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Showing posts with label Narrative. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Narrative. Show all posts

Ideology, Narratives of Terrorists: The Contrasting experiences of kidnapped

MANY look upon militants as irrational creatures, criminals, or a mere bunch of thugs. The story of Ali Haider Gilani, however, offers a different perspective. In his three years of internment by Al Qaeda, Gilani seems to have realised that militants have ideological motives, and that their real strength lies in their politico-ideological narratives.

By contrast, the tale Shahbaz Taseer tells endorses a more commonplace description of militants. The latter brutally tortured him during his confinement. Taseer was kidnapped for ransom, unlike Gilani, who was purportedly kidnapped by militants as leverage to have their colleagues released from Pakistani jails. The self-described accounts given by both young men show two different sides of the Islamist militants. Their contrasting experiences in confinement have social value too. Their stories help us understand the character of militants operating in our region.

Two different groups, Al Qaeda and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), had respectively abducted Ali Haider Gilani, son of former prime minister Yousuf Raza Gilani, and Shahbaz Taseer, son of assassinated governor of Punjab Salmaan Taseer. While both groups have foreign origins, the former has strong links with local militants. Shahbaz Taseer’s abductor, IMU, is a Central Asian militant group, and has always retained its independent identity while operating in parts of Pakistan’s tribal areas.

Notorious for its brutality, IMU did not get along well with most Pakistani militant groups, and some even resisted it. For instance, the then Taliban commander Mullah Nazir expelled IMU militants from South Waziristan in 2007. Recently, the Afghan Taliban, perceiving the group as troublesome, launched a large operation against it in the Zabul province of Afghanistan. The fighting reportedly led to Shahbaz Taseer’s freedom.

The experiences of Gilani and Taseer can help one understand the impact of extremist narratives on our youth.

The impression one gets is that the long periods of confinement have had some impact on the characters of both these young men but to varying degrees and in different ways. Taseer’s recently published article in The New York Times, and his interview with the BBC, basically narrate the five years of his sufferings — during which solitary confinement, loneliness, doubt, and anxiety triggered an internal conflict. Religion came to his rescue in the form of spiritual healing. His confinement became a journey of self-consciousness and self-discovery.

Ali Haider received better treatment from his Al Qaeda captors, and was even allowed to debate with them on different issues. The story he reported to the media explains the ideological context of Al Qaeda’s involvement in militancy. Going by his statements, he appears to understand the character of the militants and their aspirations for the enforcement of Sharia. However, he disagrees with their approach to achieving this purpose through violent means — instead, he believes that it is incumbent on people to incorporate Sharia in their personal capacity through their own will. His captivity has enhanced his religious, political and social understanding in the context of social change. Mainly, his journey has been to explore the outside world.

Both perspectives are important, as these help us understand how different narratives influence the minds of ordinary men and shape their behaviour. Importantly, their experiences could be used to understand how extremist narratives and tendencies are impacting Pakistan’s educated youth.

The state, power elites and clergy have created such a complex web of narratives, that it is hard to breach them with ‘alternative’ narratives. In Pakistan, a variety of ideological models, entrenched in religious tendencies, are available. These offer models of socio-political change in society, ranging from non-violent to violent options. Ordinary men, especially younger ones, have to choose between such models for their socio-political connection with society. Many confuse different models, and many are vulnerable to choosing the more extreme models. Gilani interacted with the sort of men who chose an extreme model, but he thinks non-violent options have not yet been fully exploited.

Gilani’s understanding of the militant groups is also commendable as he can differentiate among various groups. He endorses the perception that the TTP and Jamaatul Ahrar are part of the ‘bad Taliban’, with the former already on India’s payroll and the latter still in the process of making a deal. He himself was kidnapped by the Sajna group, once counted among the ‘good Taliban’, to secure the release of Al Qaeda prisoners.

One important revelation made by Gilani is that the Taliban’s jihad movement is transforming into a nationalist movement and that militants are turning against Punjab, inspired by the notion of Pakhtun nationalism. However, militants’ publications and other open sources do not indicate that they have been divided along ethnic lines.

Yet, they do have grievances against Punjab, as they think the establishment comes mainly from this province. Gilani also cautioned that Al Qaeda’s sleeper cells are still active in south Punjab, while the group has its subcontinental headquarters in Karachi. Most importantly, he conveyed that militant narratives still remain attractive in Pakistan.

While Shahbaz Taseer also hails from a political family, his confinement experiences sound completely different. It seems that he experienced things from a spiritual perspective, with little political or social nuance. His experience might be noteworthy in the context of the argument that Islam’s political appeal is increasing even as its spiritual appeal is decreasing.

Religious discourse has been extensively transformed in South Asia, especially in Pakistan. Groups and parties have taken over such discourse for political purposes, including those who tag themselves as spiritual leaders. The custodians of so-called Sufi traditions have become part of social and political elites. Hyper-urbanisation is also conducive to religiosity, with the latter’s social value that could provide some meaning to one’s daily life and connectivity with other social groups. It is interesting that those religious movements which provide broader connectivity are more popular in the country, such as Tableeghi Jamaat, Dawat-i-Islami, Al Huda, etc. The social connectivity that these groups provide, leans more towards ideological and political exposure than spiritual.

In an atmosphere where the practice of religion is increasingly taking on political and ideological overtones, the Sufi tradition is being undermined, and spiritual experiences are no longer able to generate a counter response to extremism.

The writer is a security analyst.

http://www.dawn.com/news/1259881/contrasting-experiences

The founder lost

For the past few years I have been researching literature written on the life of Pakistan`s founder, Mohammad Ali Jinnah; and also scholarly works which quote him extensively to substantiate theories about what Pakistan is (or was supposed to be).

The exercise is a pursuit to trace the evolution of the image of a man who passed away just a year after the creation of a country that he had so painstakingly put on the map.

My research in this context has produced multiple Jinnahs; each one echoing the zeitgeist or a particular mood of the period in which he was written into books, essays and speeches.

Most interesting is the fact that between the creation of Pakistan in 1947 and the late 1950s, not much was written on him.

The 1950s were a highly mutable period in the history of Pakistan. The country`s founding party, the All-India Muslim League, in its new incarnation as Pakistan Muslim League, was constantly ravaged by infighting, and unable to address the many economic, ethnic and religious challenges that had sprung up when a minority of India became a majority in Pakistan.

My research suggests that, on an intellectual level, problems in this context were hardly ever tackled by evoking Jinnah`s sayings or personality.

Instead, the government and the state depended more on the works of poet and philosopher, Muhammad Iqbal. For example, in 1953, when anti-Ahmadiyya riots in the Punjab spiraled out of control, the government`s response was late but stern. It imposed Martial Law in the province which eventually crushed the riots.

Then, to undermine the men who had instigated the riots, the government published the Urdu translation of a booklet authored by respected Muslim scholar, Dr. Khalifa Abdul Hakim. Called `Iqbal and Mullah`, it cited heavily (and selectively) Iqbal`s scathing criticism of clerics.

In 1956, when the indirectly-elected Constituent Assembly of the country passed the country`s first constitution, many of the text`s authors explained the supposed balance between the religious and the worldly in the constitution by citing Iqbal`s ideas of `spiritual democracy`.

Again, there was little or no mention of Jinnah.

What`s more, Jinnah`s sister who had authored a book on her brother was dissuaded (by the government) to publish it. The book was not published until 1987.

In 1954, the government authorised British writer, Hector Bolitho, to write a biography ofJinnah. But the published version was heavily censored. Entire quotes of Mr Jinnah were removed from the f`inal text while others were altered.

It was as if`the state and government of Pakistan in the 1950s had failed to f`ind any use f`or Jinnah`s thoughts in an era in which the country found itself reeling from multiple political and economic crevices. Perhaps Jinnah`s memory had seemed to be too multicultural in tone and tenor to a state try-ing to enforce a more monolithic idea of Pakistan? But this attitude was radically altered by the arrival of the Ayub Khan regime in 1958. He became the first Pakistani ruler to promptly start placing Jinnah`s portrait alongside his own in public rallies.

In his quest to modernise Pakistan, he constantly evoked Jinnah as a progressive Muslim. In April 1962, his government published a hefty book containing Jinnah`s speeches. In it were also quotes and sayings that had been censored out from Bolitho`s 1956 biography of Jinnah.

Ayub pulled out Jinnah from the confines he had been relegated to in the 1950s. His regime presented the founder as a man who wanted a modern Muslim-majority state with a strong economy (based on industrialisation), and a powerful army willing to defend the country`s physical and ideological boundaries.

This image of Jinnah was reinforced in books such as 1965`s Struggle for Pakistan (by IH Qureshi); 1966`s Quaid-i-Azam as Seen by his Contemporaries (a compilation of essays); and in 1969`s Jinnah: Founder of Pakistan published by the Information Ministry.Ayub`s opponents on the right rejected this image. They suggested that since Jinnah could not formulate a cohesive ideology (due to his demise soon after Pakistan`s creation), the Ulema should take the lead in framing Pakistan`s ideological direction because the country was made in the name of Islam.

Ayub responded by claiming that this was not possible because most Ulema were opposed to Jinnah andthat Jinnah did not want a theological state.

Much of the literature on Jinnah in the 1960s advances Ayub`s image of the founder. But this image began to change when Z.A. Bhutto`s leftleaning PPP came to power in December 1971.

Coming in on the back of a manifesto promising `socialist reforms`, one of the first signs of another change in Jinnah`s image emerged in a 1973 press advertisement of the Board of Industrial Management. In it, Jinnah`s portrait appears with a 1945 quote of his in which he emphasises the importance of nationalising important industries.

As by the mid-1970s, Bhutto had begun to place himself somewhere between left-liberalism, nationalism and `political Islam`, the brief experiment of weaving a socialist Jinnah quickly gave way to propagating a charismatic and nationalist one.

In 1976, the Bhutto regime formed the Quaid-iAzam Academy. A plethora of literature on Jinnah appeared. In 1976, 12 books on Jinnah were published alone, with most of them presenting him as a charismatic and populist nationalist, who wanted to construct a strong democratic Muslim country. An image Bhutto also wantedfor himself.

Also in 1976, appeared Sharif Al Mujahid`s Ideological Orientation of Pakistan. Published during a period in which the Bhutto regime had moved considerably to the right, the book portrayed Jinnah as a man who worked on building a separate `Islamic polity` as conceived by Iqbal.

Jinnah`s image was changing again. After Bhutto was toppled in a reactionary military coup by Gen Zia in July 1977, the new regime announced the `discovery` of a diary kept by Jinnah. In the diary, Zia claimed, Jinnah had scorned at democracy and wanted a state based on Islamic dictates and a strong army.

The claim was debunked by the surviving contemporaries of Jinnah and the regime went quiet on the issue. Unable to justify its intransigent policies with any of Jinnah`s quotes, the Zia regime `advised` state-owned media to only use those quotes of the founder in which he mentioned faith.

In the 1980s, powerful independent scholarship on Jinnah too began to emerge. It severely tested and debunked Zia`s image of Jinnah. Stanley Wolpert`s Jinnah of Pakistan (1982) and Ayesha Jalal`s The Sole Spokesman (1985), completely turned Zia`s image of Jinnah on its head, present-ing the founder more like the modern, enlightened Jinnah first put forward by the Ayub regime.

As a response, the Zia government pulled out Iqbal`s writings on religion. This was ironic because, in the 1950s, the state had used Iqbal to undermine the so-called fundamentalists; in the 1980s, Iqbal began to be posed (by the state) as an anti-thesis to the alternate image of Jinnah which began to appear from independent scholarship.

So whereas Iqbal was used in the 1950s to counter religious radicalism, in the 1980s, he began to be used to counter those debunking Zia`s idea of Pakistan and Jinnah. It was all a matter of cherry-picking (out of context) from Iqbal`s vast works in philosophy and poetry.

Not much has changed since. If one read`s Riaz Ahmad`s book, Iqbal`s letters to Quaid-iAzam (1976), one finds that both men were on the same page on various subjects. But Iqbal passed away almost a decade before the creation of Pakistan.

Maybe this is why ever since the 1970s, ideologues, politicians, dictators, theologians and intellectuals have (rather convolutedly) placed both men on the opposite poles of numerous debates on democracy, faith, state and polities.
By Nadeem F Paracha
24 April 2016
Dawn.com

Bad projections


Terrorists killing children. This article should end right here. But the killings go on.

When an ogre detonated his suicide vest in Lahore`s Moon Market some years ago, dozens of children lost their lives. Four years later, over 140 students were ruthlessly slaughtered at a school in Peshawar. And last Sunday many children werekilled in a blast at a children`s park in Lahore. Dozens were mere babies.

But life goes on. There is always a tomorrow in which to live, as if a brutal yesterday did not happen. Repress, repress and repress that terrible memory. So many ways to do it. Become a deflector: `The extremists are foreign agents.` Even if they are, exactly how does it make the meaningless, heartless attacks on crowds of women and children any less painful? I really don`t care what country or faith the ogres belong to. They were all born human who mutated into becoming monsters. Agents, maybe, but many of them were born here. Right here. And theybelieve and claim to be better Muslims than you and I. And certainly better people than the country`s so-called `minorities`.

So repress, repress and repress this terrible dilemma. So many ways to do it. Become an apologist: `Poverty and injustice are driving them to do it`. Driving them to do what? Kill children? Slaughter women? Massacre men? And if`poverty and injusticeare the real culprits, then the `agents` are in the right? Make up your minds, already. Either the ogres are enemy agents or victims of poverty and injustice. You can`t. Because you are quite clearly confused. Or worse, you simply replace agent with victim (and then vice versa), according to whatever suits your knee-jerk argument.

But thank you for trying to soften the unimaginable distress and pain suffered by mothers who lost their children and the children who lost their mothers in terror attacks. Thank you for making them feel a lot better by telling them that the killers were agents. I am sure they have overcometheir grief.

So, repress, repress and repress the terrible realisation that the ogres might just be from among us. So many ways to repress this awkward feeling. Become a radical `expert`. After all, Israeli military killing Palestinian children makes it alright for our poverty-stricken brothers here to kill Pakistani children. Or are they agents? Stupid question.

It`s all connected: 9/11, 7/7, Paris, Brussels, Lahore, Karachi, Peshawar, Baghdad, Istanbul ... all done by a powerful, all-encompassing, sinister lobby out to discredit our faith. Ah, so the ogres are employed by this lobby? Stupid question.

They are poverty-stricken and have faced great injustice from the state of Pakistan.

Ah, so they are not serving the sinister lobby? They are, but they do not know this.

Or they do know this, but poverty and injustice have made them vulnerable to exploitation by sinister lobbies. So they are brotheragents then? What about those who were living pretty decent lives and came from relatively wellto-do backgrounds but decided to become terrorists? It`s simple. They feel the pain of their brothers stricken by poverty and injustice.

So they are not agents but brothers and sisters with deep feelings who too have become agents because they have deep feelings for their faith and the fate of their brothers (and some sisters).

There you go. That`s it. Perfectly okay then for agent-brothers to slaughter women and children. And anyone ever calling you confused, or just plain dumb, is, of course, an enemy agent serving the lobby out to destroy our faith. So, shouldn`t this make them brother-agents as well? Stupid question. Move on.

This article has deteriorated into becoming a cyclic farce. Quite like the arguments and rationales of apologists. How else are they to be understood? They have become unintentional self-parodies.

One can snicker at their foolhardy mutterings, but know this: the ogres can also be described as alter egos of the apologists. It can be a TV anchor, a confused middle-class lad, a politician in the assembly, or even a rich aunt who has recently rediscovered piety.

Truth is, the ogres may as well be anarchic projections of what lies inside the apologists; but is repressed. The enemy is quite literally within.

And notice this: colleagues across the nation`s offices will readily discuss a cricket match or a funny viral video. But most simply keep quiet about a terror attack. So what is it? Shame or just plain apathy?
By Nadeem F Piracha
http://epaper.dawn.com/DetailImage.php?StoryImage=03_04_2016_424_002

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War of Narratives

PHOTO: AFP
Can Pakistan ever successfully develop an effective counter-extremist narrative? Would this help in changing the present self-destructive national course we have taken under the existing narrative? These questions are very relevant in the Pakistan of today. It is important to ask a few more questions here: did the existing narrative intensify the terrorist build-up in Pakistan by reinforcing terrorist organisations? If yes, does this narrative push Pakistan further along its self-destructive course? How does the existing narrative impact our impressionable youth? How does it turn them into foot-soldiers of terrorist organisations? And what kind of alternative narrative can help Pakistan change its course for the better?
Even if a new narrative can help, it is not easy to articulate or develop it. The present narrative is rooted in a paradigm promoting the sense that Pakistan is not a regular, normal state but a gift of God to Muslims of the subcontinent. According to this narrative, Pakistan has been under threat from external actors from the very moment of its inception and it needs to be saved and hence our national security state structure.
Those urging the development of a counterterror narrative assert that it should represent a new policy and a fresh standing of Pakistan in the comity of nations under a new perspective on nationhood, statehood and democracy. The present narrative, on the other hand, is of the view that we face the choice between either surviving as a nation or holding on to a democratic system — deeming the two mutually exclusive in the Pakistani context.
Lately, the official version on terrorism has started asserting that Pakistan is threatened more by internal forces than external ones. The instruments of internal forces that torment Pakistan are extremism and terrorism. However, while the National Action Plan has been launched with the resolve that the present narrative will be scrapped, it does not allow the scrapping of our security paradigm and policy that are at the root of this narrative.
There should be little problem in naming the sponsors of the existing narrative. They are the flag-bearers of the ‘national interest’, which, according to these flag-bearers, cannot be served without Pakistan continuing to be a national security state. In the past, this view bred terrorists and allowed organised manipulators to turn them into their foot-soldiers. A sizable proportion of the Pakistan population, for one reason or the other, has long supported the extremist and terrorist narrative. This happened because our paradigm as a national security state was glorified and terrorist organisations were considered instruments of this national security state.
The media, intelligentsia and political forces have only now begun to fear that the present national narrative is working against Pakistan and its people. Questions about the sponsors of this narrative are being asked more frequently ever since the launch of Operation Zarb-e-Azb. But these questions are not being asked as forcefully as they should be. While it is becoming a trend in the media and the academia to seek a national narrative that espouses peace, development and counterterrorism objectives, whether such a narrative can actually help the cause of peace remains to be seen.
Those striving for an alternative narrative first need to identify the sponsors of the present narrative and their political motives, their gains and ultimate stakes in the national drift. The harbingers of this narrative can be categorised as ideological, political and financial beneficiaries. The biggest achievement of the present narrative has been in its neutralising of the forces that could do something to stop extremism from seeping into the power structure.
What we must remember is that the new counterterror narrative, among other things, should focus on helping reduce the present civil-military divide. Any counterterror narrative that targets the military as the sole entity that coined and indoctrinated the extremist narrative into national arteries would only help the cause of terrorists. At the same time, no counterterror narrative can be articulated without recognising the urgent need for restructuring the state of Pakistan on democratic lines. If the present narrative has injected life into those power centres that have disrupted national life, the alternative narrative should avoid reinforcing another set of disruptive stakeholders in the name of democracy. It should rather seek political strength for democratic forces through civil-military reconciliation and restructuring of the state on anti-disruptive lines. 
Published in The Express Tribune, February 10th,  2016. http://tribune.com.pk/story/1043365/the-war-of-narratives/
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Fighting Terrorism: In the name of narratives

“THIS is a war of narratives ... there is a dire need to come up with counter-narratives ... the menace of terrorism cannot be dealt with without countering the extremist, militant ideologies.” >>>>>
These are some of the statements which have been echoing in our ears for the last several years. In particular, whenever some tragic terrorist incident takes place, such voices become louder in the public discourse. Apparently, the debate on extremism has been stuck somewhere in the fold of narratives.
The list of terms such as ‘narrative’, ‘counter-narrative’, and ‘ideological response’ has become so extensive that at times people wittily demand that the state must establish an authority to control narratives. However, the government has in fact assigned the National Counter-Terrorism Authority (Nacta) the task of developing counter-narratives. One can imagine how the bureaucracy will deal with the issue.
No doubt the challenge of militancy is a complex one and the state is in a hurry to fix it. The state wants to immediately address terrorism and extremism, but at the same time does not want to disturb the socio-religious and political structures of the state. Basically, the state’s perception of narratives is simplistic and not only the government but also a part of the intelligentsia believe that narratives can be produced ‘to order’. When a set of narratives expires or becomes counterproductive, replace it immediately with another set of narratives. Apparently it is as simple as that.
Pakistan has two major paradigms which nurture narratives. First is strictly religious and the state has not only owned it but also considers itself the custodian of this domain. The second is secular — also tagged as the alternative paradigm — which entails the establishment of a modern and progressive society. The whole paraphernalia of extremism has been built on state-owned narratives.
But now the state wants to clean the troubling narratives and appears accommodative to alternative narratives. It will not mind if the secular intelligentsia provides a remedy to get rid of terrorism. However, this should not be conceived as a paradigm shift.
Interestingly, the secular intelligentsia suggests a long-term solution, which ranges from curriculum reforms to spaces for cultural expression and transformation of state-society relations. Obviously, this is not going to address the immediate issue of terrorism. Perhaps this is why the state falls back on its religious-ideological allies for help in the ‘war of narratives’.

Narratives are neither slogans nor jingles; they reflect the mindset of a nation.


Having become part of the power elite, the clergy offers its services. However, the religious leadership has failed to offer a concrete solution. Mere ‘condemnation’ of acts of terrorism and calling the culprits ‘misguided’ is not going to serve the purpose. Nor is it going to build an effective counter-narrative to reduce the appeal of extremist ideologies.
The real strength of religious extremists is their ideological framework, which has been built on religious arguments and strengthened by political arguments. In this context, this is not merely a war of superficial narratives but is deeply linked to religious arguments or interpretation of Islamic precepts. The religious elite is either not ready or incapable of coming up with counter arguments. A rational framework for countering the militancy challenge is missing.
Are there any alternative solutions to counter terrorism? The answer is yes and the state is already employing some. The military operations are one of the effective responses to address the insurgency part of the problem. The National Action Plan was another solution to address a few immediate issues and to institutionalise the responses.
However, though the military operations weakened terrorist networks, NAP has not effectively backed up the military responses. For one, the security institutions remained confused about banned militant groups, which have become sources of recruitment for international terrorist organisations including the militant Islamic State.
Secondly, the government rightly or wrongly conceived NAP’s point of curbing hate speech as an alternative to counter-extremism measures. However, the mother of all problems remains the lack of trust and coordination within the law-enforcement agencies. Nacta was created to fill this gap, but the authority prefers the job of controlling narratives rather than leading the war on terrorism from the front.
Usually, the lack of cooperation from powerful security and law-enforcement agencies is blamed for the ineffectiveness of Nacta, but the government itself has not provided the proper resources and support which could make the counterterrorism body functional and effective. Interestingly, Nacta chooses the most difficult task for itself erroneously thinking that it will not face any resistance from any institution while creating counter-narratives.
Narratives are neither slogans nor jingles. They reflect the larger consensus as well as the mindset of a nation. They are deep-rooted in culture and the behaviour of individuals and society, but most importantly are based on a rational framework. This framework entails certain values that, when followed, guide and shape behaviour. The state has an important role in such practices but with the consent and consensus of society.
The state can facilitate a process where different segments of society — with diverse shades of opinion and different cultural, social and intellectual backgrounds — can engage in dialogue. The government can establish a national dialogue forum. It can serve as a platform for scholars, academicians, political and religious leaders and policymakers to bring all key challenges to the discussion table to understand each other’s viewpoints.
Only an argument can counter an argument. Thus, sharp and rational arguments will be created and effective counter-narratives nurtured.
However, arguments cannot provide immediate relief from terrorism. Purely from the security perspective, the government needs to sharpen its operational edge as well. The focus should not remain on military operations alone. Instead, provincial counterterrorism bodies must share more responsibilities. For this purpose, counterterrorism departments will require more human resources, funds, training and above all cooperation from other law-enforcement agencies.
But this is the dilemma the state has been facing for the last one-and-a-half decade — believing that narra­­tives can fill the void of operational coordination.
The writer is a security analyst.

The real War against Terror is the war of Ideology, Narrative, Discourse


Fighting Terrorism: In the name of narratives: “THIS is a war of narratives ... there is a dire need to come up with counter-narratives ... the menace of terrorism cannot be dealt with without countering the extremist, militant ideologies.”

 ... On the contrary, the solution lies in presenting a counter narrative to the existing narrative on religion. Its details can be looked up in the ...

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