work in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries with the highest number being in Saudi Arabia.

2. Apart from that, the GCC remains the largest source of foreign exchange for Pakistan.

3.In addition, Saudi Arabia remains Pakistan’s biggest strategic ally and helps meet our energy needs.

4. Instability within the GCC and Saudi Arabia would mean millions of Pakistanis coming back jobless, hurting us economically.

We have seen what happened to Pakistanis living in Kuwait after Iraq invaded that country.

The question remains: will Pakistan’s participation in the operation in Yemen hurt Pakistan’s own war?

No. Our military and air force deployment inside Saudi Arabia will be limited in numbers and the decision regarding this should be left to the military command.

We regularly send troops on UN missions. Does our participation in these missions affect us?  No.

Secondly, the perception that the Yemen conflict is sectarian in nature is only because of Iran’s support to the Houthi rebels.

In reality, this is more of an ethnic conflict with there being a quest for political power.

Pakistan’s foreign policy with regards to Iran traditionally has been to defend Iran too.

Hence, a serious diplomatic effort from our foreign office should be made to convince Iran that its stability as well as that of Saudi Arabia is vital for Pakistan. We cannot ignore either country.

We must also understand that there are more than 10 Muslim countries, including Turkey, backing the strikes in Yemen against the Houthis and Pakistan will eventually have to choose sides or lose support from our biggest strategic partners and energy providers.

It is now up to the prime minister and his government to cash in on the opportunity and get a good economic deal for Pakistan in exchange for providing security for the GCC countries.

Pakistan could gain economically if a sound deal is negotiated for providing jobs to Pakistanis in the GCC countries, as well as negotiating a better energy deal. A good economic package negotiated at an appropriate time to benefit all Pakistanis will help the case for a greater military role in the GCC countries.

Published in The Express Tribune, April 1st,  2015.

Pakistan corruption- Agenda 2015: Security and economy

Pakistan is at war with insurgent forces led by the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). The TTP’s war objective is to take over political control of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan. The TTP’s signature weapon is fear. The TTP’s military strategy is unconventional – fidayeen attacks, suicide attacks and bomb blasts. The TTP’s military goals are: to isolate Pakistan; to mutilate governance and then gain complete control over each and every kilometre of 796,095 sq kilometres we call Pakistan.
Insurgent force: The TTP is dependent on three factors – a geographical safe haven, a financial pipeline and supply of manpower.

Counter-insurgency: Pakistan Army’s XI Corps is the counter-insurgent force fighting to establish Pakistan’s writ over each and every kilometre of 796,095 sq kms we call Pakistan. XI Corps’ military objectives are: to disrupt, dismantle and destroy the TTP.

Counter-insurgency implementation: XI Corps is responsible for ‘clearing’ each and every TTP-held geographical safe haven. The federal government is responsible for shutting down the TTP’s financial pipeline. The federal government is responsible for cutting of the TTP’s supply of manpower. Counter-insurgency is, therefore, 33 percent military and 66 percent civil.

Economy: Economic power is one of the most critical elements of national power. Pakistan’s economic security depends on at least six factors: energy security, national debt, economic equality, human capital, industrial production growth and the right priorities.

Energy security: In 2015, Pakistan will lose around Rs700 billion of GDP because of power outages (that is the equivalent of our annual defence budget). In 2015, Pakistan will lose around Rs300 billion in line losses (that is the equivalent of what the entire army spends in a year). For the record, Pakistan’s installed capacity stands at 23,040MW but in 2015 Pakistan will produce an average of 11,000MW per day. To be certain, power outages are not because of lack of generation capacity but because of lack of governance.

National debt: On August 18, 2008, the day President Musharraf resigned, per capita debt stood at Rs40,000. On September 8, 2013, the day President Zardari resigned, per capita debt stood at Rs80,000 (we took on more debt in five years than we had done in the preceding 60 years). As of the last day of December 2014, per capita debt was recorded at Rs103,000. If the trend persists, per capita debt will cross Rs200,000 by 2018.

Economic inequality: Over the past 10 years, an estimated 90 percent of the wealth generated in Pakistan has gone into the coffers of the top two percent of the population. The income and asset gap between rich and poor continues to widen by the hour; the rich are getting richer, the poor poorer. The economy is getting more and more cartelised and the cartels are becoming more and more powerful – the power cartel, the oil cartel, the sugar cartel, the cement cartel, the banking cartel and the land mafia. One, there is an inverse link between income inequality and social cohesion. Two, crime rate and income inequality are correlated.

Human capital: Pakistan’s ranking in the Human Development Index is at 146th position out of 187 countries. India and Bangladesh are ranked at 135th and 142nd, respectively.

Industrial growth: Pakistan’s industrial growth rate peaked at 13 percent in 2004. In 2009, it turned negative and has since hovered around three percent.

Priorities: Rs260 billion for Hyderabad-Sukkur motorway. Rs44 billion for the Rawalpindi-Islamabad metrobus. Rs15 billion for Operation Zarb-e-Azb. Rs0 for the National Action Plan.

Conclusion 1: Counter-insurgency is a civil-military effort; 33 percent military and 66 percent civil. Conclusion 2: Economic security is the grossly neglected dimension of Pakistan’s national security. Conclusion 3: Pakistan’s energy security is a governance issue. Conclusion 4: Our economic priorities are all messed up.

By Furrukh Saleem
thenews.com.pk

Agenda 2015: Security and economy. Background:
The writer is a columnist based in Islamabad. Email: [email protected] Twitter: @saleemfarrukh

Insecurities and ghettoisation

THE continuing trend of people being killed in Pakistan by infuriated mobs reveals that there is some serious problem with our society and social behaviour. Lynching can neither be allowed nor justified irrespective of who does it.

The killing of two citizens by a protesting mob on the suspicion of the former’s link to the terrorist attacks on two churches in Lahore was a symptom of stress disorder. The horrific act carried out by non-Muslim protesters surprised many and annoyed certain segments of the Muslim majority — particularly those who deal in the hate business.

People are hardly able to show restraint when they feel their sense of individual or collective identity is being threatened. Such situations can turn mobs violent. The prevailing environment of insecurity and violence is exposing the fault lines that exist in the country.

Sectarian and communal violence, which manifests itself in the form of faith-based discrimination and violence against individuals, worship places and religious symbols of other sects and faiths, is among the foremost critical challenges affecting Pakistan’s security, stability and social harmony.

The challenges that non-Muslims face in Pakistan are by no means identical either in nature or intensity. However, while some religious minorities are more vulnerable than others and the threats are greater in some parts of the country compared to others, the overall situation of religious minorities has worsened across the country in general in recent years.

A sense of insecurity encourages non-Muslims to live in ghettos.
Apart from sectarian and faith-based attacks and targeted killings by violent sectarian and militant groups, sectarian and faith-based discrimination is also increasingly penetrating individuals’ attitudes and behaviour in Pakistan.

The growing intolerance towards other sects and faiths at the societal level and exploitation of people’s religious sentiments by the clergy in Pakistan has often manifested itself in the form of mob attacks carried out by Muslims on minorities, such as the Gojra killings in 2009 and attacks on Christians in Lahore’s Joseph Colony in March 2013, as well as sectarian and communal clashes.

Other major incidents include the clash between Christian and Muslim communities in Gujranwala in 2012, and Shia-Sunni clashes in Rawalpindi in 2013 that triggered sectarian violence in other cities.

The constant shadow of fear makes people behave ‘fearlessly’. Many experts and social scientists think that such insecurity leads crowds to believe in a sort of oneness, which shapes their collective actions. In that perspective, this phenomenon cannot be confined to certain communities. There are a few other factors which shape behaviours at times of crisis.

The lynching of two Muslims happened in a big Christian ghetto in Lahore, which also indicates that a typical ghetto mentality built around fear and insecurity may have triggered the violent reaction. Strangely, the phenomenon of ghettoisation is not only confined to poor religious and sectarian minorities in Pakistan; religious and social elites also prefer to live in their ghettos. Their luxurious housing societies have no comparison with the lower-middle classes’ ghettos and the slums of the poor.

The phenomenon not only highlights the economic and social disparities in society but also indicates increasing segregation on the basis of exclusiveness and fear of each other. The phenomenon is not merely linked to urbanisation but also shapes critical behaviour and thinking patterns among religious and sectarian minorities.

A recent survey-based study of the lives of religious minorities in Pakistan and their relationship with the followers of other faiths reveals that non-Muslims feel threatened by the overall deteriorating security situation countrywide.

Also, they believe that they are not part of the larger social and cultural mainstream. The sense of insecurity encourages them to live in ghettos; this may provide them a sense of community and some comfort of social interface, but such solutions only trigger more insecurity. The sense of exclusiveness and insecurity gives rise to reactionary behaviour which assumes that hard reactions can provide some deterrence against multiple kinds of bigotry.

The link between ghettos and insecurity also indicates increasing mistrust among different socio-religious communities in Pakistan. A critical dimension of the increasing ghettoisation are the housing societies launched by religious and militant groups. These have become a major source of building organisational assets for them.

Such projects also help them establish their turf and support base in a specific area, usually in walled-off communities, where they aspire to live according to their beliefs, something they claim is denied to them outside their residential projects.

Residence or acquisition of property in these projects is not open to all; it is usually by invitation only. The number of such projects is on the rise across the country.

According to media reports, in Lahore alone there are at least 12 such schemes. Various religious sects and parties have launched housing schemes in the city with residence rights reserved for members of the sect or party alone. Jamaatud Dawa’s Markaz in Muridke, Tanzeemul Akhwan’s Owassia Housing Society, and Al-Maymar Trust’s sponsored housing schemes in Karachi and Lahore are a few examples. These projects house the party secretariats while serving as residential societies.

A look at the patterns of irregular settlements in and around the urban centres reveals how these contribute to sectarian and communal tensions. The slums — mainly containing Christian residents — were located outside the cities of Punjab. But during the last two decades the expansion of the cities has made these settlements more lucrative for the land mafia. In many cases, such elements triggered communal tensions to pressurise the non-Muslims in order to grab their lands.

This highlights the state’s failure in providing housing to the common man, which has resulted in grave sociopolitical consequences. The lack of urbanisation policies and regulation of slums and ghettos is another issue which the state is guilty of. Ironically, it does not realise the impact of its poor urban policies.

Ghettoisation of different kinds has become one of the major hurdles in the way of social cohesion and harmony in the country. This has a trickle-down effect in times of increasing insecurity in society.
Insecurities and ghettoisation
by Muhammad Amir Rana, dawn.com
The writer is a security analyst.

The madressah factor

PAKISTAN’S madressah sector is increasingly being seen as a critical factor in the pervading insecurity in the country, particularly after the announcement of the National Action Plan. The fact is reflected in the decision taken by the Islamabad administration to close madressahs situated near Parade Avenue for one week on the eve of the March 23 military parade. According to media reports, the decision was taken on the advice of intelligence agencies.

Meanwhile, the government is making only half-hearted efforts to reform the madressah sector which also lack the required security perspective. It has yet to convene meetings of the two madressah reform committees set up by the federal interior minister, Chaudhry Nisar Ali Khan, last month.

Those at the helm of madressah affairs are well aware that the state has no vision, policy or strategy to deal with them. The government does not even have an authentic database or account of religious schools in Pakistan. Fully exploiting this gap, the madressah administrators and clergy are providing an exaggerated account of madressahs in the country. They have recently revised their previous claim of 22,000 to tell us that there are 40,000 madressahs in Pakistan.

A study of education and militancy in Pakistan, conducted by the Washington-based Brookings Institution a few years ago, found that there is a small proportion of students who attend religious seminaries full time. It argued that as madressahs account for only a tiny fraction of student enrolment, they can hardly pose a major obstacle to high-quality education and stability in Pakistan. According to the study, government schools still cater to 64-67pc of education requirements, though the quality of education is poor. Meanwhile 29-33pc children study in private schools and only 7pc are enrolled in madressahs. Some religious scholars estimate the total number of madressahs in Pakistan, including those with fewer students, as being not more than 10,000. The study, however, did not find any specific link between militancy and the madressah sector in Pakistan.

The state has no vision, policy or strategy to deal with the madressah sector.
It is interesting to note that the madressah sector attracts huge amounts of charity compared to its size. Where does this money go? One answer is that these funds are helping the madressah sector ‘encroach’ upon the mainstream or formal education sector. A few religious parties and big madressahs have established what they call ‘modern Islamic schools’. It is not clear if the government conceives the mainstreaming of madressahs in a similar manner.

While we know a lot about ghost schools in Sindh, there is no attempt to investigate the madressahs that only exist on paper or whose signboards we see along the highways. Indeed, there are many ghost madressahs in the country that are only used by ‘unknown’ people for the purpose of raising funds.

The expansion of the madressah sector in Pakistan has followed two distinct patterns. Large madressahs are located in commercial and industrial zones of the country, while comparatively smaller ones are situated along the main highways. Easy availability of funds is the obvious attraction offered by these locations. Most madressahs along major highways are located near bus stops or small highway suburbs, and these make announcements asking for donations all day long. As far as foreign funding to madressahs is concerned, a major chunk of it goes to the big madressahs chains. Therefore, it is not difficult for the state to track the foreign sources of funding to madressahs.

Despite all the hype about the increase in their numbers, madressahs face challenges in terms of enrolment. The number of local students is still low even in big madressahs. Madressah students mainly hail from poverty-stricken or conflict-hit areas of the country.

Another aspect of the madressah sector is its exploitation by the religious elite who tend to use madressahs as their political constituency and source of strength and power. The religious elite resist any action against madressahs, in the belief that it will create resentment and build internal pressure on them.

Interestingly, although they give an impression that there is complete unity and harmony amongst them at the institutional level this is not true. One example is the attempts at internal reform in madressahs, which have not been a smooth and uniform process. Madressahs are like private enterprises with their principals or administrators exercising a great deal of freedom and authority. Even their respective educational boards, or wafaqs, cannot intervene. The educational boards are responsible only for holding examinations in the affiliated madressahs.

Madressahs deem themselves to be the protectors of Islam, or at least their own brand of Islam. They disagree with the notion that they are encouraging extremism in any form. In a survey conducted by the Pak Institute for Peace Studies, 79pc of madressah teachers denied any link between madressahs and extremism and emphasised the distinction between militant seminaries and ‘normal’ madressahs. Of the respondents, 8pc believed that some madressahs played a role in promoting extremism but also pointed out that such seminaries were close to the government and even received support from the West. Even those that identified extremism as a real problem refused to acknowledge that madressahs play a role in promoting it.

The madressah sector poses diverse challenges ranging from insecurity and sectarian violence to education and social transformation of society. But the government is unclear about what to do about this sector of education, which evidence links to many security-related problems. No one even knows who is responsible for oversight of the madressah sector: the interior and religious affairs ministries try to put the ‘burden’ on each other. After the 18th Amendment, education has become a provincial subject. But most provinces have not come up with relevant legislation, while those which have, have ignored madressahs.

The provinces have to take up the responsibility, and evolve strategies for maintaining a database on madressahs, managing the registration process, mainstreaming the madressah sector and introducing curriculum reforms. Security is also a provincial subject, and they must be more vigilant on this front and develop a better monitoring system for the small fraction of madressahs linked to terrorism.
The madressah factor
by Muhammad Amir Rana, dawn.com
The writer is a security analyst.

Terrorism - Regional & Religious solutions

The monster of extremism and terrorism has domestic roots but it is equally fed and sustained by transnational and trans-border networks of individuals, groups and movements in Pakistan. It is not just private persons and entities within the broader Middle Eastern region giving support to religious and secular organisations, but the secret and not-so-secret involvement of states in support of their objectives and interest that makes the challenge of terrorism so messy and complex. Another very important dimension of this challenge is the scale and the long time over which it has grown with the usual apathy of our ruling groups. No political leader has ever stood firmly with a resolve to take the extremism challenge as one of the key priorities; it was as if his challenge was for others to address. In times of intense political rivalry between the two major political parties in a decade-long confrontation, each one of them showed no hesitation in courting the support of groups and individuals with ties to extremist organisations.
The challenge of extremism that has transformed itself into sectarian terrorism is a national problem first, but at the same time, it is a regional problem. The rise of the Islamic State (IS) in parts of strife-stricken Iraq, Libya, Syria and Yemen and its chronicles of atrocities against anyone branded or even suspected as ‘enemy’ has shocked the whole world, but most importantly, it has pushed a number of regional states to cooperate and coordinate their intelligence and military operations against the IS. A good number of regional countries have very courageously opted to be part of an international coalition to defeat the IS. The groups associated with the IS in the Middle East may also find support in Afghanistan and Pakistan among similar groups and movements that might share their world view and the ‘ideal’ state they are trying to establish. There are indications that some groups have already aligned with the IS in this region as well. Not doing so, will run counter to logic and the history of transnational links between the militants in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and the Middle East.
For decades, Afghanistan and Pakistan have witnessed a big informal flow of funds, militants and dangerous ideas from the extended Middle East. The problem is that rivalry between Iran and Saudi Arabia, which is secular in its ends but essentially sectarian in its means, within the Middle East has always found its expression through similar instruments and organisations in our region. Focusing overly on the cycles of the Afghan wars and weakening of the state there and the nominal presence of the Pakistani state in the frontier regions, we tend to look at the pull factors and the vacuum that militant organisations have filled. No less important is the Middle Eastern push factor that comes with the funds, ideas and organisational support in many forms.
While Pakistan and its society struggles to face the challenge of extremism through its fresh resolve and under a consensual, multi-pronged National Action Plan, we need to think of broader response with essential regional and international ingredients. Regionally, close relations with Afghanistan hold the key to our success against extremism and terrorism. Employing of proxies by either side for decades in troubled times of the other has not worked and will never work. Hopefully, we are moving towards that realisation — this holds the key to cultivating a climate of a strong relationship between the two.
It is equally important, though difficult, to plug the holes through which Middle Eastern money and the sectarian divide enter our society. The traditional state apathy towards this issue has greatly contributed to the strength of sectarian forces. A multipronged counterterrorism strategy at home and cooperation with Afghanistan and other regional states will give Pakistan a better handle on the extremism challenge.
Published in The Express Tribune, February 18th, 2015.
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Defeat religious terrorism with power of Islam:
هزيمة الإرهاب الديني مع قوة الإسلام:
Please analyse , consider all aspects, reject or accept with logic, improve & propose alternate if disagree. Take your time
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انتہا پسندی کے مسائل اور علاقائی طاقتیں
دہشت گردی اور انتہا پسندی کے عفریت کے وجود میں آنے کی وجوہ یقینی طور پر مقامی ہیں لیکن اسے پالنے اور تقویت دینے میں دیگر ممالک میں موجود گروہوں اور افراد کی معاونت بھی حاصل ہے۔ پاکستان میں کام کرنے والی مختلف تنظیمیں اور تحریکیں بھی اس میں اپنا اپنا حصہ ڈالتی ہیں۔ صرف مشرق ِ وسطیٰ کے ممالک سے تعلق رکھنے والے افراد یا نجی تنظیمیں ہی نہیں بلکہ کچھ ریاستیں بھی خفیہ طور پر(جو دراصل اتنی خفیہ بھی نہیں ہوتیں) ایسے گروہوں کی مدد کرتی ہیں جو ان کے مقاصد کے حصول میں معاون ثابت ہوتے ہیں۔ اس وجہ سے دہشت گردی کا مسئلہ انتہائی پیچیدہ ہوجاتا ہے کیونکہ پاکستان کھل کر ان ریاستوںسے بات نہیں کرتا۔
اس چیلنج کا ایک اور اہم پہلو اس کا وسیع سکیل اور وہ مدت ہے جس میں حکمران طبقوں کی روایتی غفلت اور بے حسی کی وجہ سے اسے پھلنے پھولنے اور اپنی جڑیں مزید گہری کرنے کا موقع مل گیا۔ پشاور واقعے سے پہلے حکومتوں میں شامل کسی قابل ِ ذکرگروہ یا سیاسی رہنما نے انتہا پسندی کو کچلنے کے لیے سنجیدگی کا مظاہرہ نہیں کیا تھا۔ اس معاملے سے اغماض کی پالیسی برتی گئی یہاں تک کہ اس نے ہماری سلامتی کو چیلنج کرنا شروع کردیا۔ دوبڑی سیاسی جماعتوں کے درمیان ہونے والی ایک عشرے پر محیط رسہ کشی کے دوران، دونوں نے اپنے اپنے دور میں انتہاپسندوں کو ناراض نہ کرنے میں ہی عافیت گردانی۔ بلکہ بعض نے تو سیاسی مفاد کے لیے انتہا پسند تنظیموں سے تعاون بھی طلب کیا۔اس کے بعد ظاہر ہے کہ ان کے خلاف کارروائی کی گنجائش نہیں نکلتی تھی۔
انتہا پسندی کا چیلنج فرقہ واریت اور دہشت گردی کو فروغ دیتا ہے۔ یہ ہمارا قومی مسئلہ تو ہے لیکن اس کے ساتھ ساتھ یہ علاقائی مسئلہ بھی ہے۔ عراق، شام، لیبیا اور یمن میں داعش کا سراٹھانا کوئی اچنبھے کی بات نہیں ۔ یہ دراصل مختلف ریاستوں کی دیرینہ پالیسیوں کا شاخسانہ ہے۔ اس کی جڑیں عقیدے کی غلط تشریح کے ساتھ ساتھ مسلک اور مذہبی منافرت میں گڑی ہیں۔ آج صورت ِحال یہ ہے کہ داعش کی سفاکیت سے وہ ریاستیں بھی خطرہ محسوس کررہی ہیںجو اس کی پیداوار کی ذمہ دار تھیں۔ چنانچہ آج بہت سی علاقائی ریاستیں اپنے انٹیلی جنس اور فوجی ذرائع یک جان کرتے ہوئے داعش کے خلاف کارروائی کرتی دکھائی دیتی ہیں۔ کچھ علاقائی ریاستوں نے ایک قدم آگے بڑھتے ہوئے داعش کے خلاف بننے والے عالمی اتحاد میں بھی شمولیت اختیار کی ہے تاکہ اس فتنے کوجلد از جلد کچلا جاسکے۔
داعش سے الحاق رکھنے والے گروہوں کو افغانستان اور پاکستان سے بھی حمایت مل سکتی ہے کیونکہ یہاںموجود انتہا پسندگروہ بھی انہی نظریات کے حامل ہیں جو داعش کے ہیں۔ ان سب کا مقصد ایک اسلامی خلافت کا قیام ہے۔ پاکستان میں کچھ عرصے سے اس کے لیے فکری طور پر زمین تیار کی جارہی تھی۔ کچھ ایسے اشارے ملتے ہیں کہ یہاں کے کچھ مقامی گروہ داعش کے ساتھ روابط قائم کرچکے ہیں ۔داعش کے حق میں ملک کے کچھ مخصوص حصوں میں کی جانے والی وال چاکنگ کی خبریں بھی آتی رہتی ہیں۔کسی کو اس کا مقامی امیر مقرر کیے جانے کی بازگشت بھی سنائی دیتی ہے۔ خدامعلوم ان خبروں میں کتنی صداقت ہے لیکن ایک بات پورے وثوق سے کہی جاسکتی ہے کہ پاکستان اور افغانستان میںکام کرنے والے انتہا پسندگروہوں کے مشرق ِ وسطیٰ کے روابط کی تاریخ موجود رہی ہے۔ اس سے انکار کرنا حقیقت سے آنکھیں چرانے کے مترادف ہوگا۔
کئی عشروں سے پاکستان اور افغانستان میں مشرق ِ وسطیٰ سے فنڈز کا بھاری بہائو جاری ہے۔ اس کازیادہ تر رخ انتہا پسند گروہوں کی طرف ہے کیونکہ وہ مسلک اور نظریات کے اعتبار سے مشرق ِ وسطیٰ کی ریاستوں کے قریب ہیں۔ ایک طرح سے پاکستان متحارب مسالک کا میدان ِ جنگ بن چکا ہے۔ اس کی وجہ دو ممالک کی نظریاتی دشمنی ہے۔ اس میں کوئی شک نہیں کہ اس نظریاتی کشمکش کی بنیادی وجہ مذہب نہیں بلکہ کمرشل تصورات ہیں ،تاہم ان کے لیے فرقہ وارانہ تنائو کا ہتھیار استعمال کیا جاتا ہے۔ افغان جنگوں کی وجہ سے پاکستانی ریاست کے شمالی مغربی سرحدی علاقوں میں حکومت کی عملداری برائے نام رہ گئی۔ ان علاقوں میں انتہا پسند جمع ہوگئے۔ اس کو فنڈز فراہم کرنے میں مشرق ِ وسطیٰ کے کردار کو نظرانداز نہیں کیا جاسکتا۔ اگرچہ ایسا سوویت یونین اور کمیونزم کے خلاف جہاد کے لیے کیا گیا تھا لیکن فنڈز کی فراہمی کے لیے ہم مسلک گروہوں کا ہی انتخاب کیا گیا اوریہ محض اتفاق نہیں تھا۔
جس دوران پاکستان اور اس کا معاشرہ انتہا پسندی کے چیلنج سے نبردآزما ہونے کے لیے ہاتھ پائوں ماررہا ہے، ہمیں اس کے خلاف ایک تازہ بیانیے کی ضرورت ہے۔ نیشنل ایکشن پلان پر عمل کیا جارہا ہے اور یہ اچھی پیش رفت ہے لیکن ہمیں وسیع تر خطوط پر سوچنے کی ضرورت ہے کہ یہ مسئلہ علاقائی جہت رکھتا ہے۔ اس لیے علاقائی طاقتوں کو اس میں شامل نہ کرنا غلطی ہوگی۔ سب سے پہلے ہمیں افغانستان کے ساتھ اچھے اور قریبی تعلقات درکار ہیں ۔ اس کے بعد ہی ہم انتہا پسندی اور دہشت گردی کے خلاف کامیابی کی امید کرسکتے ہیں۔ اس کے علاوہ بھارت کے ساتھ اچھے تعلقات بھی ضروری ہیں کیونکہ دشمنی اور تنائو کی وجہ سے پراکسی جنگ کا تصور ابھرتا ہے۔ اس کے لیے انتہا پسند گروہ ناگزیر ہوجاتے ہیں۔ اس وقت ، جبکہ فوجی آپریشن کامیابی سے جارہی ہے، سفارتی محاذ سے بھی کچھ اچھی خبریں آرہی ہیں۔ تاہم مشکل لیکن اہم قدم مشرق ِوسطیٰ کی طرف سے آنے والے نظریات اور فنڈز کو روکنا ہے۔ اگر ریاست نے اس طرف چشم پوشی کی پالیسی جاری رکھی تو بہت دیر ہوجائے گی اور فرقہ وارانہ طاقتیں مزید مضبوط ہوجائیں گی۔اگر افغانستان اور دیگر ریاستوں کا تعاون شامل رہے تو ان طاقتوں کی حوصلہ شکنی ہوگی اوراُنہیں شکست دینا آسان ہوجائے گا۔ تاہم اس وقت جبکہ فوج اپنا کام کررہی ہے، حکومت کے کرنے کے بھی بہت سے کام ہیں۔ کیا آنے والے دنوں میں ہم حکومت کو یہ مشکل لیکن ضروری کام سرانجام دیتے دیکھیں گے؟

اسلام کے نام پر فسادی جنگ کا خاتمہ صرف اسلام سے:

اسلام ، جہاد کے نام پر فساد کا خاتمہ کرنے کے لءیے محض مذمتی قراردادیں، کمیٹاں،دھواںدار تقریریں، بیانات، کانفرسیں، قوانین، فوجی  کاروائیاں، فوجی عدالتیں   وغیرہ کافی نہیں. یہ ایک مکمل قومی، مذھبی جنگ ہے(Total War).
  مسلمان حکمران علماء کرام کی مدد سے  تکفیری فسادیوں اور ان کے ھمدردوں کے خلاف خالی فتووں کے علاوہ کھلم کھلا اعلان جہاد کریں جس میں ہر مسلمان جان، مال، قلم یا کسی اور متفقہ طریقے سے  حکومت کی مدد (غیر سرکاری طور پر نہیں)  سے حصہ لے .

انشا ء اللہ امت مسلمہ اس سازش کو تباہ کر کہ امن قاءم  کر لیں گے. یہ کوءی سیاسی جزباتی نعرہ نہیں ایک ممکن سنجیدہ حل ہے اہل دانش اس معاملہ پر ٹھنڈےدل و دماغ سے غور و فکرکریں اور  ممکن عملی اقدام تجویز کریں. پیغام پھیلاءیں پر امن دباءو ڈالیں.

مَّن يَشْفَعْ شَفَاعَةً حَسَنَةً يَكُن لَّهُ نَصِيبٌ مِّنْهَا ۖ وَمَن يَشْفَعْ شَفَاعَةً سَيِّئَةً يَكُن لَّهُ كِفْلٌ مِّنْهَا ۗ وَكَانَ اللَّـهُ عَلَىٰ كُلِّ شَيْءٍ مُّقِيتًا
جو بھلائی کی سفارش کریگا وہ اس میں سے حصہ پائے گا اور جو برائی کی سفارش کرے گا وہ اس میں سے حصہ پائے گا، اور اللہ ہر چیز پر نظر رکھنے والا ہے(قرآن:4:85)
Takfiri Khawarji Terrorism :
http://peace-forum.blogspot.com/2015/02/defeat-religious-terrorism-with-power.html?m=1
http://flip.it/kiJqd
http://Takfiritaliban.blogspot.com