Toying with reintegration of Terrorists and De-Radicalization

THE radicalisation process not only changes a person’s worldview, it also alters their personal philosophy on life. I once asked a radical whether he would like to return to a normal life. He could not comprehend the question, even after I rephrased it several times. While he had developed differences with his leadership and colleagues, conceiving of a life beyond militancy was hard for him. When he finally got my point, he laughed. Not about his life, but about the ‘poor normal lives’ of people like myself.

It always surprises me when I hear of a hardcore militant wanting to return to the mainstream fold. It was hard to believe when the head of the Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan’s (TTP) Punjab chapter Asmatullah Muawiya was given amnesty. The reported surrender of Jamaatul Ahrar’s (JuA) spokesperson Ehsanullah Ehsan is even more surprising. This doesn’t mean that deradicalisation is impossible; there are examples across the world and in Pakistan that militants quit violence, but it usually happens due to three factors.

First, security agencies, using coercion and incentives, succeed in bringing some violent radicals back into mainstream society, mainly to use as propaganda tools against their former associates and similar non-state actors.

It is clear that the state lacks a clear, comprehensive deradicalisation policy.
Second, internal debates on theological and political issues, particularly evident in prisons, may change the minds of some militants, who then adopt non-violent means to pursue their objectives. In Cairo’s prisons, for instance, Al Gama’a al-Islamiyya militants came up with what they called a ‘revision’ and many denounced the violent path. This doesn’t mean that putting militants in the same cells will necessarily trigger deradicalisation — in many cases, it triggers ultra-radicalisation, as is happening in Pakistan’s prisons and as happened in Camp Buccaf, Iraq, where despite deradicalisation programmes the militant Islamic State group was nurtured.

Third, deradicalisation occurs when ideological, political and socioeconomic situations change and non-state actors are provided opportunities to reintegrate. There are many examples from Africa to Latin America.

The Philippines’ Mindanao (now Bangsamoro) peace process is a recent example; although it has a long history of successes and failures, the government and Moro freedom fighters are heading in the right direction. The most important thing about the Moro is that it is a separatist – not ideologically regional or global – movement. Lebanon’s Hezbollah is another example of a strong ideological and religious movement without apparent global ambitions. Despite its political mainstreaming, however, the group still behaves like a non-state actor. It may have territorial reasons for this, as ideological movements believe in ultimate victory.

I once asked Nasir Abbas similar questions about the factors behind his return to normal life. A former senior member of Indonesian militant group Jemaah Islamiyah, Nasir is now helping the government to rehabilitate terrorist detainees in Jakarta. He recounted many reasons, including some popular notions of deradicalisation — he was unhappy with the civilian causalities of bombings, and his group’s flawed political and ideological arguments for it, etc. But the most revealing reason was that his associates began to distrust him. For him, this was the deciding factor in his exit.

As far as Ehsanullah’s case is concerned, there is little information about the real motivations behind his return. One media report indicated that his close friend Asmatullah convinced him to quit JuA. One thing, however, is clear: his return is not part of any comprehensive policy to reintegrate militants.

Some in the media and policy circles argue that religiously inspired militants deserve the same amnesty granted to Baloch insurgents, but that the government has given the insurgents general amnesty is an incorrect assumption. Although political reconciliation in Balochistan was an important point in the National Action Plan, the establishment has so far shown little interest in reconciliation as it believes the insurgency is weakening anyway. There were reports that some Baloch groups were demanding much less compared to what the religious militants had once been demanding, which included jobs and the release of detainees. Although there is a huge difference between the Baloch insurgency and religiously inspired militancy in terms of scale, intensity and outreach, it is evident that the state has been showing less flexibility towards those who are tagged as anti-state.

It is also important to note that the concepts of disengagement, disarmament, demobilisation, de-radicalisation, rehabilitation and reintegration vary in functional attributes if not much in objectives, and many states have their own models and experiences. Pakistan’s context is unique; multiple types of violent and non-violent extremist groups operate here that have sectarian motives, global aspirations and local dreams. Many of them have been part of the state’s jihad project. So whenever there is debate on the soft components of counterterrorism in this country, the question of where to start such a process inevitably arises.

Recently, a working group of security experts in Islamabad debated the options and probabilities of reintegrating banned militant organisations. The group also listened to the points of view of the leaderships of two banned organisations. It reached the conclusion that it is parliament’s job to determine the direction of any reintegration plan. The group proposed that parliament constitute a high-powered, national-level truth and reconciliation commission to review the policies that produced militancy and to mainstream those willing to shun violence. This commission may deliberate on whether or not to identify wrongs committed in the past.

Most importantly, it was deliberated that such probabilities should only apply to those groups that are conventional in nature and labelled as proxies. The JuA spokesperson’s surrender and confession confuses the whole debate. The state has yet to chalk out any strategy of reintegration. Chances are few that a single surrender will trigger a trend similar to what happened in Algeria in 2005 after the enforcement of the Charter for Peace and National Reconciliation. However, it was not a general amnesty, and its people had endorsed the idea through a public referendum.

Now is the time for parliament to initiate debate on this issue. Otherwise, spoilers will continue toying with ideas like de-radicalisation and reintegration.
By MUHAMMAD AMIR RANA, The writer is a security analyst.

https://www.dawn.com/news/1331503/toying-with-reintegration

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Avenging Terror

IN a prescient statement to the UN Security Council on Feb 13, Pakistan’s permanent representative, after describing the actions taken to restrain terrorism in Pakistan, asserted: “What Pakistan continues to face today are externally supported terrorists.” As if on cue, successive terrorist attacks occurred in Lahore, Peshawar and Sehwan over the next three days.

Immediately after the atrocity at the shrine of Lal Shahbaz Qalandar in Sehwan, the ISPR spokesman said: “Recent terrorist acts are being executed on directions from hostile powers and from sanctuaries in Afghanistan. We shall defend and respond.” The army chief himself declared: “Each drop of the nation’s blood shall be revenged ... immediately. No more restraint for anyone.”

It is not always easy to avenge terror, or eliminate it, since the terrorists are often unknown or in hiding. This is not so in case of the recent terror strikes in Pakistan. We know the terrorists. The attacks have been claimed by the militant Islamic State group and the Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan’s subsidiary, Jamaatul Ahrar. We know where they are based: in sanctuaries in Afghanistan adjacent to Pakistan’s border. We know the ‘hostile powers’ that have sponsored these attacks: the intelligence agencies of Afghanistan and India.

Revenge is serious business. It must be exacted after cold calculation of the options, their effectiveness and probable consequences.

The sponsors of the terror war against Pakistan cannot be allowed impunity.
As a first step, the Torkham border crossing has been closed. This will punish the Afghan regime economically. But it may not punish the terrorists or their sponsors directly, nor meaningfully restrain their cross-border movement.

This will require full implementation of the plan to ‘seal’ the border with selective fencing, check posts and technological means to monitor cross-border infiltration. Adequate funds must be allocated to implement this plan expeditiously.

The speedy repatriation of the millions of Afghan refugees is another component of ‘defensive’ measures. Many terrorists are hiding in plain sight among the refugees. Repatriation has been slowed by UN appeals and by some Pakistani agencies on the refugee ‘gravy train’. Their resistance must be overcome. People or groups associated with militant movements and drugs and criminal mafias and the relatives of hostile Afghan leaders should be expelled forthwith.

GHQ has initiated a more direct response by demanding from the Afghan representatives in Islamabad that they take action against or hand over 76 identified terrorists who have been provided sanctuaries in Afghanistan. The demand made to Kabul was also conveyed to the US commander of the coalition forces in Afghanistan, since they exercise dominant influence over the Afghan regime and especially the Afghan intelligence agency, which is the main local sponsor of the anti-Pakistan terrorists. American whining about the Afghan Taliban and the Haqqani network should not be entertained until the US obliges its Kabul clients to take action against the TTP and IS terrorists targeting Pakistan.

Sartaj Aziz’s phone call to the Afghan national security adviser to urge cooperation against the ‘common threat’ of terrorism is unlikely to produce any result and may have detracted from the more robust message conveyed by GHQ to the Afghans. Pakistan’s counterterrorism cooperation with Kabul and the coalition to stabilise Afghanistan should be made conditional on their acting against the anti-Pakistan terrorists operating from Afghan territory.

Following the Foreign Office protest after the Lahore Mall atrocity, the Afghan charge d’affaires in Islamabad reportedly argued that the Kabul authorities could not be held accountable since there are large areas of Afghan territory that are outside its control. If this is indeed the case, and the Afghan National Army and the US-led coalition forces cannot act against the TTP and IS ‘safe havens’, Pakistan’s forces should be allowed to cross over and eliminate them. Most of these safe havens are within striking distance of the Pakistan-Afghan border.

If Kabul and the US refuse to act, or to facilitate a Pakistani operation, Pakistan may be left with no option but to take unilateral action against these safe havens and the terrorists hiding there. Other countries, like Iran or Turkey, would not hesitate to resort to such action if targeted by foreign-based terrorists. India is unlikely to use this as a pretext for cross-LoC ‘strikes’, given its vulnerability in held Kashmir.

The sponsors of the terror war against Pakistan — the Afghan and Indian intelligence agencies — cannot be allowed impunity. With the evidence in its hands, Pakistan can move the relevant UN Security Council bodies to have both these agencies declared sponsors of terrorism. At the very least, Pakistan should move the UN to conduct an impartial investigation into the role of these agencies in supporting the IS-linked TTP and its associates, as well as the Baloch insurgents. Pakistan’s agencies should no longer hesitate to reveal their ‘sources’ in establishing the sponsorship of terrorism by the Afghan and Indian agencies.

Nor can India be allowed to attack Pakistan with impunity in the west through Afghanistan. Pakistan should not foreclose the option of extending moral and material support to the ongoing indigenous Kashmiri freedom struggle. This struggle cannot be equated with terrorism; it is a legitimate movement for self-determination and implementation of UN Security Council resolutions. Pakistan’s support to the Kashmiri struggle is now both a political and moral responsibility and a strategic compulsion.

Threats and blandishments from India or its American friends cannot deflect Pakistan from protecting and promoting its own interests, objectives and security. An equitable peace with India — whe­ther in the West or the East — can be negotiated only if Pakistan displays courage and determination.

Everything must be done to avoid US sanctions. But many of the penalties entailed by sanctions have been already imposed against Pakistan, such as the halt in US military assistance and blockage of the so-called Coalition Support Funds. Unless Pakistan changes the equation, the price for restoring American largesse will be acceptance of the Indian-US agenda in South Asia. In the past, when under US sanctions, Pakistan has mobilised nationally to achieve its strategic goals, such as its nuclear and missile capabilities. These capabilities are its ultimate defence against external blackmail and aggression today. Pakistan’s leaders and its people must again rise to face the strategic challenges the nation confronts now.

BY MUNIR AKRAM — The writer is a former Pakistan ambassador to the UN.
Published in Dawn February 19th, 2017
Related: 
http://takfiritaliban.blogspot.com/
http://www.terrorism-research.com/
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Counter Narrative to Terrorism ?خوارج ، تکفیری دہشت گردی کے خلاف بیابیہ کی ضرورت

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فرار کب تک؟

پانی سر سے گزر چکا۔ حقائق تلخ ہیں لیکن اب سامنا کیے بغیر چارہ نہیں۔دہشت گردی کے تین اسباب ظاہر و باہر ہیں۔

National Counter-terrorism Narrative  >>>>>>

http://TakfiriTaliban.blogspot.com

https://PaighamPakistan.wordpress.com

 ایک دین کی وہ تعبیر جو اس وقت غالب ہے اور کم و بیش تمام مذہبی سیاسی جماعتیں جسے قبول کرتی ہیں، یہ الگ بات کہ کھل کر اعتراف نہ کریں۔ دوسرا قومی سلامتی کا وہ بیانیہ جو مذہب سے وابستہ ہے۔ تیسرا علاقائی سیاست جس میں دہشت گردی کو بطور ہتھیار استعمال کیا جا رہا ہے۔ تینوں اسباب کو سمجھے اور ان کا تدارک کیے بغیر اصلاح کا کوئی امکان نہیں۔

آ ج دین کی غالب تعبیر یہی ہے کہ اسلام سیاسی غلبے کے لیے آیا ہے اور اس کی جدوجہد مطالباتِ دین میں سے ہے۔

 ایک عالمی خلافت کا قیام مسلمانوں کا دینی فریضہ ہے۔ دنیا دو حصوں میں منقسم ہے۔ حزب اﷲ یعنی وہ مسلمان جو اس غلبے کے لیے متحرک ہیں۔ دوسرے حزب الشیطان۔ یہ وہ ہیں جو اسلام کو نہیں مانتے یا وہ مسلمان جو ان سے تعلقات رکھتے ہیں۔ قومی ریاست کا وجود اور موجودہ سرحدیں استعمار کی دَین ہیں‘ بطور مسلمان ہم جنہیں قبول کرنے کے پابند نہیں۔ ہم قربِ قیامت کے دور سے گزر رہے ہیں جس کے بارے میں پیش گوئیاں موجود ہیں کہ اس دور میں کفر اور اسلام کے مابین فیصلہ کن معرکہ برپا ہونا ہے۔ دنیا میں اس کے لیے صف بندی ہو رہی ہے۔ پاکستان کو اس معرکے میں مرکزی کردار ادا کرنا ہے۔ اسی وجہ سے قدرت نے پاکستان کو ایٹمی قوت بنایا ہے۔

دین کی یہ تعبیر زبان اور قلم سے پیش کی جاتی ہے۔ ہمارا میڈیا اس کی اشاعت و ترویج کرتا ہے۔ اس کے ماننے والے پاکستان میں اکثریت میں ہیں۔ ریاست نے اس کا کوئی متبادل بیانیہ مرتب نہیںکیا۔ وہ اس باب میں شدید ابہام کا شکار ہے۔ ریاست نہ تو اس بیانیے کی اشاعت کو روک سکی ہے اور نہ ہی اس کی غلطی واضح کر سکی ہے۔ پاکستان میں مذہبی سیاست کے علمبردار فی الجملہ اسی تعبیر کو مانتے ہیں۔

دوسرا سبب قومی سلامتی کا بیانیہ ہے جو مذہبی ہے۔

 پاکستان ایک قومی ریاست ہے جس میں مسلمانوں کی اکثریت ہے۔ ہم نے اس قومی ریاست کی سلامتی کے لیے جو بیانیہ ترتیب دیا‘ اس کی بنیاد مذہب میں ہے۔ اس قومی ریاست کے دفاع کو ہم جہاد کہتے ہیں۔ اس کے لیے اگر کوئی رضاکارانہ جدوجہد کرتا ہے تو ریاست اس کی تحسین اور تائید کرتی ہے۔ ریاست نے اس بات کو نظر انداز کیا کہ مذہب ایک عالمگیر وحدت کا نام ہے جو روحانی اساسات رکھتا ہے۔ مذہب کو اگر ایک ایسی قومی ریاست کے دفاع کے لیے استعمال کیا جائے جس کی متعین سرحدیں ہیں تو اس سے تضاد واقع ہو گا۔ قومی سلامتی کے دفاع کے لیے وہی بیانیہ اختیار کیا جا سکتا ہے جو اس کی سرحدوں میں مقید رہ سکے۔ مذہب یہ نہیں کہتا کہ صرف پاکستان کا دفاع کیا جائے اور افغانستان کا نہیں۔ کیا افغانستان مسلمانوں کا ملک نہیں ہے؟ جو آدمی مذہبی بنیادوں پر پاکستان کا دفاع کرتا ہے، اسے افغانستان کے دفاع سے کیسے روکا جا سکتا ہے؟ افسوس کہ ریاست نے تجربات کے باوجود اس پہلو کو نظر انداز کیا۔ ریاست کا دفاعی بیانیہ تا دمِ تحریر مذہب پر کھڑا ہے۔

تیسرا سبب علاقائی مفادات ہیں۔ 

افغانستان کے ساتھ ہمارے تعلقات کشیدہ ہیں۔ افغانستان کا الزام ہے کہ پاکستان کی سرزمین پر وہ لوگ موجود ہیں جو افغانستان میں دہشت گردی کے واقعات میں ملوث ہیں۔ اب دکھائی یہ دیتا ہے کہ جواباً افغانستان ان عناصر کے لیے پناہ گاہ بن چکا جو پاکستان میں دہشت گردی کے واقعات میں ملوث ہیں۔ دونوں ریاستیں، یہ تاثر ملتا ہے کہ قومی مفاد کے نام پر عوام کے جان و مال سے بے نیاز ہو رہی ہیں۔

ان اسباب پر اگر اتفاق رائے ہو تو حل تلاش کرنا آسان ہو جاتا ہے۔ پہلے سبب کا حل یہ ہے کہ منظم طریقے سے دین کی اس تعبیر کی غلطی کو واضح کیا جائے۔ ریاست اس باب میں اپنی ذمہ داری پوری کرے۔ نیشنل ایکشن پلان کے تحت، سب سے پہلے اس تعبیر کی اصلاح کو ہدف بنانا چاہیے تھا۔ اب تک ایسا نہیں ہو سکا۔ ریاست کے ذمہ داران ابھی تک ابہام کا شکار ہیں۔ یہی وجہ ہے کہ ان دہشت گردوں کو سہولت کار میسر ہیں۔ ریاست نے دہشت گردوں کو ہدف بنایا لیکن ان اسباب کو نہیں۔مذہبی سیاست کے علمبرداروںکو بھی اپنا نقطۂ نظر واضح کرنا ہو گا۔ انہیں بتانا ہو گا کہ کیا اس تعبیرِ دین کو وہ درست مانتے ہیں؟ اگر نہیں تو ان کا جوابی بیانیہ کیا ہے؟ میرے نزدیک اب لازم ہے کہ یہ جماعتیں اس باب میں اپنا موقف دو اور دو چار کی طرح قوم کے سامنے پیش کریں اور بتائیں کہ وہ داعش یا عسکری تنظیموں سے کیسے مختلف ہیں؟ ان کا اختلاف اگر ہے تو یہ نظری ہے یا حکمتِ عملی کا؟

دوسرا سبب بھی لازم ہے کہ نیشنل ایکشن پلان کا حصہ بنے۔ اگر قومی سلامتی کا وہی بیانیہ باقی رہنا ہے جس کی بنیاد مذہب پر ہے تو پھر عسکری تنظیموں کا راستہ نہیں روکا جا سکتا۔ عسکری تنظیمیں جب بن جاتی ہیں تو ان کی سرگرمیوں کو محدود رکھنا ممکن نہیں رہتا۔ پاکستان کی گزشتہ چالیس سالہ تاریخ اس کی شہادت ہے۔ لازم ہے کہ قومی سلامتی کے بیانیے میں عسکری ذمہ داری فوج اور ریاست کے پاس ہو۔ اس کے علاوہ کسی کو یہ حق نہ ہو کہ وہ دفاعِ پاکستان کے نام پر ہتھیار اٹھائے۔ اس کی ایک فرع یہ ہے کہ کسی سیاسی یا مذہبی جماعت کو یہ حق نہ ہو کہ وہ دفاع پاکستان کے باب میں ایسی پالیسی کو فروغ دے جو ریاست کی حکمت عملی سے متصادم ہو۔ پاکستان کی سلامتی کے لیے اب ناگزیر ہے کہ اسے قومی سلامتی کے خود ساختہ محافظوں سے نجات دلائی جائے۔

تیسرے سبب کے خاتمے کے لیے اب ناگزیر ہے کہ افغانستان کے ساتھ دو اور دو چار کی طرح بات کی جائے۔ دسمبر 2014ء کے حادثے کے بعد جنرل راحیل شریف افغانستان گئے تھے۔ بعد کے واقعات سے اندازہ ہوتا ہے کہ عدم اعتماد کی فضا ختم نہیں ہو سکی۔ اب ناگزیر ہے کہ افغانستان اور پاکستان یہ طے کریں کہ وہ ایک دوسرے کے خلاف اپنی سرزمین استعمال نہیں ہونے دیں گے۔ اس کے ساتھ یہ بھی لازم ہو گیا ہے کہ مجرموں کے باہمی تبادلے کا معاہدہ کیا جائے۔ محض فہرست دینے سے بات نہیں بنے گی۔ جواباً وہ ایک فہرست ہمیں تھما دیں گے۔

2017ء پاکستان کے لیے فیصلہ کن ہے۔ پاکستان کی معیشت ایک نئے دور میں داخل ہو چکی۔ ساری دنیا اعتراف کر رہی ہے کہ اب مستقبل پاکستان کا ہے۔ بھارت میں موجود تمام امکانات کو کھنگالا جا چکا ۔ اب دنیا کی نظرپاکستان پر ہے۔ اس مرحلے پر دہشت گردی ایک بار پھر پاکستان کے مفاد کے در پے ہے۔ اگر قومی سلامتی مطلوب ہے تو لازم ہے کہ قومی سلامتی کا نیا بیانیہ ترتیب دیا جائے۔ اس کے لیے ان تین اسباب کو ہدف بنائے بغیر کو ئی راستہ نہیں۔ ریاست کو اب منفعلانہ کے بجائے فاعلانہ کردار ادا کرنا ہو گا۔

By Khursheed Nadeem , Dunya.com.pk

Source  Dunya : http://dunya.com.pk/index.php/author/khursheed-nadeem/2017-02-18/18597/46227587#tab2

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1. Terrorism and solution? دہشت گردی اور اس کا حل ؟: دہشت گردی ایک اختلافی نظریہ ہے جس کی بہترین وضاحت اس قدیم کہاوت سے ہوتی ہے؛ “ایک شخص کا دہشت گرد دوسرے کے نزدیک آزادی کا مجاہد ہے”... 
2. National Counter-terrorism Narrative
3. http://takfiritaliban.blogspot.com

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Reviewing National Action Plan (NAP) against Terrorism in Pakistan

IN the plan to counter terrorism through the National Action Plan (NAP), 2016 was the second operational year. Towards the end of it, we are still mired in debate. After the December 2014 attack on Peshawar’s Army Public School (APS), it was hoped that the political and security leaderships would rationalise the country’s course of action. Sadly, that hope has only partially been realised.

Security institutions made a few adjustments in their operational strategy, but failed to completely transform their counterterrorism approach. The statistics show some improvements, for which every institution is trying to take the credit. Although a downward trend in incidents of terrorism has been apparent since 2010 — owing to multiple reasons — terrorists’ operational infrastructure and support networks, albeit weakened, remain intact.

The APS massacre has become part of bitter memories. NAP was the reflection of a collective pledge that state and society would not repeat past mistakes. Many have welcomed the fact that the mastermind of this crime was killed in a drone strike in Afghanistan this year. But has the Pakistani state changed its course of action?

The government has not seriously attempted to take internal security policy completely into its own hands.

Just a day before the APS anniversary, the judicial commission probing the Aug 8 Quetta hospital bombing put forth its findings, reminding us that old habits die hard. The Quetta hospital bombing was no less a tragedy than the APS one, but state institutions reacted differently. After the Peshawar atrocity, the nation spoke up clearly and loudly against the problem of internal militancy; NAP was an outcome of this realisation. But, apparently, that threat perception almost died by the time the Quetta hospital carnage occurred, where the old problem of externalising the threat became prominent. Indeed, the externalisation factor has become so strong again that state responses have become absurd, as also pointed out in the Justice Qazi Faez Isa inquiry commission report.

Apart from its findings on the Quetta bombing, the commission has come up with some comprehensive recommendations. However, it is not certain whether the government will take the advice seriously. The commission has suggested “NAP should be made into a proper plan, with clear goals, a comprehensive monitoring mechanism, and periodic reviewing”.

Implementation of NAP is a vital challenge that the government has continuously been avoiding. The lack of coordination and cooperation among state institutions and, in particular, the not-so-cordial civil-military relations remain a huge challenge.

However, the government has not made any serious attempt to take internal security policy completely into its own hands. While the government spent 2015 saying that NAP would take time to make progress, this year exposed the low capabilities of those heading internal security. Initially, they successfully shifted the pressure on to the police and its counterterrorism departments, using the National Counter -Terrorism Authority (Nacta) as a cover for their failures. The formation of NAP implementation committees was another tactic to keep shifting the burden of failure. Eventually, NAP has become a political gimmick.

After the Quetta hospital bombing, another implementation committee was formed, and retired Lt-Gen Nasser Khan Janjua was named its head. However, the interior minister has been insisting that the newly constituted NAP implementation committee was “merely an administrative body and both the interior ministry and Nacta will continue to have an oversight role in NAP’s implementation.”

Nobody ever asked about the fate of 16 committees on NAP implementation; the interior minister heads 13 of them. The head of the new NAP implementation committee formed regional committees in all four provinces, Azad Kashmir and Gilgit-Baltistan, despite knowing that provincial apex committees already existed to do the same job. October’s crucial meetings to review progress on both internal and external threats were also briefed by Mr Janjua. As reported in the media, he shifted the burden on to the provincial governments.

The Justice Isa commission recommended the activation of Nacta according to its constitutional mandate. Apparently, the authority showed some progress in 2016. It worked on a ‘red book’ of terrorists containing complete information on and profiles of them. It made available the list of banned organisations on its website and included two more groups on that list, the Lashkar-i-Jhangvi al-Aalmi and Jamaatul Ahrar; Nacta had included these two names when Justice Isa asked the federal government about their status. It rationalised the Fourth Schedule lists and advised banks to take immediate action against individuals on the lists. Nacta was also assigned the responsibility of developing the task force to curb terror financing.

Another initiative that the authority took was the preparation of new forms for madressah registration with the consultation of the Ittehad-i-Tanzeemat-i-Madaris Pakistan, an umbrella organisation of different madressah educational boards. However, despite promises and several announcements, it failed to activate the Joint Intelligence Directorate, which was its core mandate.

What Nacta has achieved is not because a certain institutional mechanism has been evolved where it is operating as an independent authority. The credit for these achievements may go to individuals; otherwise, the counterterrorism body is still operating as a subsidiary of the interior ministry.

A comprehensive review of NAP’s implementation and state responses may reveal more shortcomings in counterterrorism approaches. The state has also failed to address structural issues — crucially, the handling of banned organisations.

The exact level of extremism and potential of terrorist outfits cannot be measured until the complete enforcement of the laws referring to banned organisations. The reason is that groups involved in terrorism get their human resource from them. Banned organisations provide not only ideological legitimacy to terrorist groups but also a conducive environment for their operations. Additionally, banned organisations have encroached on far-right territory and, if this process continues, they will erode the socio-cultural fabric of society.

Threat perception is not a tricky thing and it does not require a tragedy to correct it. It only requires vision, vigilance, and commitment. Otherwise, the National Action Plan remains merely a bunch of documents.

The writer is a security analyst.

Muhammad Amir Rana is a security analyst. He is the Director of Pak Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS), Islamabad, Pakistan.

http://www.dawn.com/news/1302942/another-year-of-nap

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2 YEARS after initiating the National Action Plan, its ownership, implementation and efficacy are being extensively debated. This review has acquired an added urgency in the wake of the Charsadda attack.

The ideal implementation of NAP requires institutional, structural adjustments. An analysis proves that implementation requires multidimensional interventions.

Point one: Execution of convicted terrorists pertains to the ministry of interior, the provincial prisons departments, home departments and the judiciary.

Choking funds for militancy has been a dormant area.
Point two: To ensure conviction and quick disposal of terrorism-related cases, military courts were established via the 21st Amend­­ment. To enhance the efficacy of the existing anti-terrorism courts and reduce the backlog of cases in Sindh, the apex committee recently decided to instal 30 additional courts.

Point three: This reiterates the resolve that armed militias won’t be allowed to operate. It conforms with Article 256 of the Constitution. In Fata, the army dismantled the infrastructure and training facilities of such militias. In Karachi, the Rangers and police jointly reduced the operational space for such forces.

Point four: Strengthening and activating Nacta lies in the federal government’s do­main. A full-time police officer has been entrusted with the task of hiring professionals. A joint intelligence directorate will start functioning in June 2016.

Point five: Countering hate speech and extremist material is the shared jurisdiction of the district administration, police and special branches of the provincial police. The situation warrants that all those who draft, print and distribute such material be nabbed.

Point six: Choking financing for militant groups remained a dormant area. To ensure stern actions against the facilitators and financiers of militancy, the government recently decided to establish the National Terrorists Financing Investigation Cell to track financial transactions meant to fund extremism and terrorism. This requires the collective efforts of the State Bank, the finance and interior ministries, the banking sector and FIA.

Point seven: In acting against the re-emergence of proscribed groups, the ministries of foreign affairs and interior have already notified such organisations. In the provinces, it’s the responsibility of the Counterterrorism Department, Special Branch, police and administration to reduce the room for such groups. It is also their joint responsibility to ensure they don’t resurface with new names.

Point eight: Raising and deploying a dedicated CT force is linked to the provinces. Though such forces are now in the field, they must be under a dedicated command and not employed for VIP duties etc.

Point nine: Taking effective steps against religious persecution requires practical steps by the provinces. Nacta is planning a process to assess the volume, spread and severity of religious persecution in the country and then draft recommendations for policymakers.

Point 10: Registration and regulation of madressahs is another ideal that remains to be achieved. To monitor progress on madressah reforms, KP recently established district monitoring committees.

Point 11: Ban on glorification of terrorism and militant groups through print and electronic media is the responsibility of Pemra and media gatekeepers. The drafting of the Electronic Media Code of Conduct is a positive intervention. The code also incorporates the rights of victims.

Point 12: After clearing out most of Fata to entrust its administration to a civilian set-up, recently a parliamentary committee has been tasked to suggest reforms in the tribal areas. Imple­mentation is in the hands of the centre.

Point 13: Dismantling communication networks of militant groups in Fata is being successfully carried out by the army.

Point 14: Measures against internet and social media abuse for terr­­orism purposes is the domain of the FIA’s cybercrime unit and PTA. Apart from legal intervention, the capacity-building of investigators is required. The public must be educated about the procedure of lodging complaints relating to cybercrime.

Point 15: Where zero tolerance for militancy in Punjab is concerned, although action has been taken, intensified intelligence-led operations are still needed.

Point 16: Taking the ongoing operation in Karachi to its logical conclusion, the federal agencies FIA, NAB and Rangers are actively assisting the Sindh government.

Point 17: To make reconciliation a success in Balochistan is the responsibility of the centre, the provincial government and the political parties. Though the pace is slow, efforts are afoot.

Point 18: Dealing firmly with sectarian militants pertains to home departments, police and special branches.

Point 19: The policy on Afghan refugees rests with the Ministry of States and Frontier Regions, the Foreign Office and the provinces.

Point 20: Reforming the criminal justice system is primarily the provinces’ task.

Reconciliation, de-radicalisation and de-weaponisation also need to be incorporated as top priorities.

Reviewing NAP, By  MOHAMMAD ALI BABAKHEL. The writer is a police officer.

Dawn: http://www.dawn.com/news/1234992/reviewing-nap

Madrassas: behind closed doors: By Victor Mallet

Are south Asia’s Islamic schools causing a surge in extremism?

Islamic leaders retort that the whole point of most seminaries is to train scholars and holy men, and ask why schools whose ultra-conservative curricula have been unchanged for centuries are being blamed for modern-day terrorism. They, and academics sceptical about the “factories of terror” rhetoric, also note that only a tiny proportion of Asian Muslims attend madrassas.

Christine Fair, an associate professor at Georgetown University in the US and an expert on Pakistan, delights in debunking misconceptions about the country and its madrassas. Few Pakistanis, she says, actually attend madrassas, and those who do typically only go for a couple of years, while violent extremists are not destitute illiterates but disproportionately well-educated.
Nevertheless, she has concluded that Deobandis are indeed the largest source of violence in the country and that Deobandi madrassas are increasing faster than others. What is more, the latest data collected contradicts earlier conclusions that madrassa attendance is not correlated with terrorism. “They don’t produce terrorists, but what they do is predict support for terrorists,” she says, suggesting that militant parents, including mothers, are more likely to place their children in madrassas. “I’ve had to do a volte-face on this. Just going to a madrassa [means that] you are more disposed to supporting these kinds of groups.”

Before evening prayers in Deoband, one of the students, 19-year-old Mohammed Abu Umamah, cheerfully confronts us outside the marble-paved mosque. He repeats Madani’s message of peace. “Some people in Europe are presenting the wrong image of Islam, insisting that Islam is the religion of terrorism,” he tells us. “But Islam teaches peace and Islam condemns the killing of any person.”
Across the region, however, from the Maldives to central Asia, hundreds of millions of moderate Muslims are increasingly alarmed about the spread of violent extremism in their own societies. Deoband may be preaching the importance of peace, but its mosques and madrassas are where many of the most violent militants spent their formative years, and the schools continue to proliferate. “The number of madrassas [in India] has multiplied four or five times in the last 70 years,” says Madani proudly, “and mosques by 10 times.” The signs are that madrassas will continue to multiply in south Asia for years to come.
Victor Mallet is the FT’s south Asia bureau chief
Photographs: Adeel Halim; Victor Mallet
Read full article: http://www.ft.com/cms/s/2/d807f15a-7db0-11e5-98fb-5a6d4728f74e.html#slide0

Related:

Genesis of Terror & Road to Peace

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