Saturday, January 21, 2012

Memogate commission declares Haqqani guilty: Traitors appointed on important Positions!

  1. Click here for updates on Memogate >>>>
  2. Memogate, background and timeline >>>>
  3. Just for a piece of paper?
  4. میمو کا تنازع >>>
  5. آصف علی زرداری updates:>>>Asif Ali Zardari
A Parody


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Memogate commission declares Haqqani guilty

Pakistan's former ambassador to the US, Husain Haqqani, has been declared guilty by a commission probing the alleged 'memogate' scandal that hit the country last year. However, Husain Haqqani said that the memo commission’s proceedings were one-sided as it refused to hear him and will be challenged by his lawyers. Haqqani was forced to resign after Pakistani-American businessman Mansoor Ijaz claimed that Haqqani had asked him to pass on a memo, on behalf of Pakistan President Asif Ali Zardari, to the American government calling for their help to oust Islamabad's military leadership. Both Haqqani and Zardari have rejected Ijaz's claims. The sealed report presented by Memo Commission was read out to the apex court’s nine-member bench. The report said the former ambassador was a functionary of government of Pakistan but, he was not loyal to the country, adding he used to elicit 2 million US dollars annually from the US government. ”He does not like to live in Pakistan as his interests rest with the US and its government”, the report notes adding that Haqqani did not have any land property in Pakistan. ”Haqqani forgot that he is an ambassador of Pakistan”, it added. “Hussain Haqqani is not loyal to Pakistan,” the report asserts adding he wanted to become the head of new proposed security team. The report said Hussain Haqqani violated the Constitution of Pakistan only to prove that the civil government in Islamabad is a friend to the US and can help the US in its non-proliferation efforts. The bench directed the report should be issued to all the petitioners and the media. The court issued orders to the former ambassador to appear before the court in the next hearing. The three-judge commission that probed the alleged scandal was constituted by Pakistan's Supreme Court on December 30, 2011. The court also summoned Haqqani to appear before the bench in the next hearing and adjourned the case for two weeks. During the commission's hearing, Ijaz was allowed to depose via video conferencing from London after he refused to come to Pakistan due to security concerns. Haqqani had refused to attend the hearings after he was not allowed to depose from abroad. The commission, running 24 marathon sessions and recoding statements of scores of concerned persons including that of the prime character Mansoor Ijaz’s on video link, prepared the report. The report incorporated over 300 evidences in it. Meanwhile Husain Haqqani said that the memo commission’s proceedings were one-sided as it refused to hear him and will be challenged by his lawyers. Haqqani tweeted on the micro-blogging website that the commission’s report is being used to distract attention from other embarrassing issues and that its claims are political and not legal. He also said that the commission is not a court and those claiming it has determined guilt or innocence are wrong. “Those who endorsed military dictators and allowed them 2 amend constitution cannot judge my -or anyone else's-patriotism,” Haqqani wrote on the Twitter.
http://www.nation.com.pk/pakistan-news-newspaper-daily-english-online/islamabad/12-Jun-2012/memogate-commission-declares-haqqani-guilty
[Comments: He should be declared judge for himself, or select judges of his choice]
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A Brief Analysis


In all civilised societies mlitary is subservient to the civilian political authority for the defence of country [not in private control to support their corrupt practices]. If 'Memogate' is true, then its a nasty effort by corrupt and incompetent people to keep defence forces under full control like PIA, Steel Mill, Railways and other strategic national assets, which are in doldrums, verge of collapse, causing national loss of loss of Rs100 crore/1000 millions per day. Hope Memogate is untrue but ...... 


There is simple formula to exercise authority, not merely legal authority but the moral authority which stems from honesty, sincerity, competence and exemplary leadership, which they seems to lack ..... Previously it backfired with Nawaz Sharif, besides his discomfort, the nation had to suffer in dictatorial rule for a decade. When Caliph Omar sacked celebrated war hero General Khalid bin Walid, Henry Truman sacked war hero General Dogulas Mac Arthur, they had great moral authority besides legal authority. Civilian rulers of Pakistan have to develop such character if they want to exercise full authority over military, not seeking help from foreign powers. [Aftab Khan]
Updates here >>>>>
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Around 1485, a 'Memo' was written by Amir Abdullah to Christian power of Spain. Abdullah had requested help from Christians that if he is helped by King Ferdinend, Abdullah would hand over Muslim Spain to Christians. In return, Abdullah only wanted wealth, gaurenteed puppet status and permission to keep personal overseas lands and wealth. Incredibly, the supreme court and ministers as well as intellegencia and army of the time knew of the 'secret' correspondence but stayed silent in national interest or were bought by Abdullah. As a result, Granada and last bastion of Islam in Europe fell to Christians in 1492, who pounced upon the opportunity frm regional states. The name of Prime Minister of Abdullah was also Yusuf ! Today, after 500 years, history is hauntingly being repeated. Another memo has been written on identical terms and have been exposed. The courts and opinion makers play games, while army watches!





WARNING!  ......   INDECENT VIDEO



Watch Now Lekin – Nawaz sharif and Hussain Haqqani – 3rd December 2011




Why Mansoor Ejaz was selected to deliver the memo?
Here is his answer >>>


Watch Now Aaj kamran khan ke saath – 18th november 2011
More>>>> Lekin 

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  1. Memogate: Will the Mansoor Ijaz story shake Pakistan?

    Pakistani-American businessman Mansoor Ijaz, the man who apparently took President Zardari's plea for help ...
  2. 'Memogate': Haqqani in Pakistan to explain his ...

    The air is rife with tension in Pakistan after a secret memo, allegedly sent by Pakistan President Asif Ali Zardari ...
  3. Witness with Quatrina: Will PPP be able to ride out ...

    Quatrina Hossain invites Yasmeen Rehman (MNA PPPP), Fauzia Kasuri (President Women Wing PTI), qbal ...
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How Mansoor Ijaz Nearly Brought Down the Government


He did not come, he did not see, and he certainly did not conquer. But Mansoor Ijaz, a US businessman of Pakistani origin, nearly brought down the government in Islamabad.


The murky affair billed as Memogate is as good as dead and buried. The investigation by the judicial commission will drag on till the end of March, and the relevant people will go through the motions, but the sting is out of the scandal. Nearly all stakeholders have stepped back and do not appear interested in pursuing the matter any more.


The trail seems to have gone cold.


As the dust begins to settle, it becomes clear that the scandal has produced two casualties: Husain Haqqani, and the truth. In time, Haqqani may recoup the damage done to him, but the truth may not be known for a long time. But what is known is that the country has been taken for a ride.


All those involved may now heave a collective sigh of relief, but this glosses over the fact that almost every stakeholder comes out smelling bad. In fact, the least to be affected – in an ironical way – may be Mansoor Ijaz. He didn’t really have much to lose. He never had any stakes in Pakistan, and neither did he have much credibility to start with. Known as a publicity-seeking self promoter, Ijaz had flirted around with almost every recent Pakistani government, peddling his supposed influence within the US power circles and presenting himself as a mediator, facilitator and promoter of various issues. No one in Pakistan had taken him too seriously before. In fact, perhaps the only people who ever took him seriously were the Fox News Channel news managers, who occasionally featured him as an expert on Pakistan.


So why did his word carry so much weight this time around? Perhaps he became an unwitting cog in a larger strategic game. Perhaps he triggered off a series of events which then spun out of control. Or maybe – just maybe – he was actually on to something, but didn’t have enough evidence to prove it. Whatever the case may be, what is clear is that he was not the sole player in this sordid saga. Messages were exchanged. Lines were written. Emails were sent. And thoughts were structured for a plan of action. The action was just never executed.


In other words, there was enough material flying around for the head of ISI to take it seriously. Were it not for his London trip to meet Ijaz, and were not it for his convincing arguments to the army chief, the Memogate scandal would have died a natural death on the editorial pages of the Financial Times. From there, the issue gained new life as it got splashed in the local media. Suddenly detailed transcripts of email and BBM exchanges found reams of column space and hours of air time. A one-paragraph accusation transformed into a full-blown political scandal.


The rest, as they say, is history. Except that it’s not.


The army chief and the ISI head still have a lot to answer for. What convinced them to take this issue so seriously? What prompted them to get Husain Haqqani’s scalp and still relentlessly pursue the matter in court through their strongly-worded written statements? And what made them ultimately back away and not ensure Ijaz’s arrival in Pakistan? These questions may stop making headlines, but they still remain unanswered, and will keep hanging around for some time to come.


The government has a lot to answer. Why was it so afraid of a thorough enquiry into the matter? Why did it panic at the thought of Ijaz coming to Pakistan to record his statement in front of the judicial commission? Why did it keep insisting the memo was nothing more than a piece of paper when its content was specific, and required specific answers? The memo may recede into oblivion, but a nagging feeling still pollutes the air that the government knew more than it admitted to; that there was more to the affair than the government cared to admit. In short, the government was terrified of full disclosure.


Additionally, the judiciary has a lot to answer for. Why did it pounce on the matter despite the dubiousness that surrounded the issue? Why did it act in haste by banning Haqqani from travelling abroad, and by forming a commission? And why has it suddenly put the issue in veritable cold storage by giving the commission a two-month period to complete its work? The superior judiciary will be accused of indulging in judicial haste when perhaps judicial restraint may have been a better and more prudent option. The judicial commission will be blamed for its ineffectiveness and failure to fulfill its mandate to find the truth.


Nawaz Sharif will also have to answer several questions. Did he jump the gun by rushing into court with a bagful of petitions on the matter? Was he used? Is he now a victim of his own second-guessing? And has he also realized that the matter benefits no one if it drags on. His best defence would be that he judged wrongly. The best is clearly not good enough.


The media, too, needs to do some introspection. In its eagerness to go after the Big Story, did the media overplay the issue? Did the relentless coverage of Memogate inflate it beyond its actual significance and force the institutional power players to dig in their heels for fear of losing face? And should the media move on to the next story when Memogate has clearly not reached a logical conclusion?


The final verdict is still to be given. But chances are Mansoor Ijaz will not land in Pakistan any time soon. Expect a few more op-ed pieces from him in the coming weeks and months. Perhaps even a book. But words alone will never be enough to explain why Pakistani leaders were – and still are – so afraid of an unsigned piece of paper that no one owns up to.
http://www.newslinemagazine.com/2012/02/how-mansoor-ijaz-nearly-brought-down-the-government/

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Countdown? by Ikram Sehgal



Finally, the Supreme Court simply ran out of patience with the government’s successful filibustering for over two years to prevent the implementation of the NRO judgement taking effect. The indictment of the government by a five-member bench of the Supreme Court on Tuesday initiated the process of sending the corrupt Gilani regime packing. Even then, the Supreme Court bench must be commended for exercising judicial restraint in declaring the Zardari-Gilani duo unfit for office. The bench gave the government six days to ponder over six options before a final hearing on Jan 16 by a full bench. 
The Musharraf-enacted NRO that gave Asif Ali Zardari immunity as president and he and cronies to run riot in Pakistan with impunity has come a full circle more than two years after the Supreme Court judgment declaring it null and void. “Dr” Babar Awan (of “Monticello Univesity” fame) is all fire and brimstone, but let’s see how long his bravado lasts.
Many things have come to a head, all at once. Whether on national security or on economics, the political games being played by Zardari and Gilani had only one motive, how to escape accountability and buy their way back into power in order to loot the public some more. Watching the parody Hum Sab Umeed Se Hain the day Hamid Mir’s interview with Zardari was to be aired on Geo TV, a short clip of the interview was shown in-between as a “promo.” When Hamid Mir brought his attention to the virtual meltdown of PIA, the Railways, Wapda and other organisations, Zardari dismissed each with a shrug: “It is your assessment, it has only become weak.” For one surreal moment one thought it to be part of the comedy show, and then I realised the mocking tone was vintage Zardari, and for real. Either the man had completely lost common sense, or the brazenness was reflective of the deep scorn with which with he treats Pakistanis for having elected a tainted man like him as head of state?
With both the judiciary and the Pakistani army serious about uncovering the truth about the Mansoor Ijaz-Husain Haqqani memo, the Memogate Commission is more than likely to come up with the facts in the near future. When Mansoor Ijaz arrives in Pakistan he will probably reveal much more. By dragging their feet on issuing Ijaz a visa and intimidating him to prevent his coming to Pakistan and appearing before the commission, the government was clearly following the strategy of sabotaging the process. Not getting a straight reply about Ijaz’s visa and his personal safety from the interior secretary, Justice Isa warned him that he would be charged with contempt of court: “Don’t make a mockery of the commission.”
Unlike Mansoor Ijaz, who promised to hand over his Blackberry and all related data, Husain Haqqani flatly declined to hand over his own Blackberry for investigation. Claiming initially that he was unaware of where the device was, he then volunteered it was somewhere in his home in Washington DC. Even without having anything to hide, as he insists, he categorically rejected the commission’s request to waive his privacy rights with the Canada-based manufacturer of Blackberry phones, “Research in Motion” (RIM). He said tongue-in-cheek: “I may require approval of the government as I am bound to observe the Official Secrets Act.” Refusing to submit the Blackberry data to the commission, he also declined to share the PIN of his old set with the commission. When Justice Isa politely asked Haqqani’s lawyer if the waiver would harm his client, he received an evasive answer. The chief justice of the Balochistan High Court rightly observed that if obstacles continued to be created “an adverse inference can be drawn.” That is quite damning. Could it be that Haqqani is desperately hiding something even worse than what was in the memo?
Three weeks after the army chief and the director general of the ISI had submitted their responses to the Supreme Court, Gilani chose a Chinese newspaper to make the “revelation” (meant to embarrass the army chief during his visit to China) that no official action can be taken by a government functionary without the prior approval of the government, and therefore their depositions in the Memogate case were unconstitutional and illegal.
Justice (Retd) Wajihuddin Ahmed said dozens of government servants submit their replies with the courts of law daily as a routine practice in various legal cases, and they do not get their replies vetted. The prime minister simply wanted to confuse and complicate things in order to sabotage the memo enquiry. The PPP government wanted “Shahadat” (martyrdom) to win people’s sympathies by choosing a confrontational path with the institutions.”
Neither the people of Pakistan nor the rank and file of the army want martial law, but they would also not tolerate any attack on the institutions of the army and the ISI. Any attempt by the government to sack Kayani and Pasha could well incite a mutiny. What prompted Gilani to ignite the fire by fuelling a controversy by virtually charge-sheeting the army chief while he was abroad but a deliberate attempt to incite reaction that would plunge the country into complete anarchy and chaos?
Having been caught red-handed in the Memogate case both Zardari and Gilani are trying desperately to become martyrs of democracy. By playing politics with national security to save his skin, Gilani is not only putting the system and democracy at risk but Pakistan as well. While his incompetence in the exercise of his authority as prime minister is well-documented, his attempt to try to achieve political goals threatened to demolish the entire system. Despite the deliberate provocation the army, let the Supreme Court implement the rule of law. The Supreme Court has done well by heading off the possibility of martial law or, even worse, a mutiny.
The army should exercise patience and remember Sun Tzu’s saying: “If you wait by the river long enough, you will see the corpse of your enemy go floating by.” Gilani and President Zardari mock at state institutions, including the judiciary and the military establishment, to further their regime’s misrule and corruption. They use their version of democracy selectively to camouflage and gloss over their wrongdoings.
Despite vehement and vociferous protests from my good friend of 48 years, 34th PMA course-mate and in-house lawyer Commander Kaifi, one has always liked and respected Adm Fasih Bokhari. However, failure to prosecute the outright crooks indicted by the Supreme Court was shocking and disappointing. Before his reputation suffers further damage, he would do his friends and admirers (and the uniform) a great favour by resigning as chairman of the National Accountability Bureau before facing the Supreme Court on Jan 16.
Notwithstanding the good faith behind the Supreme Court’s giving the government various options, the “Doctrine of Necessity” can never be really eradicated. It is like a chameleon, it will surface in both political and military forms. It made its appearance in its judicial image when the Supreme Court gave an option to the government to face disqualification or to go the electorate. Zardari and Gilani either violated their oath of office, or they did not. The rule of law in either case has to take its course, there is no third option.
The writer is a defence and political analyst. Email: isehgal@pathfinder9.com
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Some more questions about Husain Haqqani fiasco
 Conspiracies are intriguing and fascinating. The Memo Scandal, involving Husain Haqqani and others, is no different. Some of its secrets are already known, while others may be on the way. In my previous post (“Some questions on the Husain Haqqani fiasco”), I raised some questions. Here are some more.

Why was the memo written and delivered in the first place?
According to Mansoor Ijaz, Haqqani claimed that the government feared a military coup. However, now it appears that it was the other way round. After the Abbottabad attack, the army preferred to claim that it had been taken by surprise. In view of its vulnerability due to public outrage, somebody in the Zardari coterie had the brilliant idea that the present army leadership should be replaced with pliable one. The idea got a favorable hearing.
However, it was not forgotten what had happened to Nawaz Sharif, who made a clumsy attempt to remove the army chief with disastrous consequences. So, it was decided to get the American support before replacing top generals.
The thrust of the charge against Haqqani is given in Mansoor’s article in Newsweek (http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2011/12/04/an-insider-analysis-of-pakistan-s-memogate.html). He writes,
“Zardari and Haqqani both knew the U.S. was going to launch a stealth mission to eliminate bin Laden that would violate Pakistan’s sovereignty. They may have even given advance consent after CIA operations on the ground in Pakistan pinpointed the Saudi fugitive’s location. The unilateral U.S. action, they might have surmised, would result in a nation blaming its armed forces and intelligence services for culpability in harboring bin Laden for so many years. They planned to use the Pakistani public’s hue and cry to force the resignations of Army chief Gen. Ashfaq Kayani and intelligence chief Gen. Shuja Pasha. Pliable replacements would have been appointed.”
Haqqani has not much to worry about a conviction if Zardari is still the President. After all, there will be nothing to stop Zardari from pardoning Haqqani promptly. If Rehman Malik can survive despite court judgments, there is no reason why Haqqani should fare worse.
Persons close to Zardari, in Islamabad and Washington, conceived, wrote and finished the memo, with his approval. Then it was delivered to the Pentagon through Mansoor.

Why did the memo surface now?
Both Haqqani and Ijaz would have kept the memo secret forever, whether or not it led to any action by the U.S. How come it was disclosed only after four months? Lt Gen Hameed Gul believes that the Pentagon made the disclosure after the government had failed to carry out the promises made in the memorandum even in over four months. (That means the Pentagon did give the warning to the army top brass that Zardari coterie wanted and then waited for the fulfillment of the promises in the memo.)
There is another possibility. The Pentagon did not expect a pliable government to emerge after the elections because parties of both Zardari and Nawaz Sharif were losing popularity. Imran Khan could break into vote banks of both PPP and Nawaz League. The more time he has, the more popularity he will gain. Even if he did not get majority in election, he could still end up as the head of a coalition. That will make life quite difficult for the U.S. operations in Afghanistan.
The urgent question for the Pentagon was: How to stop Imran Khan? The best option would be to get rid of the PPP government now, help install an interim government to revive economy and clear the mess, and get the elections postponed indefinitely. Then it will be comfortable army-to-army dealings. Since top Pentagon generals knew the existence of the Haqqani memo, one of them asked Ijaz to disclose it. It was to be a booby trap. No wonder, the Zardari regime is teetering on the verge of collapse.

Could Haqqani nip the scandal in the bed?
He could. The day Mansoor’s article appeared in The Financial Times, Haqqani could have concluded that Zardari’s game was up. The Pentagon did convey the warning to the army in May but was now angry with Zardari for failing to carry out the remaining promises in his memo.
That should have been enough for Haqqani to resign immediately, claiming that he was exhausted by grueling diplomacy and wanted to go back to his “professory” (as we say in Urdu). To be on the safe side, he could also seek political asylum. To his misfortune, Haqqani dragged his feet and finally had to leave Washington kicking and screaming to face the music in Islamabad.
As it happens often with ambitious persons, arrogance makes them ignore the ground realities. Haqqani was not willing to call it quits so easily. With Zardari at his back and many influential friends in the U.S., he was sure he could survive easily. However, his defense against Ijaz’s onslaught was only denial. It was like defending oneself with a plastic shield against a rocket launcher. So, he landed himself soon in a very hot soup, with his hope dashed of becoming the National Security Advisor and, with luck, even something much higher. Now he wonders whether it will be his neck or that of his “boss” -- or both.

What can Haqqani do now?
There was for some time a talk of compromise (muk muka مک مکا  in plain words), to end the episode after getting Haqqani’s resignation. However, the action by Supreme Court on the Haqqani scandal has made it impossible.
بات نکلی ھے تو دور تلک جاءے گی
Now Haqqani has two options: Stick with Zadari or betray him. If he believes that Zardari will survive the crisis, he may decide to remain faithful to him. If, in his view, Zardari may be forced out even without impeachment or conviction (see below), Haqqani may become an approver against his “boss.”
What are the prospects for Zardari’s survival? His impeachment may be difficult, as he may use all his skills and means to win over most MNAs. The motion to impeach Pervez Musharraf seemed likely to succeed, as it had support from both the U.S. and the army. If the same support is available, Zardari may be impeached. However, it will be simply removal as President. He will still be a force to reckon with, being the head of his party.
If Zardari is prosecuted, his prospects will be better than impeachment. He did not allow any case against him to reach a conclusion despite years of trial. He will work harder to do the same indefinitely, using all the tricks of legal profession.
Haqqani might be tried not under Article 6 of the Constitution but, according to Justice Tariq Mahmood, under Section 121 of the Pakistan Penal Code, viz., “Whoever wages war against Pakistan, or attempts to wage such war, or abets the waging of such war, shall be punished with death, or imprisonment for life and shall also be liable to fine.”

How will it all end?
A lot of noise may be created for months by investigation, court trial, impeachment motion, discussions, agitations, all the words poured out in the paper and electronic media but the process may well drag into Zardari’s final months in office. He is not very keen for another term for him and his party because he and his cronies have grabbed all they wanted, destroying all they could in the process. So, he will not be unhappy if he leaves in 2013 with a guard of honour. He may even resign soon, if pressed hard enough.
However, what most people fear may well happen, as long as Zardari is in Sadar Mahal صدر محل (President House). In the meantime, he may do much worse than he had promised the U.S. in his memo to Admiral Mike Mullen. So, the Establishment may not be willing to allow status quo to continue. It also has to consider abysmal conditions in the country: economic disaster, massive corruption, gross misgovernance, high inflation, severe crime wave, energy crisis, political chaos, subservience to foreign interests. The security of the state and vital national interests are far more important than any possible hostile reaction from politicians, media and Supreme Court. (The so-called “international community,” including the U.S., may also soon reconcile with fait accompli, even if it is not happy.) So, don’t be surprised if you learn one fine morning that the 111 Brigade is in action.
http://mahameed-articles.blogspot.com/2011/12/some-more-questions-about-husain.html 

Some questions on the Husain Haqqani fiasco


روشنی طبع، تو بر من بلا شدی اے
This Farsi line applies aptly to Husain Haqqani, now that his brilliance has landed him in the worst debacle of his career.
The fiasco raised many questions, some still unanswered, some not fully answered. Let us try to find out what it was all about and also put available facts in perspective.

Did Husain Haqqani do it?
Of course, beyond a shadow of doubt. He did pass on a memorandum to Mansoor Ijaz, seeking his help in saving his boss’s government. It is not a simple case of one man’s word against the other. Mansoor Ijaz has already provided enough documentary evidence from his Blackberry to prove it.

How were the beans spilled?
Haqqani and Ijaz, as professionals in tricks, were to keep the secret only to themselves. By talking one-to-one with Zardari on one side and Mansoor Ijaz on the other, Haqqani ensured complete secrecy. It might well have remained secret.
But human frailty upset the plan. Days before his retirement as Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Mike Mullen spoke harshly against our army in his testimony before the U.S. Senate. May be he was disappointed on not succeeding in Afghanistan, or may be it was his pent-up frustration over years on not being able to get our army do his bidding every time. (In an interview some time ago with the French news agency, Agence France Presse (AFP), he said Gen. Kayani could stop the terrorists if he wanted to, and then added ruefully, “I don’t know whether he will do it or not.”)
There was an outrage against Mullen in our media, though the U.S. government played down his statement, even disassociated itself from what he had said. Mullen was enraged, believing that ISI was behind it.
Since Mullen had helped Ijaz in establishing his credibility with Haqqani, he approached him for a quid pro quo. Ijaz agreed and wrote the article for the op-ed (opposite editorial) page of The Financial Times, hoping that it would discredit our army for wilting under American pressure and not taking over. The secret that was deep in his heart came out, to Haqqani’s hard luck. Ijaz himself justified the article in his interview with Sana Bucha (“Lekin!” Geo News, Nov. 14) as a counterattack to criticism against Mullen.
Haqqani must have known much about Mansoor Ijaz, such as his conservative (rightist) leanings and his links with the Pentagon (that he needs for his high-flying diplomatic freelancing). However, he did not know that Ijaz also believes in exchanging favors.

How did Haqqani try to save his skin?
The disclosure of his approach to Ijaz was a disaster for Haqqani. He thought denial would be the best way out. So, he himself contradicted Ijaz, asked the spokesman of the President and the Foreign Office to do the same. They obliged him but it was not enough for him. A contradiction from the other side was also necessary. So, he succeeded in persuading the former spokesman of Mullen to issue a carefully crafted denial. Enraged, Ijaz hit back with a long rejoinder. In fact, he went so far as to show the entire content of his Blackberry to a high official (probably of ISI) and even offered, in his interview with Sana Bucha, to appear before a Parliamentary committee or a court. Haqqani was now in a very thick soup.

Why did Haqqani approach Mullen in the first place?
As an ambassador, Haqqani should have approached the U.S. State Department for help. He could even meet Hillary Clinton. But this channel in his view could not be very productive. A warning from the Pentagon to the army would be more effective. However, he could not meet Mullen directly under the diplomatic rules. Media savvy that he is, he also wanted deniability in case something went wrong. (A message sent through an intermediary could be easily denied if ever the need arose.) Moreover, Mullen could convey the warning to Kayani in normal conversation during one of their frequent meetings, without raising any suspicion that Zardari was behind it.
Politicians with no deep roots in the masses and no confidence in their ability to govern seek help from the outside. Haqqani knew that in September 1999, the Sharif brothers became panicky and sought American help against a possible coup that they feared. Shehbaz rushed to Washington and got a strong statement issued by the State Department in favor of his brother’s government but ultimately to no avail.
In fact, Musharraf had no plan to topple Nawaz government and would not have done anything against it if the Prime Minister had not tried to remove him in a clumsy attempt that was also illegal. (Under the Army Act, no action can be taken against an officer, even a lieutenant, while he is abroad. Secondly, the army chief could not be removed unless the Defense Secretary issued a notification about it (which never happened); there was no validity to even written orders of the Prime Minister that would-be army chief, Lt Gen. Ziauddin Butt, has been showing around.

Who asked Haqqani to do it?
It is the father of all questions. Najam Sethi (“Aapis ki bat,” Geo News, Nov. 15) did a clever spin job. He implied that the army had arranged the Ijaz article, conveniently ignoring the fact that it had nothing to gain. Kayani, like Musharraf, never planned to take over. So, a warning from Mullen, even if given, did not matter. Rather, the article would give the impression that the army did want to take over but held back under an American threat.
Najam also gave an impression that Haqqani might not be guilty, only the army considered him so. He also stopped short of saying that Zardari had asked Haqqani to do it, as if Gilani or somebody else might have done it. Zardari would have been much better off if he had Najam as his official spin doctor.

Who told Zardari about a possible coup?
Good question. Our rulers are very credulous when it comes to a threat to their power. Anybody can make them panicky with a rumor of a coup, however wild. It happened with Nawaz Sharif, when some cronies told him about the possibility of a coup after the Kargil (even though the army had no such intention). No wonder, he sent his brother hastily to the U.S. to prevent it.
The same must have happened with Zardari. Somebody, who had his ear, wanted to convince him of his loyalty and also of his being very informed, told him that he would be the fall guy after the U.S. action in Abbottabad. He could be somebody Zardari trusted very much but was fed false information. Somebody in intelligence? Some journalist, who wanted to get close to the President? Time will tell.

How will it end?
Najam Sethi says that the crisis will end with the sacking or resignation of Husain Haqqani and appointment of a National Security Advisor on the recommendation of the army. It may not be that simple. The army is eyeball to eyeball with Zardari, and according to Ijazul Haq, “On the basis of my information and observation, it is a case of who moves first.”
Azizi of the popular program, “Hasb-i-Haal” (Dunya News), disclosed recently that Zardari has asked Adiala Jail authorities to keep his belongings in the room that he had occupied while there. “I may have to live there again.” The statement has not been contradicted.
According to a media report, Zardari once told a visitor, “If I make America angry, I lose this (pointing to his chair.) If the army gets angry, this will happen.” He moved his open palm across his neck.

http://mahameed-articles.blogspot.com/2011/12/some-questions-on-husain-haqqani-fiasco.html

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Memogate: What Happened Behind Closed Doors
By Aman Azhar  

Khakis versus civvies: How far will the military, led by General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani (third from top), go in squeezing the civilian government over Memogate? (From top to bottom: President Asif Zardari, Husain Haqqani, General Kayani and Lt. General Shuja Pasha). Photos: AFP

“The meeting was not too tense, but it didn’t pack any smiles either. Indeed, the matter at hand was too grave for anyone’s comfort,” said a highly placed intelligence source, who provided a sneak peek into the closed-door meeting that sealed Husain Haqqani’s fate as Pakistan’s top diplomat in Washington.

Interestingly, it wasn’t the Presidency but the prime minister’s palatial spread at the foot of the Margallas that was okayed for hosting the sensitive meeting. President Asif Zardari had to dash to the PM House (which doesn’t happen very often) to be a part of the meeting attended by the Chief of Army Staff, General Ashfaq Kayani, and his trusted ISI chief, Lt. Gen. Shuja Pasha.

“Despite under pressure to clear his name, Haqqani remained confident and pleaded his case by smooth-talking the generals, who expected him to cut a sorry figure instead,” said our intelligence source, who spoke on the condition of anonymity. “Seeing Haqqani press on with his defence, the Kayani-Pasha duo sought the prime minister’s intervention.”

Presumably, the premier was in the know about the investigation that the ISI had covertly undertaken, which also involved a meeting between Lt. General Pasha and Pakistani-American lobbyist Mansoor Ijaz in London. During the meeting, Ijaz is believed to have handed over ‘evidence’ implicating Haqqani in the Memogate scandal.

“The premier agreed to a thorough investigation led by a civilian, acceptable to the parties concerned,” our source maintains. But that isn’t the only probe on the table anymore.  The commission probing the May 2 incursions by the US Navy Seals inside Pakistan’s territory is set to interview Haqqani over his alleged role in Memogate. More recently, the Parliamentary Committee on National Security – led by PPP Senator Raza Rabbani – has been asked to investigate the matter too. A petition has also landed in the Lahore High Court, pleading that Haqqani’s name be put on the Exit Control List (ECL).

Clearly, Haqqani’s resignation has not quenched the thirst of those who believe that the Memogate affair has more to it than what meets the eye. There seems to be a general consensus among the intelligence community (both civilian and military cadres) that the link between Haqqani and Ijaz on the matter of the memo is a straightforward one. But the opinion is divided on whether the origin of the alleged conspiracy winds over to the Presidency.

Unless there is credible evidence that establishes Zardari-Haqqani complicity in the scandal, any efforts to squeeze the civilian set-up are likely to backfire. “That is probably why more bets are being placed on getting Haqqani to spill the beans by tightening the noose around him. Placing his name on the ECL happens to fit this scheme,” our source explained.  Whether the alleged plan pans out remains to be seen. But the war of nerves is certainly on.

Meanwhile, intelligence circles continue to offer different interpretations of the Memogate controversy and the circumstances surrounding the affair. “The public is duped into believing that a memo was not officially signed and [therefore] cannot be trusted. The truth is that it was a non-paper, which technically is never signed and is a valid channel used for communicating with presidents and prime ministers,” asserts a senior official with the ISI. “Such non-papers are routinely circulated for the consumption of high government functionaries and considered as official as anything else,” he maintains.

Another senior officer affiliated with a civilian intelligence outfit agrees with the memo/non-paper binary and offers his viewpoint: “The quarters terming it a non-paper presuppose a link between the Memogate saga and President Zardari. But there is as yet no evidence beyond that assumption.” He further remarked: “Chances are slim for the investigations to establish any direct connection between the Presidency and Haqqani on the question of the memo. And the khaki circles are aware of the broken link.”

Mian Abdur Rauf, a senior advocate of the Supreme Court, endorses this view. “It [a memo] is just like Note for Consideration, which is authored to negotiate a broad outline of a plan between the negotiating parties, which can include governments. And, yes, the non-paper is always unsigned because it is meant to cover footprints,” he says.

Asked if this is enough to implicate the president of the country into the affair, Rauf advises caution. “It is not so simple; it will have to be proved in a court of law that the memo was indeed linked to the person accused – if in this case President Zardari – and that [link] is a difficult one to pin down.”

Meanwhile, opposition parties have jumped into the fray to extract political mileage out of the raging controversy. Both the PML-N and Imran Khan’s Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) have sided with demands for a probe into the Memogate scandal and have sharpened their demand for an end to the rule of the “man on the hill” in Islamabad. “This is the biggest scandal to have hit the country in the recent times,” says PML-N parliamentarian Pervaiz Malik, adding that the N-League would prefer the courts to investigate the matter. “We have already gone to court with our demand for the probe. Raza Rabbani’s committee is not acceptable to us because, after all, he is a PPP man.”

Malik differed with the assertion that the PML-N and PTI have joined hands in shaking the PPP-led government over the controversy. “We are the ones who spearheaded the demand for an impartial investigation. We want the nation to know the facts behind Memogate, and we want these facts to dictate our future course of action,” he maintained.

Dr Hassan Askari Rizvi, a well-known political analyst, agrees that Memogate has opened up a new front on the political battlefield in Islamabad. “Domestic politics is intricately linked to the memo controversy and how it pans out in the near future. And quite naturally, the PPP’s political foes want the Memogate inferno to reduce the present government to ashes. But for now, it is a wait-and-see situation for them all.”

Other political observers caution that if fanned any further, the raging Memogate conflagration can tilt the political balance in favour of right-wing forces led by the likes of the PTI, PML-N and Jamaat-e-Islami. It seems plausible that at a time like this when the country is already facing the heat on the external front – the latest NATO incursion inside Pakistani territory, for instance – that Memogate will only fuel pro-right-wing sentiment further, putting progressive elements in the country on the back foot.

Will such a twist of fate be any different than what happened to Pakistan in the 1980s when a pro-Islamist regime was manufactured to front the CIA-sponsored jihad in Afghanistan? Political observers hope better sense will prevail this time around. “We’ve seen what happens [when we travel] down that alley,” says Dr Askari.

 This article originally appeared in the December 2011 issue of Newsline under the headline “Feeling the Heat.”Aman Azhar is a renowned Islamabad-based journalist who has worked for national and international publications, as well as broadcast TV networks. He is also a political analyst in addition to working as an advisor to governments on public diplomacy and strategic communications.
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Memogate’ scandal strains civil-military relations 

By Afzal Khan,  Khaleej Times


25 November 2011 A bassador Husain Haqqani’s resignation marks the culmination of only one phase of the crisis that erupted in the wake of publication of a story about a controversial memo in foreign newspapers.
 But far from bringing to a closure what Haqqani described as a “meaningless controversy” that was threatening our fledgling democracy, it signifies the opening up of another difficult and ominous chapter in the civil-military relationship that came under severe strain because of the memo scandal.

The resignation had become inevitable because of the wide exposure it got  that was labelled by Haqqani as “media trial”. On the other hand the military establishment which never approved of Haqqani’s performance in Washington build up pressure on President Asif Ali Zardari and Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani for Haqqani’s removal once it established as a result of its own investigations that he had initiated the memo. These developments had made Haqqani’s position untenable and forced him to resign. The story doesn’t end there and a more excruciating phase seems to have just begun. Haqqani claimed that he had himself resigned to save the democratic government from a difficult situation.

But the prime minister’s office said he was asked to resign following Prime Minister Gilani’s meeting with the army chief and the ISI head. It is immaterial whether Haqqani volunteered to resign or was asked to do so by the prime minister, what matters is the pressure from the establishment. The statement from the prime minister’s office that an investigation into the ‘memogate’ scandal would be conducted at an “appropriate level” and carried out fairly, objectively and without bias, is significant.

Though Haqqani has himself been demanding such probe to vindicate his position, it is obvious that those who had forced him to quit are not willing to stop there.

The opposition also wants a comprehensive inquiry seemingly in the hope to engulf the president. It would mean more uncertainty and instability in national politics with disastrous implications.

Haqqani says that more than the memo, the issue involves much bigger things. He has not elaborated but is seemingly referring to the civil-military equation. Being a close confidant of the president, his ouster marks a setback for the Presidency.

The reports that the venue of the troika meeting was shifted to the PM House instead of the Presidency and that the President was present when Haqqani was asked to clarify his position, indicated a weakening of the civilian authority.

Those who would like the constitution to prevail and establish the preeminence of elected civilian order over the uniform that is normal in democracies across the globe, must have been dismayed. The memo is now seen as a clumsy attempt to rein in the powerful security establishment that backfired.

Haqqani is not a particularly popular figure and is not known for any high sense of loyalty. But his friends and foes equally admire his ability, skill and knowledge. He has been a very effective interlocutor and, more than any of his predecessors, he was the most well connected ambassador in Washington’s influential circles including top civil and military officials and congressional leaders.

It was his misfortune that his period as envoy marked the most difficult one in the history of Pakistan-US relations for various factors beyond his capacity. The country thus could not fully avail the benefit of his potential to strengthen these ties.

Prime Minister Gilani did not lose time and named Sherry Rehman to replace Haqqani in Washington. She had quit as information minister in a row with Interior Minister Rehman Malik and felt disgusted when the president took Malik’s side. Since then she remained at odds with the Presidency which gives credence that her appointment was initiated by the prime minister and backed by the military establishment while the president only endorsed it though not willingly. It further shows him in quite an un-envious position.
news@khaleejtimes.com

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On October 10, 2011, The Financial Times published an article by Mansoor Ijaz: “Time to take on Pakistan’s Jihadist spies”. The article reads, inter alia:
Early on May 9, a week after US Special Forces stormed the hideout of Osama bin Laden and killed him, a senior Pakistani diplomat telephoned me with an urgent request. Asif Ali Zardari, Pakistan’s president, needed to communicate a message to White House national security officials that would bypass Pakistan’s military and intelligence channels. The embarrassment of bin Laden being found on Pakistani soil had humiliated Mr Zardari’s weak civilian government to such an extent that the president feared a military takeover was imminent. He needed an American fist on his army chief’s desk to end any misguided notions of a coup – and fast.
The diplomat made clear that the civilian government’s preferred channel to receive Mr Zardari’s message was Admiral Mike Mullen, chairman of the US joint chiefs of staff. He was a time-tested friend of Pakistan and could convey the necessary message with force not only to President Barack Obama, but also to Gen Kayani.
In a flurry of phone calls and emails over two days a memorandum was crafted that included a critical offer from the Pakistani president to the Obama administration: “The new national security team will eliminate Section S of the ISI charged with maintaining relations to the Taliban, Haqqani network, etc. This will dramatically improve relations with Afghanistan.
The memo was delivered to Admiral Mullen at 14.00 hours on May 10.”
A secret memo seeking Washington’s help reining in the Pakistani military has brought into sharp relief the tensions between Pakistan’s shaky civilian government and its powerful army generals. The resulting scandal threatens Pakistan’s ambassador to the U.S. and perhaps the country’s president.The ambassador, Husain Haqqani, has denied claims he was behind a a memo delivered to the U.S. military chief asking for help in installing a “new security team” in Islamabad that would be friendly to Washington.
The “memogate” scandal is adding to pressures on the already deeply unpopular government. Some analysts have speculated that President Asif Ali Zardari himself could be in danger if charges that he signed off on the memo gain traction.
“The target is not me, the target is President Zardari and Pakistani democracy,” said Haqqani, who has offered to resign over the affair.

Though Pakistan has a civilian president, the military retains vast political and economic power. It has ruled Pakistan, directly or indirectly, for most of its six-decade existence, and fiercely resisted attempts by civilian leaders to curb its role.

If authentic, the memo would fuel politically toxic charges that the government is colluding with the United States against the interests of the country and its army. Though Washington pumps huge amounts of aid into the country, the U.S. is highly unpopular here. The affair has been whipped up by rightwing critics of the government and those close to the military establishment, which doesn’t trust Haqqani.

The unsigned memo was sent soon after the May 2 raid that killed Osama bin Laden in a city outside Islamabad and was delivered to Adm. Mike Mullen, the top U.S. military officer at the time. The bin Laden raid led to intense and highly unusual domestic criticism of the army.

A Pakistani English-language newspaper, The News, and Foreign Policy’s website on Friday published the text of the memo. After initially denying any knowledge of the document, Mullen’s spokesman confirmed he received it but ignored it because it was not credible.

The memo promises to allow the U.S. to propose names of officials to investigate bin Laden’s presence in Pakistan, facilitate American attempts to target militants like al-Qaida leader Ayman al-Zawahri and Taliban chief Mullah Omar and allow the U.S. greater oversight of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons.

The memo also accuses Pakistan army chief Gen. Ashfaq Pervez Kayani of plotting to bring down the government in the aftermath of the bin Laden assassination. It asks Mullen for his “direct intervention” with Kayani to stop this.

Haqqani denied having anything to do with the note. Still, some say Zardari will have no choice but to dismiss Haqqani, a close ally. Zardari’s spokesman said Thursday that the government had not decided what action, if any, to take against the envoy, who has been summoned to Islamabad to explain the scandal.

The News also printed what it said were transcripts of Blackberry messenger conversations between Haqqani and Mansoor Ijaz, a U.S. citizen of Pakistani origin who claims to have delivered the memo to Mullen via an intermediary, on the orders of Haqqani.
Washington Posthttp://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia-pacific/memogate-scandal-threatens-pakistans-ambassador-to-us-and-possibly-president/2011/11/18/gIQAcxRZXN_story.html

Is the memo believable? by Babar Sattar

What about the Memo written by Altaf Hussain to British PM? 

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The Memo shock
Finally, the Mike Mullen memo is out in the open and forms another twist in a saga that refuses to die. The memo indeed makes for grim reading and is bound to lead to further tensions in the normally fraught civil-military relationship in the country. If there is any truth in the memo having come from an official source, an allegation strenuously denied by Ambassador to the US Husain Haqqani and the government, it is bound to have serious repercussions and raise many questions. But what stands confirmed by events outside Pakistan is that the memo was very much a reality and the government, the foreign office, the presidency and the embassy of Pakistan in Washington had been trying to obfuscate matters for many weeks in feeble attempts to somehow brush the whole matter under the carpet. The final nail in all these coffins was thumped by Admiral Mike Mullen himself who retracted his earlier denial of the memo and confirmed its receipt by going down his memory lane and asking a colleague who brought him a copy. What he did with it is irrelevant but what is important is that he did receive it. The probe, reportedly ordered by President Zardari after meeting General Kayani, has now a new and simple job to complete — to identify and punish the culprits. The charge has been established, the evidence has been provided and the jury now must give its verdict.

The six points of the memo make for sensational reading: the Pakistan Army and the intelligence agencies were declared to be complicit in harbouring Osama bin Laden, an inquiry commission was promised in which Americans would sit in judgment which has also been announced in advance, US troops would be given carte blanche and a green light to conduct operations on Pakistani soil, a new national security team would be put in place and Pakistan’s nuclear assets would be put under a verification regime, disciplined as the memo says. The ISI would be cut down to size and Pakistani officers would be handed over to India. All this would be done if the US intervened against the Pakistan Army and supported the civilian political set-up. The memo clearly suggests that the top civilian echelons of the country made all these shocking commitments. What now? This is a million-dollar question. The government cannot be expected to do anything meaningful, as its topmost echelons could be a party to the dispute. The military it seems was the target. So a third party has to pick up the thread and take this case to its logical end. The only credible institution to do this is the judiciary and specifically the Supreme Court. The media has done its job and it is now for the judges to examine all the available evidence.
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Mullen's secret memo

WASHINGTON: Geo News has received the controversial memo that was allegedly given by Mansoor Ijaz, an American citizen of Pakistani origin, to Admiral Mike Mullen who was the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff at the time. Mansoor Ijaz has claimed that the memo was handed over to him by the Pakistan Ambassador and was asked to deliver to the US president containing message from the Pakistan government. The memo was sent to Adm Mike Millen on May10. According to the memo, a commission will be formed to probe the presence of Osama bin Laden in Abbottabad as civil government is under army's pressure. It has been demanded in the memo that Adm Mike Mullen should convey a strict message to the army leadership.
"Request your direct intervention in conveying a strong, urgent and direct message to Gen Kayani that delivers Washington's demand for him and Gen Pasha to end their brinkmanship aimed at bringing down the civilian apparatus."
It is important to note that Adm Mike Mullen has confirmed the receiving of the memo on Thursday.
Following is the complete text of memo:

BRIEFING FOR ADM. MIKE MULLEN, CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

During the past 72 hours since a meeting was held between the president, the prime minister and the chief of army staff, there has seen a significant deterioration in Pakistan's political atmosphere. Increasingly desperate efforts by the various agencies and factions within the government to find a home - ISI and/or Army, or the civilian government - for assigning blame over the UBL raid now dominate the tug of war between military and civilian sectors. Subsequent tit-for-tat reactions, including outing of the CIA station chief's name in Islamabad by ISI officials, demonstrates a dangerous devolution of the ground situation in Islamabad where no central control appears to be in place.

Civilians cannot withstand much more of the hard pressure being delivered from the Army to succumb to wholesale changes. If civilians are forced from power, Pakistan becomes a sanctuary for UBL's legacy and potentially the platform for far more rapid spread of al Qaeda's brand of fanaticism and terror. A unique window of opportunity exists for the civilians to gain the upper hand over army and intelligence directorates due to their complicity in the UBL matter.

Request your direct intervention in conveying a strong, urgent and direct message to Gen Kayani that delivers Washington's demand for him and Gen Pasha to end their brinkmanship aimed at bringing down the civilian apparatus - that this is a 1971 moment in Pakistan's history. Should you be willing to do so, Washington's political/military backing would result in a revamp of the civilian government that, while weak at the top echelon in terms of strategic direction and implementation (even though mandated by domestic political forces), in a wholesale manner replaces the national security adviser and other national security officials with trusted advisers that include ex-military and civilian leaders favorably viewed by Washington, each of whom have long and historical ties to the US military, political and intelligence communities. Names will be provided to you in a face-to-face meeting with the person delivering this message.

In the event Washington's direct intervention behind the scenes can be secured through your personal communication with Kayani (he will likely listen only to you at this moment) to stand down the Pakistani military-intelligence establishment, the new national security team is prepared, with full backing of the civilian apparatus, to do the following:

1. President of Pakistan will order an independent inquiry into the allegations that Pakistan harbored and offered assistance to UBL and other senior Qaeda operatives. The White House can suggest names of independent investigators to populate the panel, along the lines of the bipartisan 9-11 Commission, for example.

2. The inquiry will be accountable and independent, and result in findings of tangible value to the US government and the American people that identify with exacting detail those elements responsible for harboring and aiding UBL inside and close to the inner ring of influence in Pakistan's Government (civilian, intelligence directorates and military). It is certain that the UBL Commission will result in immediate termination of active service officers in the appropriate government offices and agencies found responsible for complicity in assisting UBL.

3. The new national security team will implement a policy of either handing over those left in the leadership of Al Qaeda or other affiliated terrorist groups who are still on Pakistani soil, including Ayman Al Zawahiri, Mullah Omar and Sirajuddin Haqqani, or giving US military forces a "green light" to conduct the necessary operations to capture or kill them on Pakistani soil. This "carte blanche" guarantee is not without political risks, but should demonstrate the new group's commitment to rooting out bad elements on our soil. This commitment has the backing of the top echelon on the civilian side of our house, and we will insure necessary collateral support.

4. One of the great fears of the military-intelligence establishment is that with your stealth capabilities to enter and exit Pakistani airspace at will, Pakistan's nuclear assets are now legitimate targets. The new national security team is prepared, with full backing of the Pakistani government - initially civilian but eventually all three power centers - to develop an acceptable framework of discipline for the nuclear program. This effort was begun under the previous military regime, with acceptable results. We are prepared to reactivate those ideas and build on them in a way that brings Pakistan's nuclear assets under a more verifiable, transparent regime.

5. The new national security team will eliminate Section S of the ISI charged with maintaining relations to the Taliban, Haqqani network, etc. This will dramatically improve relations with Afghanistan.

6. We are prepared to cooperate fully under the new national security team's guidance with the Indian government on bringing all perpetrators of Pakistani origin to account for the 2008 Mumbai attacks, whether outside government or inside any part of the government, including its intelligence agencies. This includes handing over those against whom sufficient evidence exists of guilt to the Indian security services.

Pakistan faces a decision point of unprecedented importance. We, who believe in democratic governance and building a much better structural relationship in the region with India AND Afghanistan, seek US assistance to help us pigeon-hole the forces lined up against your interests and ours, including containment of certain elements inside our country that require appropriate re-sets and re-tasking in terms of direction and extent of responsibility after the UBL affair.

We submit this memorandum for your consideration collectively as the members of the new national security team who will be inducted by the President of Pakistan with your support in this undertaking.

Mansoor says Mullen wanted Zardari's clearance of memo

LONDON: US businessman Mansoor Ijaz who broke all hell in the world media by releasing the evidence of his secret Memo to Admiral Mike Mullen said on Friday Mullen insisted on having the ambassador's offers put in writing because the US government had been repeatedly deceived by Pakistan's verbal offers of action in the recent past.

"He also insisted that I obtain the ambassador's assurance that President Zardari had approved the offers contained in the memorandum. I did exactly those two things," he told The News.

Speaking after Admiral Mullen confirmed the Memo, Mansoor said at 09:06:16 hours, "I spoke to Amb Haqqani at his London hotel (Park Lane Intercontinental Room 430) in a call lasting 11:16 minutes.

"During this call, he confirmed that the final text of the Memorandum was okay and that he had "the boss' approval" that the memorandum could be sent to Admiral Mullen. The boss was an obvious reference to President Zardari," Mansoor insisted.

He also revealed that at 08:45:43 on Tuesday, May 10, 2011, the final draft of the memorandum was sent to the ambassador's private e-mail address. At 08:47, I sent him a BBM reminder to have a look, and that we needed to have a short call for him to verbally confirm everything was GO. The memorandum's contents had been drawn from calls with the ambassador and instructions given by him to me in drafting it. The content of the memo entirely originated from the ambassador (and perhaps those instructing him elsewhere). At 14:51:33 (about 9am in Washington DC), I called my US interlocutor and informed him we were GO and that the memorandum could be delivered. At 1400 hrs on Tuesday, May 10, 2011, Admiral Mullen received the memorandum from my US interlocutor."
Updates are available at: http://www.geo.tv/important_events/2011/mullenmemo/pages/english_news.asp
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