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Pakistan: Need for Classical conditioning for Development and progress

According to the English philosopher John Locke, human nature is like a `tabula rasa` or a blank slate. He believed that human nature is dependent on a good or bad environment. So if the state provides basic needs to people, the pleasant environment will reflect in the improved behaviour of the people. They will respect moral values and preserve their dignity and virtues. Based on this philosophy, the Western states have reformed education and health, thus positively impacting the lifestyle of people. The ruling classes of Pakistan should also introduce reforms for education and health for the common man. This would change the human nature positively across the country. Failure to do so means the existing rate of decline will only pick up pace. 

In an endeavour to understand human nature, thinkers and philosophers debate its changeability. Historical ac-counts of different nations show that although customs, traditions, culture, religious practice and law may control human behaviour, the reaction and attitude of a nation towards the society is influenced by economic and political progress.

As long as political institutions are stable and the economic system is strong enough to provide basic needs to people, societies sustain moral values. But when political and economic systems collapse, morality and legal systems also degenerate, resulting in chaos and disorder.

Greek historian Thucydides, in his book The History of the Peloponnesian Wars, compares the Athenians during peace and prosperity with the crisis they confronted during the plague.

Prior to the epidemic, the Athenians valued their freedom, democratic reforms and their victories in war. Their leader Pericles delivered the famous funeral oration and honoured those who were kil-led in the battlefield while defending the Republic of Athens. He praised the virtues of the city and its traditions and customs, creating a sense of pride among the audience.

Culturally superior to others, the Athenian society was a paragon of virtue and honour.

According to Thucydides` account of the war, the situation changed dramatically in the fifth century. Soon after the famous speech by Pericles, Athens was struck by a plague. This was when the Peloponnesian war refugees from the neighbouring villages and towns took shelter within the city of Athens. The overcrowding, hot and humid weather conditions, poor water supply and no sewerage led to the spread of the deadly virus.

Pericles himself died in the epidemic along with thousands of people, leaving behind a chaotic city.

In the absence of preventive measures and remedies, the disease rapidly spread through the city.

Dead bodies lay everywhere and people would throw corpses in the burning funeral pyres of other dead people, violating the tradition and custom of funerals.The plague destroyed the entire fabric of society which according to Thucydides, was the worst aspect of the plague. People abandoned the dead along with their sick friends and family. As self interest overpowered the feelings of fraternity and brotherhood, the sense of honour and sharing with others disappeared.

Some people took full advantage of the plague and the suffering and violated all social norms. They plundered, pillaged and accumulated wealth, enjoying the revelry and debauchery.

This account of events shows that human nature changes according to changing circumstances.

People behave differently in times of peace and prosperity as compared to times of war, famine, drought and pestilence.

History shows that when a nation progresses, the people are dignified.

But when the nation stagnates, so does the character of its people.

In view of this historical background, when we study the history of Pakistan we find that the behaviour of its people has changed with political and economic vicissitude.In its early history, the moral situation of the society had not degenerated so much as it has presently.The institutions worked efficiently, bureaucrats were not (that) corrupt and the politicians, although ac-cused of inefficiency, were not utterly venal. This is of course a generalisation, but a somewhat accurateone at that.

Repeated military interventions, wars and political in-fighting completely changed the structure and values of the society, resulting in disorder and chaos. The decline and failure of society has affected the behaviour of people. Moral values have lost their impact while self-interest has become the leitmotif for success.

The behaviour of people can only change for the better with economic and political stability.

According to the English philosopher John Locke, human nature is like a `tabula rasa` or a blank slate.

He believed that human nature is dependent on a good or bad environment. So if the state provides basic needs to people, the pleasant environment will reflect in the improved behaviour of the people.

They will respect moral values and preserve their dignity and virtues.

Based on this philosophy, the Western states have reformed education and health, thus positively impacting the lifestyle of people.

The ruling classes of Pakistan should also introduce reforms for education and health for the common man. This would change the human nature positively across the country. Failure to do so means the existing rate of decline will only pick up pace. 
By Mubarak Ali: http://epaper.dawn.com/DetailImage.php?StoryImage=27_10_2013_424_003
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Decline and Fall of Nations - Open Warning

After studying the process of the decline and degeneration of a society, one can detect the elements which cause this downfall. The first, and most important sign, is the collapse of moral values. Once they are weakened in, or wiped out from a society, individuals are free to indulge in all sorts of corruption with any social stigma. There is no condemnation or boycott of those who violate moral traditions. This absence of morality encourages all the hitherto hidden and repressed vices of an individual to appear to the eventual detriment of society.

The second sign is the increased emphasis on self interest. National interest becomes redundant (and unfashionable) and people, in order to survive, follow the path of self interest. At this stage it become easy to betray the nation and collaborate with foreign powers, as well as domestic enemies of the state.

The third sign is a preference for wearing your religion on your sleeve. People begin to show their religious devotion outwardly without having any real faith in religious teachings. The manifestation of this preference for form over function is an increase in ‘showy’ religious processions, celebrations, sermons and distribution of religious tract and pamphlets. The corollary is that the actual teachings of the creed are neglected.

The fourth sign is the weakness of state power which allows people to indulge in all sorts of criminal activities without any fear of punishment. The judiciary fails to maintain justice; the army and police become powerless to enforce law and order. The result is those who are powerful form mafias and militias, illegal organisations which then dominate society and force the relatively weak (through terror and coercion) to obey them rather to look to state for protection.

The fifth sign is the loss of creativity. Artists, intellectuals, musicians, architects, sculptors and scientists are not able to invent or contribute anything new. They survive on imitation alone, leading society towards backwardness and degeneration.

The sixth sign is that society becomes so shallow that it fails to produce any people of substance. The giants vanish and pygmies rule over all.

We experienced this very process in the decline and fall of the Mughal empire. After the death of Alamgir in 1707, the Mughal empire rapidly degenerated. A succession of rulers came and went, all incapable of governing and controlling the state. Corruption, debauchery, intrigues and self interest prevailed. Therefore, we find that nobles were ready to collaborate with invaders like Nadir Shah and Ahmad Shah Abdali. When the East India Company appeared on the political scene, there was no dearth of Mir Jafars.

During this period, people, not feeling safe, wandered from one place to another for protection. Bandits, robbers, and thugs ruled the main thoroughfares. Travellers were not safe. Murders and killings were common.

Poets and historians lamented the dismal political, social, and economic condition of their society, and people expected that a savior would come and deliver them from these crises.

It did not happen. Instead of a saviour came the British who colonised India and, for the most part, people happily accepted their rule and came to terms with being ruled by them. The relative ease of that adjustment also shows the level of their decline.

When Pakistan came into existence, this new nation was fresh and energetic, ready to explode with new ideas and creativity. It was hoped that Independence would liberate the nation from colonial institutions and new traditions would be established based on the interests of the nation. Quite the reverse happened, and we saw not a rise but a continuous decline. Instead of improving upon what we inherited, we corrupted and destroyed it to the point where the state now teeters on the brink of the abyss.

We are ruled by pygmies. Our intellectuals are shallow and our artists have little vision. Our architects, instead of building the future, disfigure our cities with meaningless monuments and borrowed buildings. Worst of all, the people themselves are disillusioned and hopeless, watching helplessly as the decline continues, and an almost inevitable fall stares back at us from the annals of history.
BY: MUBARAK ALI
http://www.dawn.com/news/1050498/past-present-decline-and-fall

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عید مبارک Eid Mubarak

Say, "Who prohibited the nice things GOD has created for His creatures, and the good provisions? Say, "Such provisions are to be enjoyed in this life by those who believe. Moreover, the good provisions will be exclusively theirs on the Day of Resurrection." We thus explain the revelations for people who know. Say, "My Lord prohibits only evil deeds, be they obvious or hidden, and sins, and unjustifiable aggression, and to set up beside GOD powerless idols, and to say about GOD what you do not know." [Quran; 7:32-33]

Eid ul Adha, is celebrated at end of Hajj, by sacrificing animal to commemorate the tradition of Abraham who offered to sacrifice his only son Ishmael which was replaced with a ram. Read more >>>>

The  Eid al-Fitr (عيد الفطر‎ ʻĪd al-Fiṭr], "festival of breaking of the fast"), also called Feast of Breaking the Fast, the Sugar Feast, Bayram (Bajram), the Sweet Festiva and the Lesser Eid, is an important religious holiday celebrated by Muslims worldwide that marks the end of Ramadan, the Islamic holy month of fasting (sawm). This has to do with the communal aspects of the fast, which expresses many of the basic values of the Muslim community; e.g., empathy for the poor, charity, worship, steadfastness, patience etc. Fasting is also believed by some scholars to extol fundamental distinctions, lauding the power of the spiritual realm, while acknowledging the subordination of the physical realm. It also teaches a Muslim to stay away from worldly desires and to focus entirely on the Lord and thank Him for his blessings. It is a rejuvenation of the religion and it creates a stronger bond between the Muslim and his Lord. After the end of Ramadan, is a big celebration of Eid that is very importance Islamic tradition. Keep reading >>>>


Hate Malala , Love Taliban?

Media hype is created every now and then on some issue, its required for their survival, but if we look at the Social media it appears that Mala is the only problem of Pakistan .... this reflects a particular mindset of primitive society of Jahelya 1400 years ago, when girls were burred alive, now we see they being killed called HONOR Killing. Unfortunately all this is being done on the name of Islam, which is against such nonsense. These are cultural local taboos. Every thing from West is not bad .. even this FACEBOOK and internet we are using to express our views .... is not Muslim invention. West has bad aspects and some good aspects. As we adopt good things from West for our personnel comfort and convenience we should also see the humane aspects among their common people. They are ahead because they practice "some moral aspects" which used to be hall mark of Muslims.
We must reject their bad aspects and appreciate good ones. NOW Taliban verses Malala.... and those who curse Malala because she took stand against Talilban. So while advertising her one should know that he is standing on the side of Taliban ... does he know it? or doing it inadvertently .... I am sure while some sympathize with Taliban as "reaction" to corrupt rulers.... no sane person who knows little bit of Quran can favor Taliban .... SOME ONE VERY CLEVERLY DIVERTED OUR ENERGIES FORM THE MAIN ISSUE TO A NON ISSUE ........... BBC the Western radio talk on this  link is worth listening :http://www.bbc.co.uk/urdu/multimedia/2013/10/131011_malala_confusion_a.shtml  ..... LOL
Also: http://pakistan-posts.blogspot.com/2013/10/blog-post.html

WHY do they hate her so? At least with the TTP it isn`t hard to figure out: Malala has publicly and powerfully defied them. But why do so many ordinary, seemingly normal folk hate her? Shame is an obvious possibility. Malala is the world`s most famous teenager. Her bravery and idealism have inspired millions. And yet, we`ve only had the privilege of witnessing Malala`s bravery and idealism because Pakistan has become the kind of place where a teenage girl is shot in the face for speaking about a girl`s right to education.

That`s pretty grotesque stuff, and something the haters know the rest of the world fawning over Malala is aware of.

But shame doesn`t cut it as an explanation. For where`s the rage against the TTP then? If the victim has earned scorn for unwittingly bearing testimony to the monstrousness that stalks this land, then why not opprobrium for the perpetrators too? No, it feels less like guilt and shame and more like resentment. Resentment against a teenager shot in the face for speaking about a girl`s right to education? Surely, that`s not what your average Pakistani has been reduced to? The easy and to some, the obvious answer is: yes, that is in fact what we have become.

In part because the implications of the simple answer are too horrifying to dwell on and also because simple explanations rarely fit something as complicated as societal perceptions, let`s try and search for a fuller explanation.

Why are so many ordinary, seemingly normal people consumed with anti-Malalaism? It`s fair to say that your average Pakistani isn`t terribly impressed by the state. He loves Pakistan, he is attached to the land that comprisesPakistan, he fiercely believes in Pakistan as an idea, but when it comes to that most basic of questions in the state-society equation how well does your state serve your needs? he is not terribly impressed.Nor should he be. Pakistan is a declining state. The ability of the state to positively intervene in people`s lives or to create an environment that allows people to pursue their life priorities as they see fit has been in decline for years, decades.

Forget the Taliban for a minute. It`s the everyday stuff that the state is supposed to provide the most that the state is failing at the most.

Basic security in neighbourhoods and homes? It`s been outsourced to the citizenry, rural and urban: higher walls, stronger gates and, for those who can afford it, personal guards.

Education and health? It`s been outsourced to the private sector, rural and urban: fee-charging schools, afterschool tuition, private clinics, expensive medicines.

Justice? Fuggedaboutit.

Water? Which brand of bottled water would you prefer? Entertainment or sport? Head to your nearest mall. Parks? See your local land grabber first. Public transport? Take your pick between a deathtrap on wheels or on rails.

Sanitation? For Chrissake.

Electricity? If it ended at that, perhaps it would be all right. But your average Pakistani doesn`t just have to turn to the private market for virtually everything the state ought to be providing, he has to spend to protect himself from a predatory state.

Direct spending when it comes to dealing with, say, thelower judiciary and the police; indirect spending when it comes to dealing with, say, the health fallout of businesses and industries that pollute.

It sucks to be a Pakistani in Pakistan. And it sucks, largely, because the state is in decline.

A declining state engenders no love or loyalty. If the corpus of its laws and rules fails to create a system that delivers meaningfully and positively, why should the average citizen automatically rally to that system`s defence when it is under threat? Sixty-six years into an irreversible experiment, the state its structure, its systems, its rules is still up for negotiation because the state has failed to make an irrefutable case to its people that the present structure, system and rules are the only ones that can work for Pakistan.

We`re still collectively standing around the drawing board, unconvinced by the model scrawled across it. And when you`re still stuck at the drawing-board stage, there`s always the possibility that someone will elbow their way to the board, chalk in hand, and present a different model.

Enter the Taliban.

Ever wonder why the protalks brigade is so quiet about what exactly can be negotiated with the Taliban? As in, what can we offer them in return for them ceasing their violence? It`s fairly obvious: the bits about Islam. Tweak a few laws here and there, suggest some modifications to the judicial process, bring religion yet more explicitly into the functioning of the state where`s the harm in any of that? That`s the problem with a state that has failed to stamp an irreversible identity for itself. By staying in the realm of the abstract, of the negotiable and re-negotiable, it opened the door to an alternative discourse, a replacement theory.

Folk may hate the Taliban`s violence, but few would inprinciple argue against the Taliban`s basic idea for the state: more religion will lead to peace, security and maybe even prosperity.

What does any of that have anything to do with Malala? Why hate a young girl with so evidently a beautiful mind and spirit? Because she speaks of the old model, of a state that is rooted in universal and modern principles and tenets, that delivers equally to all without recourse to religion. But there`s a new theory in town and it`s spread far and wide in this land of ours.

The Taliban have never been and will never be the principal threat to the Pakistani state as it was once conceived, but that failed to materialise. It`s the shared belief between the Taliban and the public in the essence of the Taliban mission that is the principal threat.

For better or worse, a state can`t exactly swap out swathes of its population and replace them with new citizens. But a state can, in theory at least, eliminate the purveyors of an ideology that make it possible for so many to hate a teenage girl who was shot in the face for speaking about a girl`s right to education.

But can an already declining state do any such thing? Long live the Taliban! Down with Malala! • The writer is a member of staff.

By Cyril Almeida:cyril.a@gmail.com Twitter: @cyalm 
http://epaper.dawn.com/DetailImage.php?StoryImage=13_10_2013_009_005

MJ Akbar on Malala:

BETWEEN the prime minister of Pakistan, which 16-year-old Malala Yousafzai wants to become some day, and a Nobel winner for peace, which she might have become this week, the former is by far the better destiny.

The Nobel generally comes to worthies when they have long passed their sell-by date; and the last peace winner whose name I can recall, President Barack Obama, has not fallen far short of a superpower`s quota for international violence. A gong and a cheque would certainly help Malala, not to mention a media anxious for saleable headlines. A political career would help Pakistan.

Malala Yousafzai is a brave girl, as much for dreaming of a better future as for getting a bullet on a bus on her way to school from those who are wrecking her country. Gender oppression, of the very worst kind, is central to the DNA of Pakistani extremists seeking to drive a nation back to the days of jahiliya, or prejudice and ignorance, which is how the preIslamic tribal deserts of Arabia are often described.

Islam won the hearts of Arab women by banning prevalent malpractices such as female infanticide. Pakistan`s Taliban, and their numerous terrorist associates, are a throwback to the 6th century, and a disgrace to the religion they profess.

This has not, alas, diminished their growing influence at the grass roots, or weakened the clamour among Pakistan`s political elite for a `negotiated settlement` with the Taliban.

The question that is rarely asked, and never answered, is a simple one: what is there to negotiate? What should be on the agenda in a dialogue with sectarians who have made random murder their principal tactic, and perhaps the centralprinciple of their ideology as well? The Taliban and its surrogates, barely disguised by thin labels, want power. Is that on offer from Pakistan`s politicians? Does anyone want to appease them with a share of authority in regions northwest of the Indus? No one can stop their rhetoric, blasted into public space through some mosques and public rallies.

Can they be bought off with money? Unlikely, as they have enough funds from domestic as well as external sources. Andhere is a delicate question: will they ever agree to cooperate by turning their guns only in areas which suit Pakistan`s covert interest, like Afghanistan or India, and leave cities like Peshawar and Quetta alone? You cannot deal with inconvenient facts by pretending that they do not exist.

If Malala is in a British school today, it is because of them. If she hopes to challenge their vicious grip through elected office, it is because she knows how dangerous they are to the very sanity of Pakistan.

Malala is a teenager. She has every right to dream, particularly since she has been given a second life. Her dreams certainly make more sense than the rambling, shambling fantasies of a 70-year-old has-been like [retired] Gen Pervez Musharraf.

Musharraf can, and probably should, escape to Dubai or America or wherever he can find a few dollars more, instead of looking desperately for power, and posturing as a `saviour`.

Pakistan has moved far beyond him in some ways, even as it has regressed in other ways. But it is no longer a country for old dictators.

If Pakistan is going to be `saved` then it needs to become a nation with younger women and men in office, a new band of officials blessed by the fact that they do not carry the burden of recent history. It must become a land where Malala can return home.

Malala has everything she could conventionally want at this age in Britain: an education, a future, and the laudatory attention of a British media that has been building her up in the expectation that she would win the Nobel.

I am sure she wanted the Nobel even more than her wellwishers did. But she wants to bring peace to Pakistan, not to Britain. She wants to be a young woman in Lahore or Peshawar, not Bradford or Birmingham, to challenge the forces of misogyny and fanaticism which still command the streets.

What are the odds that this might happen? Not too good, if one were to be honest. Nawaz Sharif has become prime minister at the head of a stable government because voters believed that he could restore calm to a nation whose nerves are on edge, and whose peace of mind has been shattered.

So far, Sharif seems to be travelling at a leisurely pace to nowhere. To be fair to him, he still has time. But if Sharif fails, Malala and her generation will have to confront another question: is there nothing anyone can do? A teenager who nearly lost her life, but never abandoned hope, does not need the counsel of despair. Dreams do not necessarily come true, but then how many get a second life? • The writer is an author and editorial director of The Sunday Guardian, published from Delhi. 

Comments:
Malala is terrorist? Did she kill 45000 innocent Pakistanis, destroyed schools, mosques, churches, attacked naval base Mehran, PAF Kamrah? Noble prize be given to Taliban, peace loving pious only Muslims... don't be confused .. more at
http://TakfiriTaliban.blogspot.com/


Every effort for education especially for girls must be supported. Malala is just a symbol for this struggle. But one is perplexed to notice social media campaign to project her as symbol of West. .. just reflect level of ignorance , deprivation and sympathy for Talibans ... let's try to educate these people this mindset ... rest will follow..
http://dunya.com.pk/news/authors/detail_image/x4656_31524040.jpg.pagespeed.ic.r8bZoeKdtM.jpg
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Candy floss and cyanide: Breeding grounds for terrorists?

Ever been approached by a member of the Tableeghi Jamat (TJ)? How soft-spoken and friendly they sound. So much so that even if you disagree with their overly ritualistic interpretation of the faith, you can’t help but listen to them before (politely) excusing yourself.

However, recently when a TV anchor did a show on the leader of this Islamic evangelical movement, Tariq Jamil, and criticised some of his ways, the anchor was bombarded with the kind of unhinged comments (on social media) that are usually associated with the notorious ‘PTI trolls’.

Crude, crass, abusive and entirely reactionary. One was surprised at how easily the veneer of gentility that usually defines the personalities of TJ members and of their supporters rubs off at the first sign of criticism.

The attacks on the (liberal) anchor were so rapid and abusive that it even made the anchor’s (more conservative) companion on the show Tweet that ‘Tariq Jamil is no prophet that he cannot be criticised’.

Late last year, the former Interior Minister Rehman Malik had also come down hard on the TJ, claiming that the evangelical movement had become a breeding ground for extremists. His statement understandably ruffled quite a few feathers, especially from within parties like the moderate-right PML-N and the Islamic JUI-F.

PML-N’s Sharif brothers have had close links with the TJ, and the JUI-F follows the Sunni Deobandi school of thought that the TJ too adheres to.

Also, quite a large number of TJ members are from Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP), the province from where the JUI-F draws the bulk of its electoral support.

For long the TJ has been viewed as a benign movement that distances itself from mainstream politics and militancy, focusing instead on propagating ‘correct’ Islamic rites and attire, and ritualistic paraphernalia in tune with the Deobandi line of thinking.

The TJ was formed in the late 1920s to supposedly ‘cleanse Islam from Hindu and Sikh influences’ in the subcontinent.

However, after Pakistan’s creation in 1947 the TJ was more successful in attracting positive attention from Pakistanis living abroad than from those living in the country.

Based in Raiwind in the Punjab, the TJ membership and appeal, however, got a two-fold boost after the arrival of the reactionary Ziaul Haq dictatorship in 1977.

This was the time when Zia used a part of CIA and Arab funds (dished out for the anti-Soviet Mujahideen insurgency in Afghanistan) on constructing a number of indoctrination centres in the shape of seminaries. The rise in the TJ’s fortunes was thus a product of the proliferation of the more puritanical strands of Islam during the Zia regime.

By the late 1980s, the TJ became successful in also attracting membership from the country’s trader classes, especially in the Punjab and KP. In the 1990s it began attracting the interest of certain prominent sections of Pakistan’s affluent middle-classes, including certain pop musicians, TV actors and eventually cricketers.

Throughout the (Sunni-Shia) sectarian turmoil that the country faced in the 1980s and 1990s, the TJ however, remained free to preach and recruit. It was always believed to be a harmless movement that had no political, sectarian or militant motives.

However, since the country’s Sunni majority remains 'Barelvi', a parallel evangelical movement emerged in the 1980s. ‘Barelvi Islam’ emerged in the 19th century India as a Sunni Muslim infusion concocted from elements of Sufism and ‘folk-Islam’. It is opposed to the Deobandi branch of South Asian Islam and both the Sunni sub-sects have been embroiled in vicious polemical battles for over 150 years.

Called the Dawat-i-Islami, the new evangelical movement claims to represent the Barelvi majority’s spiritual interests. Also seen as non-political, the Dawat, however, has been accused of containing members that have graduated to becoming members of some Barelvi militant organisations.

The guard who shot dead Punjab governor Salmaan Taseer (for ‘blasphemy’) in 2011 was also a former member of the Dawat.

On the other end, when Rehman Malik spoke about the TJ it was the first time a member of a sitting government in Pakistan had accused the outfit of breeding possible recruits for various hard-core Islamist organisations.

Alarms in this respect were first raised by some western observers when in the mid and late 1990s, the former chief of Pakistan’s intelligence agency, the ISI, Lt Gen Javed Nasir, became a staunch member of the TJ. This was also the time the TJ was making in-roads into the Pakistan army.

Though known for his staunch Islamist views, Lt Gen Nasir’s entry into TJ’s fold was seen as being only incidental and the TJ continued to recruit and preach freely.

But the accusations (though suppressed in Pakistan) kept coming. The TJ’s name came up in connection with terrorism plots, such as in October 2002 in the US (the Portland Seven case) and the September 2002 Lackawanna Six case (also in the US).The TJ was mentioned again in the August 2006 in a plot to bomb airliners en route from London to the United States, and in the 7/7 bombings in London in 2005.

However, TJ as an organisation was not directly accused in any of the cases because most of the accused men were said to be members of various violent Islamist organisations. TJ's name only came up when the accused were also said to have been a part of the TJ at some point before their final radicalisation and entry into more militant and radical outfits.

In 2008, the Spanish police arrested 14 Asian Muslims for allegedly planning to attack various places in Spain. Twelve were Pakistanis. A Spanish Muslim leader claimed that all of these men had once been members of the TJ. Though counter-terrorism experts have understandably focused their studies more on the militant groups, in the last five years or so, many of them have now begun to also study the dynamics of evangelical groups like the TJ.

They believe that in spite of the fact that TJ’s primary function remains to be non-political and almost entirely evangelical, its rather secretive organisational structure and the goodwill that it enjoys among most Pakistanis allows elements from extremist organisations to use TJ as a recruiting ground for more violent purposes. They say that most young men joining the TJ are more vulnerable to the Islamists’ propaganda due to the TJ’s conservative social orientation.

Rehman Malik was not shooting in the air. He was merely pointing out yet another area of concern in a country being torn apart by men committing violence in the name of faith. His statement only became controversial because very few Pakistanis are aware of the potential of the TJ unwittingly allowing the polluting of its pond with rotten fish.


By Nadeem F. Piracha: http://www.dawn.com/news/1046248/smokers-corner-candy-floss-and-cyanide
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  2. Tablighi Jamaat - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

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Terror is bound to be defeated: A Historic Reality



In Pakistan, we confront the  terrorism. Knowing that their goals cannot be achieved through popular support, they resort to violence as a means to weaken the government and its agencies. The result is that innocent lives are lost in near-daily incidents of bomb explosions and attacks.

Acts of violence can create anarchy and disorder in the society but they cannot change the regime.

Historical studies show that terrorist groups have power and energy only for a limited period of time until their resources are exhausted and they have no option but to abandon violence and turn to negotiations. This happened in case of the IRA and Basque separatist movements.

In Pakistan, the terrorists must face the defeat. Sooner or later they must negotiate for a settlement. The question is when that moment will come, and at what cost. Let's look at the history in brief:

There are many examples in history where dictatorial and revolutionary governments have used terror to eliminate opponents and to establish an unchallenged rule of an individual or a group of radicals. In the case of resistance movements, nationalist terror becomes a tool to expel occupying foreign powers and to liberate the country.

There is a third category of terrorism, where disgruntled and dissatisfied groups, having lost all hopes of changing the system through legal and constitutional means, attempt to destroy the administrative set up and make governance impossible. The state and its institutions become sabotaged and the result is disorder and chaos.

In 1793, the French revolution turned into a reign of terror when its moderate period came to an end. France was governed by the Committee of Public Safety, and Danton and Robespierre were influential members.

The radical group known as the Jacobins assumed power in order to root out all old traditions and institutions. Since they wanted to transform the society on the basis of revolutionary ideals, and had zero tolerance for opposition or hindrance in the execution of their plan, thousands of people were condemned and sent to the guillotine. For the first time in history, terror became an official government policy, with an aim to use violence in order to achieve a higher political goal.

The terror was legal, having been voted for by the Convention. Nearly 40,000 people were executed including the Jacobin leaders who were at forefront of the revolution. It is said that the revolution devours its own children, hence Danton and Robespierre, the radical leaders were condemned and guillotined. Though the reign of terror ended, it weakened the Jacobins and radical elements.

Soon began a counter revolution. Tired and exhausted from the reign of terror, the wheel now spun in a different direction. Young people from wealthy backgrounds, known as the gilded youth, led a movement and began to destroy all symbols and traces of the revolution. They attacked the Jacobin clubs, disrupted their meetings, and terrorised the former leaders of the revolution.

They destroyed the memorial of Jean Paul Marat, one of the most outspoken leaders of the French Revolution who was killed by Charlotte Corday, the daughter of an impoverished aristocrat and an ally of the Girondists. They stormed hotels, coffee houses and restaurants where the radical groups often met.

The Jacobins, who executed their own members, were now a weak party and as a result there was no strong group to left to counter the gilded youth.

We find a similar case in Russia where Stalin’s secret police or the KGB inflicted large-scale purges, terror and forced depopulation on the people of the Soviet Union. Consequently, the foundation of the Russian revolution became weak. The absolute rule of Stalin silenced the intellectuals and creative people in order to provide new ideology to the revolutionary government.

In Nazi Germany, Hitler became so powerful that nobody dared to challenge his authority. The Gestapo arrested and executed all those who opposed the Nazi regime. The result of this terror was that intellectuals, scientists and professionals left Germany to take refuge in other European countries and the USA. The German universities became barren as the intellectual element in the society suffered. Both Russia and Germany confronted state terrorism and ultimately, the whole system collapsed.

In some instances nationalist resistance movements used terror against occupying forces in their country; like the Carbonari in Italy launched a movement against France and Austria.

In Russia, Ireland, Spain and Sri Lanka, extremist groups launched campaigns against their own governments.

In Sri Lanka, the Tamil Tigers who were well-organised and resourceful eventually lost their energy to fight and were defeated by the government forces. In the subcontinent, a terrorist movement began to oust the British colonial powers but was crushed by the government agencies.
By Mubarik Ali:  http://www.dawn.com/news/1046246/past-present-tales-of-terror

Women & the Veil

WHEN Saima, my late mother’s maid, first joined our staff, she used to wear the full burqa. But after a bit, when she saw that neither my mother, nor her relatives and friends who visited the house covered themselves, she felt relaxed enough to take her black, all-encompassing garb off when she was indoors.

When I got to know her better, I teased her about this: “Saima, why don’t you cover yourself in the house when men often visit? And other members of the staff are male, so how come you cover yourself outside the house, but not inside?”

Her reply was entirely sensible: “I don’t wear the burqa for religious reasons; but if I don’t wear it outside, men say lewd things and stare at me.” This says less about her faith than it does about our society, with all its difficulties and dangers for women.

Just how dangerous was made clear in the recent Human Rights Commission report that highlighted the violence, rapes and honour killings rampant in Pakistan. Instead of improving, things are getting worse, largely because perpetrators of crimes against women almost invariably get away unpunished.

I was reminded of Saima by two recent cases involving the full niqab in the UK.

In the first, a college in Birmingham first banned the full, face-covering veil, and then backed down in the face of protests. In another, a judge barred a young woman from covering her face in court, but then relented with the proviso that she must allow the jury to see her face while she was giving evidence.

While the full burqa has been banned in public places in France and Belgium, Britain has resisted calls to follow suit. Even the Conservative-led coalition government is against the state getting involved in this debate.

Teresa May, the home secretary, declared that women should be free to decide what they want to wear. This statement followed a call for a national debate on the subject by a junior minister in her department.

The entire discussion has put liberals and feminists on the spot: on the one hand, they defend the right of women to dress as they please. But they also deplore Muslim women being forced to cover themselves up by family and social pressure.

However, the reality is that in most cases, many young Muslim women born and raised in the UK choose to wear the hijab or headscarf, and more rarely, the niqab or the full burqa.

In most cases, this attire is worn more as a badge of identity than a religious duty.

In fact, Islamic texts call upon women to dress modestly, but not to envelop themselves from head to toe, leaving only the eyes visible. This is why burqas and niqabs are relatively rare across the Muslim world. Working women, especially in the fields, simply could not function in them.

When writing about the subject at the time the French debate on the full veil was going on, I thought I should try this garb myself. Accordingly, I donned a black burqa that had a mesh over the eyes, and covered my entire body.

My whole world shrank to a small rectangle; my movements were restricted; and I felt hot and claustrophobic. As I wrote at the time, any man who makes his wife, daughter or sister wear this attire should put it on himself first.

But wearing the full veil in male-dominated, violent countries like Pakistan is very different from putting it on in liberal societies like the UK.

In the former case, the garment is for self-protection, while in the latter, it is mostly about identity. And even though the number of women wearing the full burqa in the UK is tiny, the outfit does arouse irrational anger. As Maleiha Malik, a professor of law, wrote recently in the Guardian:

“Today’s debates about, and treatment of, veiled Muslim women are akin to the way heretics, lepers and Jews were treated in mediaeval Europe… [In the post 9/11 era] Political elites have exaggerated, rather than alleviated, understandable popular anxieties about Muslim religious differences in ways that often make reasonable debates impossible…”

While political correctness makes it difficult for my British friends to be openly critical about veils when discussing the issue with me, they do express one reasonable concern. Why should many young Muslim girls at school be deprived of pursuits like games, swimming and dramatics due to their constraining outfits?

Apart from depriving them of healthy activities, their parents also prevent them from sharing these experiences with non-Muslim friends, and thus diminishing the benefits of a liberal education. So while young women from other migrant groups are represented on the stage and the sports fields across Britain, few Muslims are.

Does this matter? Yes, if you are born and brought up in a country that you now call your own, and where you would like to be gainfully employed.

Maleiha Malik proposes an internal debate on the veil within Muslim communities. However, given the divisions that exist among Britain’s three million or so Muslims, it is hard to see how a consensus can be developed on this, or any other, subject.

I often wonder why this is not a political issue in the United States which also has a substantial Muslim population. I suspect one reason could be that the unemployed there do not enjoy the same benefits they do in much of Europe.

Here, if you can’t get a job because you insist on wearing the full veil or an unkempt beard, you can go on the dole.

For a liberal like me, this is a lose-lose debate: on the one hand, all my instincts say women should be free to dress as they choose; on the other, I don’t want to see young Muslim women being marginalised and stigmatised because they insist on antagonising the mainstream by their extreme attire.

From "Behind the veil" By Irfan Hussain: http://www.dawn.com/news/1044320/behind-the-veil
irfan.husain@gmail.com
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
Redefining Muslim women in history
    
OXFORD University Press, Lahore, invited Farida Shaheed, the coauthor of Great Ancestors: Women Claiming Rights in Muslim Contexts, to talk about her book. The audience comprised students as well as seasoned scholars. Ateeb Gul, an editor at Oxford, did a good job moderating the session. Shaheed started by explaining how the initial idea was to prepare a training module for women working for their rights in Muslim societies and to mobilise new activists. The project was supported by the organisation, Women Living Under Muslim Laws.

Shaheed highlighted that there is a `misconception in Muslim societies that the struggle for women`s rights is confined, historically and geographically, to European and North American locations.` She explained how, as an academic and an activist, she was offended by this `myth` every time she came across it. Yet, it enjoys credibility that women`s rights in Muslim societies are an alien idea and whoever works for them is promoting some `foreign` agenda. The misconception is not only confined to Muslim societies but also to some people in non-Muslim cultures that see Muslim women as passive and silent victims. So prevalent is this misconception that any example of brave Muslim women resisting patriarchal values, whether in the past or present, is brushed aside as an exception. Shaheed emphasised that this `myth` has been repeated so often, in public as well as in our private lives, that we consider it reality.

Calling it a `dangerous myth,` Shaheed stressed for it to be `challenged, debunked, and laid to rest.` It is promoted by the opponents of gender equality in Muslim societies, she said. Without completely shattering it, the majority of women will keep fearing to speak out for their rights, afraid of being treated as the `other`, as someone who has imported these `problematic` and `negative` ideas from foreign cultures.

The main thesis of Great Ancestors, Shaheed said, is that the women living in Muslim societies have struggled for a more just society in every era and every region.

The book provides around some 500 examples from the eighth to the mid-20th century where women living in Muslim contexts strived either for their individual rights or struggled for better conditions for women as a whole.

Shaheed`s aim was to bring forth an alternate reality, a reality that has been completely erased from our history textbooks. She has tried to rediscover the narratives of expanding the rights and personal spaces of women from numerous historical moments. The lives of our great ancestors narrated in the book can be a catalyst for rethinking `Muslim womanhood` as a socially and historically constructed identity. It is essential for women living in Muslim societies to read their history for themselves. As Fatima Mernissi points out in her book The Forgotten Queens of Islam,women cannot count on anyone to read their history for them. In the book Mernissi gave several examples of female queens in Arab history, to the surprise of many.

However, unlike The Forgotten Queens of Islam, Great Ancestors brings forth the stories of not only queens and powerful women but of women from all walks of life including poets, scholars, sufis, rulers, artists, and rights activists.

The question-answer session brought further vibrancy to the debate when a member of the audience questioned the utility of historical examples when Islamic texts are used by most religious scholars to undermine the project of gender equality. In response, Shaheed qualified that her book `is not about theology or the religion of Islam or even women`s lives in relation to Islam.` The purpose of the book, she said, is `to elucidate examples of women who defied culturally defined gender norms to assert their right to be different and to change their society.

This further engaged the audience in a discussion on what is more important for bringing about social change: presenting facts, countering the established norms or challenging the prevalent theories through abstract arguments. To this, Shaheed underlined the importance of historical narratives by stating that history is not merely a collection of stories: `By telling us who we have been, history defines for a people a sense of self that funnels into and guides a sense of potential tomorrows.`
By Umair Khan- http://epaper.dawn.com/~epaper/DetailImage.php?StoryImage=22_09_2013_462_002

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Altaf Hussain MQM Chief- Pakistani’s Iron Grip, Wielded in Opulent Exile, Begins to Slip


For two decades, Altaf Hussain has run his brutal Pakistani political empire by remote control, shrouded in luxurious exile in London and long beyond the reach of the law.
He follows events through satellite televisions in his walled-off home, manages millions of dollars in assets and issues decrees in ranting teleconferences that last for hours — all to command a network of influence and intimidation that stretches from North America to South Africa.


This global system serves a very localized goal: perpetuating Mr. Hussain’s reign as the political king of Karachi, the brooding port city of 20 million people at the heart of Pakistan’s economy.

“Distance does not matter,” reads the inscription on a monument near Mr. Hussain’s deserted former house in Karachi, where his name evokes both fear and favor.

Now, though, his painstakingly constructed web is fraying.

A British murder investigation has been closing in on Mr. Hussain, 59, and his party, the Muttahida Qaumi Movement. His London home and offices have been raided, and the police have opened new investigations into accusations of money laundering and inciting violence in Pakistan.

The scrutiny has visibly rattled Mr. Hussain, who recently warned supporters that his arrest may be imminent. And in Karachi, it has raised a previously unthinkable question: Is the end near for the untouchable political machine that has been the city’s linchpin for three decades?

“This is a major crisis,” said Irfan Husain, the author of “Fatal Faultlines,” a book about Pakistan’s relationship with the United States. “The party has been weakened, and Altaf Hussain is being criticized like never before.”

Mr. Hussain’s rise offers a striking illustration of the political melee in Pakistan.

His support stems from the Mohajirs, Urdu-speaking Muslims whose families moved to Pakistan after the partition from India in 1947, and who make up about half of Karachi’s population. Since the 1980s, the Muttahida Qaumi Movement has fiercely defended Mohajir interests, and in turn it has been carried to victory in almost every election and to an enduring place in national coalition governments as well.

Mr. Hussain fled to London in 1992, when the movement was engaged in a vicious street battle with the central government for supremacy in Karachi. The British government granted him political asylum and, 10 years later, a British passport.

London has long been the antechamber of Pakistani politics, where self-exiled leaders take refuge until they can return. The former military ruler Pervez Musharraf lived here until recently, and the current prime minister, Nawaz Sharif, lived here until 2007.

Mr. Hussain, however, shows no sign of going back. The Muttahida Qaumi Movement has an office in Edgware, in northwest London. But these days Mr. Hussain is mostly at home, in a redbrick suburban house protected by raised walls, security cameras and a contingent of former British soldiers he has hired as bodyguards.

From there, he holds court, addressing his faraway followers in a vigorous, sometimes maniacal style, punctuated by jabbing gestures and hectoring outbursts. Occasionally he bursts into song, or tears. Yet, on the other end of the line, it is not unusual to find tens of thousands of people crowded into a Karachi street, listening raptly before an empty stage containing Mr. Hussain’s portrait, as his disembodied voice booms from speakers.

“The cult of personality surrounding Altaf Hussain is quite extraordinary,” said Farzana Shaikh, an academic and the author of “Making Sense of Pakistan.” “He is immensely charismatic, in the way one thinks of the great fascist leaders of the 20th century.”

In Karachi, his overwhelmingly middle-class party is fronted by sharply dressed, well-spoken men — and a good number of women — and it has won a reputation for efficient city administration. But beneath the surface, its mandate is backed by armed gangs involved in racketeering, abduction and the targeted killings of ethnic and political rivals, the police and diplomats say.

Other major Pakistani parties indulge in similar behavior, but the Muttahida Qaumi Movement frequently brings the most muscle to the fight. An American diplomatic cable from 2008 titled “Gangs of Karachi,” which was published by WikiLeaks, cited estimates that the party had an active militia of 10,000 gunmen, with an additional 25,000 in reserve — a larger force, the dispatch notes, than the city police.

Many journalists who have criticized the party have been beaten, or worse, driving most of the news media in Karachi to tread lightly. In June, the Committee to Protect Journalists, a lobbying group based in New York, accused the party of organizing the killing of Wali Khan Babar, a television reporter.

In the West, the party has avoided critical attention partly because it has cast itself as an enemy of Islamist militancy. In 2001, Mr. Hussain wrote a letter to Prime Minister Tony Blair of Britain, offering to help Britain set up a spy network against the Taliban.

Critics of the party have frequently questioned the role of British officials in facilitating its unusual system of governance. Pakistani exiles from Baluchistan, also accused of fomenting violence, have faced criminal prosecution. But Britain is not the only node of Mr. Hussain’s international support network.

Through the Pakistani diaspora, the Muttahida Qaumi Movement has active branches as far afield as the United States, Canada and even South Africa, which has become an important financial hub and a haven for the group’s enforcers, Pakistani investigators say.

Two police interrogation reports obtained by The New York Times cite militants from the movement who say they traveled to South Africa in between carrying out political assassinations in Karachi. One of those men, Teddy Qamar, confessed to 58 killings between 2006 and 2012, the police say. In an interview, Anis Hasan, the party’s joint organizer for South Africa, denied any link to organized violence.

But if Mr. Hussain seemed immune to scrutiny at his London stronghold, his luck started to turn in September 2010 after Imran Farooq, a once-influential leader in the movement who had split from the party, was stabbed to death near his house in Edgware.

Soon after, Mr. Hussain appeared on television, mourning Mr. Farooq with a flood of tears. But over the past year, the police investigation has turned sharply in his direction.

In December, officers from Scotland Yard’s Counter Terrorism Command searched the movement’s London office. Then in June they went to Mr. Hussain’s home and arrested Iftikhar Hussain, his cousin and personal assistant, who is now out on bail. The police impounded $600,000 in cash and some jewelry under laws that target the proceeds of crime.

Mr. Hussain was not available for an interview, his party said. But a senior party official, Nadeem Nusrat, speaking at the movement’s London office, denied any link to Mr. Farooq’s killing. “Our conscience is clear,” Mr. Nusrat said. “We have nothing to do with it.”

Mr. Nusrat said the impounded money had come from political donations. And he rejected accusations, also the subject of a police inquiry, that Mr. Hussain has directly threatened political rivals, in some instances by warning that he would arrange for their “body bags.”

“It’s all taken out of context,” Mr. Nusrat said.

Mr. Hussain has receded from public view during the recent furor. There have been rumors about mounting health problems, which Mr. Hussain’s aides deny. But he cannot return to Pakistan, they say, because the Taliban could kill him. “In Pakistan,” said Muhammad Anwar, a longtime aide, “nobody can guarantee your life.”

Then there are the legal threats: over the years, dozens of murder charges have been lodged against Mr. Hussain in Pakistan, although some have been quashed in court. A more pressing question, perhaps, concerns the impact on the streets of Karachi if Mr. Hussain is forced to step down.

Some fear that without his guiding hand, tensions within the movement could split it into hostile factions — a frightening prospect in a city where political violence already claims hundreds of lives a year.

“However viciously the party conducts itself, there is an order within the apparent disorder,” said Ms. Shaikh, the academic.

Even if the British government wished to crack down on Mr. Hussain, she added, it might find itself subject to appeals from the Pakistani authorities. “The fear of Karachi going up in flames is so great,” Ms. Shaikh said, “that no government can take that risk, as long as Altaf Hussain is alive.”

This article has been revised to reflect the following correction:

Correction: September 17, 2013

An article on Friday about the declining influence of the exiled Pakistani political leader Altaf Hussain misstated the given name of his cousin and personal assistant who was arrested in June by Scotland Yard and who is now out on bail. He is Iftikhar Hussain, not Ishtiaq.

A version of this article appears in print on September 13, 2013, on page A1 of the New York edition with the headline: Pakistani’s Iron Grip, Wielded in Opulent Exile, Begins to Slip.

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Millions laid down lives for Secular or Islamic Pakistan>

While some prefer to emphasise the economic independence within secular Pakistan, others dream of theocracy like Iran. They try to support their perceptions by misquoting and twisting sayings of Muhammad Ali Jinnah, the founder of Pakistan. Both are far from the reality. This fundamental question has been settled through Objectives Resolution, adopted by first constituent assembly on March 9, 1949, and subsequently by all assemblies till now. Any ambiguity was further clarified by Liaquat Ali Khan, the 1st Prime Minister of Pakistan, also a close associate of Muhammad Ali Jinnah, in his speech on the Objectives Resolution, March 9, 1949. 
"Pakistan was founded because the Muslims of this sub-continent wanted to build up their lives in accordance with the teachings and traditions of Islam, because they wanted to demonstrate to the world that Islam provides a panacea to the many diseases which have crept into the life of humanity today."
"Islam does not recognize either priesthood or any sacerdotal authority; and, therefore, the question of a theocracy simply does not arise in Islam. If there are any who still use the word theocracy in the same breath as the polity of Pakistan, they are either labouring under a grave misapprehension, or indulging in mischievous "propaganda."
"The Preamble of the Resolution deals with a frank and unequivocal recognition of the fact that all authority must be subservient to God. It is quite true that this is in direct contradiction to the Machiavellian ideas regarding a polity where spiritual and ethical values should play no part in the governance of the people and, therefore, it is also perhaps a little out of fashion to remind ourselves of the fact that the State should be an instrument of beneficence and not of evil."
"The Muslim [in Pakistan] shall be enabled to order their lives in the individual and collective spheres in accord with the teachings and requirements of Islam as set out in the Holy Quran and the Sunnah"
[Excerpts: Liaquat Ali Khan, the 1st Prime Minister of Pakistan, on the Objectives Resolution, March 9, 1949]http://pakistan-posts.blogspot.com/p/why-pakistan.html