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Smashing the Conspiracy of Silence: MQM & Mirza

Didn’t we all know what was wrong with Karachi? Weren’t we familiar with the cult of violence devouring the city? Extortion in Urdu has an expressive equivalent: ‘bhatha’. Didn’t we all know who the greatest collectors of ‘bhatha’ were?


But while this knowledge was inscribed on the tablets of our minds, it was knowledge that dared not speak its name. For the consequences of speaking out were swift and terrible: a bullet in the neck, if you were lucky; drill machines and your shroud in the form of a gunny bag if you were out of luck. We were so brave about exercising our freedom of expression when it came to the sins of politicians, the unholy role of generals and the ISI, Pervez Musharraf’s many transgressions.

But something happened to our courage when it came to Karachi. Our admirable attachment to freedom of expression lost its sting, intrepid anchors lost the use of their tongues, newspaper editors became paragons of moderation, choosing discretion over valour.

So all of us – analysts, certified patriots, screeching politicos – spoke of Karachi in a circular manner, never saying anything directly. Karachi taught us to be masters of the roundabout phrase.

This literary expertise, this gift for indirect speech, had unforeseen consequences. Terrible as the violence was, the conspiracy of silence was in a way far worse for it imprisoned our minds. And the killers enjoyed a free hand because no one was willing to name them. They spread a pall of fear over the city, especially its less favoured parts where their hegemony was unchallenged, and made a thriving business of collecting extortion money...doing so with impunity, their writ uncontested, because there was no one to name them, far be it from anyone to nab them.

Until, that is, Dr Zulfiqar Mirza’s bombshell news conference. This was not just political theatre, although it was this too, but something much more, something far bigger: an event to change, perhaps dramatically alter, things as they were. The status quo has been attacked. The conspiracy of silence and lies has been rudely shattered. The truth we always knew but now it is not only out, it lies exposed. A name, finally, has been given to the spectre haunting Karachi. The age of equivocations, of dodging around the truth, is over. Nothing can be the same again.

The MQM is shell-shocked, as it has every right to be. The allegations against it, backed by chapter and verse and some documents, were virtually on oath, Mirza with a hand on the Quran throughout his tour de force, at times holding the holy book to his head. It was a bravura performance during which Mirza, to my surprise I must say, was never at a loss for words. Occasionally, he was also devastatingly funny, as when he dilated upon Interior Minister Rehman Malik’s steady adherence to the unvarnished truth.

Naming MQM killers, holding the MQM responsible for the killing of the journalist Wali Babar – again naming names – referring to the recent attack on a police van in which many policemen were killed and again accusing the MQM for this. Accusing the MQM of being behind the killing of its own former leader Imran Farooq, and saying that in 2001 Altaf Hussain had written to then British prime minister Tony Blair offering to organise pro-western demonstrations in Karachi and elsewhere and calling upon the West to help disband the ISI lest it produce more Osama bin Ladens – to characterise these charges as explosive would be the under-statement of the century.

When was the last time such a thing happened? That too before a rapt nation-wide audience, hanging on to his every word and scarcely believing the evidence of its ears.

But there was also enough dynamite to shake the Presidency. For an attack on Rehman Malik is an attack on President Asif Zardari, Malik’s ultimate protector. Malik is a Zardari creature, owing everything to him, being of no account in political terms on his own. If Mirza says that if anything happens to Pakistan, Malik will be responsible, Zardari indirectly is also touched by the accusation. As he is by Mirza’s no-holds-barred attacks on the MQM, for who is the master-architect of the alliance with the MQM? President Zardari.

Remember also that Mirza’s language, his tone, are not his alone. He has touched a chord, and a burning one at that, expressive of sentiments passionately shared across the length and breadth of rural Sindh, including amongst the PPP’s own power-base. He can be excommunicated from the PPP but his views are not easily ignored.

Mirza has not so much thrown down the gauntlet as exposed the Republic’s nakedness in Karachi, the lies fuelling the bonfire of violence consuming the city. Like it or not, this is a call for action. If his charges are not refuted, if the names he has named are not denied, the government comes under a responsibility to act. But will it?

It is a safe bet that Zardari, a master of masterly inactivity, his forte presiding over a state of paralysis and construing it as cleverness, will do nothing. He will be hoping that like previous storms, this one too will pass. His instinct will be to preserve the alliance with the MQM even if the cup of popular cynicism boils over. This approach might work in normal times but after Mirza’s fireworks we are beyond the politics of the routine. This is different. The ball has already been flung into other courts.

The Supreme Court, reduced to a state of helplessness by the government’s stonewalling on a range of issues, has at last found a cause, the situation in Karachi, worthy of its suo moto consideration. It will be strange if Mirza is not called upon to testify and if and when he does it will become the responsibility of the Supreme Court to act, to issue clear directions, on the information he imparts.

Two great issues, overshadowing others, threaten Pakistan’s peace and security: religious extremism and the Taliban threat from the north-west; and the politics of extortion and blackmail in Karachi...theocratic violence on one side, and secular violence on the other. The Supreme Court has now an unrivalled opportunity to address the second of these two issues.

There is a tide in the affairs of men...there’s one in the affairs of the Supreme Court and it has to be seen whether it takes it at the flood or allows this opportunity, not likely to return soon, to slip through its fingers.

And, pray, what about the guardians? Mirza’s recklessness was controlled and well-directed. While he did not spare his chosen targets, Malik and the MQM, he was most judicious in his references to the army and ISI, going so far as to give a certificate of preserving the country to the latter. This points to intriguing possibilities. Zardari will not act, we can be sure of this, and Malik will continue to play his smooth games. But what is turning in the mind of My Lord the Chief Justice and what cue from his labours will the long-eyed men in General Headquarters take? Let no one say we don’t live in interesting times.

The lawyers’ movement broke the Musharraf status quo. For seven-and-a half years – Oct 99 to Mar 2007 – nothing was happening, Musharraf’s armour impervious to any assault. Then, out of the blue, he committed his famous faux pas with the chief justice and nothing was the same again (and to think that Pakistan’s lawyers, minor instruments of history, were to reduce themselves to showering rose petals on Taseer’s killer, Mumtaz Qadri... this is to trace a path from the sublime to the revolting).

Mirza’s thunderbolt has shaken the Zardari status quo, its impact greater than the confines of Karachi. For three and a half years nothing was happening, nothing sticking to Zardari’s Teflon armour. Now this.

To echo Ghalib, no hand is on the reins and no foot in the stirrups...where the galloping steed comes to rest let us see. Dr Zulfiqar Mirza has entered where angels would fear to tread. Where this leads to we don’t know. But at long last the elements of change have been set in motion.
Ayaz Amir: http://www.thenews.com.pk/TodaysPrintDetail.aspx?ID=65478&Cat=9&dt=8/31/2011

Religion and State


A COLLECTION of 15 well-researched papers, Islam and Society in Pakistan, offers a comprehensive survey of the evolution of Islam within Pakistan’s anthropological and sociological context.

The “assumption” that the study of Islam and Pakistan “are one and the same”, though unpalatable, is not far from the truth. Islam (rather political Islam) remains the be-all and end-all of Pakistan’s constitution and politics. Some scholars have argued that there is danger of Islam becoming a gate-keeping concept, equating Islam and Pakistan as two sides of the same coin.

Though this may be applicable in the context of the country evolving as an Islamic state, it is not really the case as all the instruments of the state and the government, and above all our societal mores, are by and large anything but Islamic in either context or form.

The book questions “What Islam means, where to locate it in society and how best to serve its interests in Pakistan today.”
Without reflecting on the status of the ulema as those who interpret religious texts, the book outlines how they tend to restrict Islam to religious practice, thereby denying the complete, all-embracing role of Islam in other, secular departments of life. The chapter, “Changing Role of Islamism and the Ulema in Society and Politics,” discusses the role of pre-partition religious parties who were opposed to the creation of Pakistan and then tried to depict themselves as the champions of a Muslim Pakistan post-partition.

The book goes on to comment on how guardianship of the Islamic world had always been Pakistan’s cherished yet costly dream as the second largest Muslim state after Indonesia and the fifth largest in the world. Its ambition to act as a state representing modern Islam may be challenged by Arab states.

The compendium would have greatly added to its value by pointing out the hazards and contradictions involved in the formation of a state on the basis of religion or else how would one justify the Quaid’s speech of August 11, 1947 declaring religion as not the state’s business.

Though Islam and Society in Pakistan: Anthropological Perspectives is a treasure trove for academics and research scholars, it has little to offer to a history student. Also, a chapter on the rise of Jihad tracing back to the Kashmir dispute and the Afghan war would have added enormously to the value of the book.

State and religion Reviewed by A.R. Siddiqi


Islam and Society in Pakistan: Anthropological Perspectives, (HISTORY), Edited by Ali Khan and Megnus Mavsden, Oxford University Press, Pakistan, ISBN 9780195479577 ,461pp.


Urdu Language- From Hindi to Urdu


For decades, the Pakistani state, like its counterparts elsewhere, has force fed certain myths to its grumbling populace. These myths are designed to engender ideological acquiescence to a state project defined by an unrepresentative elite and silence those who dare to speak against it. Typically, these narratives push forth a linear and fantastical view of history, in which our past is rooted in an image of what the state wishes us to become. The drive to create patriotic citizens out us all is predicated, among other things, on the simplistic notions of one country, one religion, and one language; when the intertwined histories of all three are rarely, if ever, so straightforward.

This is why Dr Tariq Rahman’s From Hindi to Urdu: A Social and Political History is so important. It is a detailed study of the social and political history of Urdu. In embarking on this study, Dr Rahman has attempted to complicate our understanding of Pakistan’s official language and in the process shattered certain myths propagated by nationalist narratives. This book, then, clearly has an agenda, and one that is much needed at this point in time.

But this is not the first time that Dr Rahman has done this. A scholar at the Quaid-i-Azam University, Dr Rahman is Pakistan’s foremost expert in linguistics and linguistic history. His most famous works, Language and Politics in Pakistan (OUP 1996), and Language, Ideology and Power (OUP 2002) explore the politics of language and the ends to which it’s used (ideally, both should be read in conjunction with this book). He is thus on firm ground when it comes to writing a detailed history of the evolution of Urdu and how it came to be associated with an exclusionary form of identity politics.

Urdu, Dr Rahman informs us, has a lineage which, as far as the earliest records tell us, stretches as far back as the 11th century.
Five centuries onwards from the 13th, the ancestor of both modern Hindi and Urdu was mostly called Hindi. In between there were a variety of names such as Dehlavi, Hindi/Hindui, Gujri, Dakkani, Indostan, Moors, Hindustani, and Rekhta, which were each associated with certain regions and identities. The word Urdu itself was first used in the late eighteenth century.

In the first of many myth-busters in the book, Urdu, while meaning ‘camp’ in Turkish, did not emerge from Mughal military cantonments, but rather developed from earlier variations of the same language. In discussing this, Dr Rahman, provides a fascinating insight into the regional variations of this language and how they evolved over time.

The picture that emerges from this discussion is of a language that was the product of a religious and cultural synthesis, though it is worth pointing out that religious and cultural identities themselves evolved in complicated ways over centuries.
Gradually however, Urdu came to be associated with an elite class that was predominantly Muslim.

This trend gained further momentum with the colonial encounter when the controversies over ‘Urdu’ and ‘Hindi’ began. Both came to be associated with divisive communal identities and parochial politics. Linguistic reformers in both camps purged words and grammatical constructions deemed to belong to the ‘Other’. This process continued with the emergence of the post-colonial states and their respective projects of state building. While Urdu became highly Persianised and Hindi became highly Sanskritised, both became mutually unintelligible to each other and almost unrecognisable from the shared vernacular spoken in much of the subcontinent.

That was by way of chronology. This book, however, is organised in an interesting way, with a rough chronology running, perhaps slightly uneasily, across its chapters. After detailing the nomenclature, origins and periodisation of the language, Dr Rahman moves into discussing the use of Urdu across various social realms. He examines the usage of Urdu in employment and education as well as the communicative mediums of print, radio and screen. In between, he also discusses the impact of colonialism on the development of the language and examines its varied encounters within the British administered territories and the princely states. Perhaps most interestingly, he shows how Urdu was used both as a language for the sacred and the profane (as defined by those who determine what the ‘sacred’ is). He thus dedicates a chapter each to “Urdu as an Islamic Language” and “Urdu as the Language of Love”. It would have been wonderful, though, had he also examined in depth the use of Urdu as a language of protest and as a medium for drawing people together rather than dividing them.

In doing so, Dr Rahman relies on an impressive range of sources, which range from rare medieval manuscripts to interviews with literary figures. Indeed, the bibliography itself makes for an interesting read. True to his specialised training, he examines the literary constructions of earlier works and shows the linkages between the linguistic variations that fed into the development of Urdu. The very breath of his methodological approach and source material, however, points towards a slight shortcoming of the overall text. For the very ambitiousness of this project meant that Dr Rahman, inevitably, had to cursorily engage with certain historical debates relating to the process of political and social change in South Asia. That said, his work opens up numerous avenues for further research by aspiring scholars as well as the intellectually curious.

On a tangent (and this is worth talking about), it is quite rare, if not unheard of, for a book to be prefaced by a tragic account of the author’s run-ins with pen-pushers in the bureaucracy. Financed (somewhat) by the Higher Education Commission, Dr Rahman had to go through numerous personal and professional trials just so that this project could be completed. If nothing else, this account should serve as an instructive lesson to donors on how not to deal with distinguished scholars. That this book was eventually published is not just reflective of a labour of love but also a testament to the reserves of perseverance that scholars have to draw on merely in order to publish books that are of academic worth.

Nevertheless, one has to be grateful that this book was eventually published. It is an excellent study that is both socially and politically relevant. It challenges nationalist narratives that deny the existence of a shared and pluralistic past by complicating our understanding of it. This is an exercise that we would all do well to undertake if we want to move beyond our recent past of exclusion and intolerance towards a future that is pluralistic and accommodating.

"Mind your language", Book Reviewed by Ali Raza: THIS book comes at an opportune moment. At a time when debates are raging about the creation of separate provinces along ethno-linguistic lines, it is only fitting that a work of breathtaking scope comes along to disturb nationalist narratives. The reviewer is a PhD candidate in South Asian History at Oxford University
"From Hindi to Urdu:" A Social and Political History, by By Tariq Rahman, Oxford University Press, Pakistan, ISBN 9780199063130  , 476pp
http://www.dawn.com/2011/08/28/cover-story-mind-your-language.html


ANP- Awami Narional Party


With the recent eruption of violence in Karachi, much has been written about the city’s largest political force, the MQM. History of Karachi’s other major player, the PPP, is also well documented mainly due to the fact that it remains the country’s biggest political party.

However, Karachi now also has a third force: The Awami National Party (ANP). Whereas large numbers of the city’s mohajir community vote for the MQM, and Karachi’s Baloch, Sindhi and some Punjabi segments go for the PPP, a bulk of the city’s Pashtuns (estimated to be about 17per cent of Karachi’s population), vote for the ANP. In spite of the fact that the ANP was also voted to become Khyber Pakhtunkhwa’s largest party in the 2008 elections and for the first time managed to win a couple of seats in Karachi, very little is known (among the young generation) about this party.

The ANP is not a new phenomenon. A Pashtun nationalist party, but its roots lie in a rather vibrant left-wing entity, the National Awami Party (NAP). Formed in 1957, NAP emerged when a number of small left-wing parties pooled their members and resources. Packed with the leading lights of Sindhi, Baloch, Pashtun and Bengali nationalists, NAP surfaced as a strong party whose main aims included the dismantling of the hated ‘One Unit’ system (that clubbed all of West Pakistan as a single provincial unit), the imposition of a socialist economy, the implementation of a non-aligned foreign policy and the recognition of Pakistan’s varied ethnicities as separate nations as opposed to this being a nation of Islam.

Many commentators believe that had a general election taken place in the late 1950s, NAP would have emerged as the country’s leading party. With the taking over of power (through a military coup) by Field Marshal Ayub Khan in 1958, NAP, along with all other political parties, was banned. After the ban on political parties was lifted in 1962, NAP reorganised itself.

Incidentally, this was also the time when an intra-ideological split also opened up between the Soviets and the Chinese. The split affected a number of Marxist outfits all over the world, including NAP with its Bengali leader, Maulana Bhashani, taking a more pro-China/Maoist line and Pashtun leader, Wali Khan, taking a pro-Soviet stand. A similar split also appeared in the student organisation close to NAP, the National Students Federation (NSF). The split spilled out into the open in 1967 at the start of the left-wing student and workers’ protest movement against the Ayub dictatorship.

The pro-China group became NAP (Bhashani) and the pro-Soviet group became NAP (Wali). Interestingly, many Bhashani members and student leaders joined the emergent PPP, making the Wali group of NAP the stronger faction. Another, more radical Maoist group from NAP broke away to form the Mazdoor Kissan Party (MKP).

It was NAP (Wali) — now studded with Pashtun and Baloch nationalists — that managed to win an impressive number of seats in KP and Balochistan in the 1970 elections that were otherwise swept by the PPP in West Pakistan and the Awami League in the country’s eastern wing. After East Pakistan became Bangladesh in 1971, NAP (Wali) managed to form coalition governments in KP and Balochistan. However, the PPP regime led by Z A. Bhutto dismissed the Balochistan government, accusing NAP of fermenting Baloch rebellion against the state and being funded by the Soviet Union.

Angered by Bhutto’s actions against the NAP government on Balochistan, the NAP-led government in KP resigned. NAP was banned again in 1973 when radical Baloch groups began an armed insurgency against the Bhutto regime. To crush the insurgency Bhutto used the Pakistan military and helicopters given to Pakistan by the Shah of Iran. Almost all NAP leaders were arrested and jailed for treason.

Attempts were made to revive NAP after the fall of the Bhutto regime in 1977. And though it was the Zia dictatorship that had squashed the treason cases against NAP leaders, Zia soon came down hard on leftist forces and NAP’s reformation was thwarted. Nevertheless, when in 1986 PPP co-Chairman Benazir Bhutto returned from exile in 1986 and began taking the Zia dictatorship on, some former Pashtun, Baloch and Sindhi NAP leaders finally managed to revive the party, this time calling it the Awami National Party.

By the late 1980s, however, after ANP’s Baloch and Sindhi leaders broke away and formed their own nationalist groups, ANP watered down the old NAP’s hard Marxist rhetoric and became exclusively a secular and left-liberal Pashtun nationalist party.
As an electoral entity, ANP’s performance was mixed in KP. Throughout the 1990s it got into various alliances with the PPP and PML-N, none of them successful.

Even though KP’s Pashtun dominated areas have been electoral strongholds of ANP, JUI and PPP, in Karachi the Pashtuns had mostly been electorally aligned with NAP and then ANP. All this changed in the 2002 elections when ANP was almost wiped out by religious parties (MMA) in KP. Nevertheless, during the discrediting of the Musharraf dictatorship in 2007 and rising unpopularity of the right-wing MMA government in KP, ANP bounced back during the 2008 elections, bagging the majority of seats in KP.

A rapid rise in Karachi’s Pashtun population (between 1998 and 2008), saw ANP’s vote bank in the city almost double and for the first time it managed to win seats in Karachi. But in Karachi, ANP has had to make certain adjustments, because this is a city where political parties have, from the 1980s onwards, found the need to maintain militant youth groups as well as patronise their favourite street thugs.

The MQM, the PPP and the ANP are now embroiled in this phenomenon, a phenomenon that was ironically first introduced by the Jamat-i-Islami (JI) in the late 1970s. This is why ANP’s political idioms in KP may sound a tad different than its rhetoric in Karachi.
Smokers’ Corner: Meet the ANP, By Nadeem F. Paracha: http://www.dawn.com/2011/09/04/smokers-corner-meet-the-anp.html

Essence of Quran in 3 Verses: Key to Salvation

WebpageTranslator


A matchless specimen of comprehensiveness and brevity of the message of Qur’an, a whole world of meaning has been compressed into three short sentences in Surah 103, in few brief words, which is too vast in content to be fully expressed even in a book. In it, in a clear and plain way it has been stated what is the way to true success & salvation for man and what is the way to ruin and destruction for him. The great scholar of Islam; Imam Shafie has very rightly said that if the people only consider (understand) this Chapter well, it alone would suffice them for their guidance(Ibne Kathir), he is also reported to have said that , if only this Chapter was revealed in the Qur’an, it would have been sufficient for the guidance of mankind (Abdah). How important this Surah was in the sight of the Companions can be judged from the tradition cited from Abdullah bin Hisn ad-Darimi Abu Madinah, according to which whenever any two of them met they would not part company until they had recited Surah Al-Asr to each other. (Tabarani). According to Imam Razi; This Surah [103] is very harsh, because Allah has decided to destroy all the mankind except those who comply with the four conditions i.e. to have faith, perform Righteous Deeds, urge one an other to Truth and to Patience and Constancy. It implies that the salvation is collectively contingent upon these four acts. As every human is concerned about his own self similarly he has to preach to others i.e. inviting to the Deen (Islam), advise to act on good things and avoid forbidden and the prohibitions. Read and watch click <<Essence of Quran in 3 Verses>>


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Way to Progress for Pakistan

Pakistan: Beyond the ‘Crisis State’


TODAY’S turmoil and turbulence are such that there is no concerted official effort to plan for Pakistan’s future. But both the urgent and the essential must be addressed if the country is to be transformed into a strong state responsive to the welfare of its people and not merely its privileged elites.


Dysfunctional politics, unresolved structural economic problems, internal security threats and the governance deficit all have to be tackled simultaneously and not in isolation from one another as together they have contributed to the systemic crisis.

But first urgent actions have to be taken to deal with the country’s security situation and the crisis in public finances to enable the pursuit of other critical goals. Prioritisation is necessary to push forward an enforceable reform agenda.

Effective governance is what makes the difference between successful states and struggling ones. Improving the quality of governance is therefore central to the effort to move Pakistan beyond the ‘crisis state’. This volume has identified both short- and long-term reform measures needed to enhance the capabilities of public institutions, institute checks and balances and create a more competent civil service. Yet none of these policies can be undertaken without articulating a vision and the mechanism to implement it.

What this book has also emphasised is the need to bring the country’s politics in sync with the social, economic and technological changes that have been transforming the national landscape and creating a more ‘connected’ society. Electoral and political reforms that foster greater and more active participation by Pakistan’s growing educated middle class will open up possibilities for the transformation of an increasingly dysfunctional, patronage-dominated polity into one that is able to tap the resilience of the people and meet their needs.

In re-designing the polity the central principle that should be applied is that democracy cannot function without the rule of law. This means strengthening the judiciary to operationalise robust checks and balances. It also means ensuring the availability of justice to citizens by reforming the judicial system, especially at the lower levels.

Stable civil-military relations are essential for political stability to be maintained. The Armed Forces can contribute towards a viable national polity by subjecting themselves to civilian oversight and control. This will have to be matched by civilian leaders who should abide by the Constitution and refrain from dragging in the Army to settle political disputes.

The goal of economic revival will have to be comprehensively targeted with emergency actions, short term measures and long term reforms, all of which will have to be pursued simultaneously. Immediate steps to restore macroeconomic stability and the fiscal and financial balance need to be accompanied by efforts to mobilise resources to power Pakistan’s economic development. Broadening the revenue base by taxing the rich and the powerful and bringing exempted sectors such as agriculture into the tax net should be the crucial elements for setting up an equitable and efficient tax regime.

The state has to play a central and active role to create an enabling environment for economic growth and job creation. This means addressing the infrastructure deficits, especially in power, evolving a fair regulatory framework for economic activity and halting the haemorrhaging in the public sector enterprises that is fuelling the budget deficit and crowding out private
investment.

A coherent strategy to revive the agriculture sector should include new investment in the rural infrastructure, appropriate pricing and incentives, land reclamation, focused research and development, application of modern technology and utilisation of international market rules and opportunities. These measures should aim to turn the country into the region’s food reservoir.

Policies to promote industrial growth and expansion should entail greater support to small and medium enterprises, and identification and encouragement of manufacturing in sectors where Pakistan has or can acquire the greatest competitive
advantage and where demand is rising rapidly. A key policy objective should be the country’s integration into global production chains and manpower training and skills development.

The highest priority needs to be given to human development. A crash programme should be implemented to educate Pakistan and meet the target of achieving universal primary education in the next 10 years through higher government spending and public-private partnerships. Meeting the education and health needs of citizens, alleviation of poverty and steps to end discrimination against women should be part of a comprehensive human development strategy.

It is also critical to address the challenge of a rapidly growing population and youth bulge by implementing a mix of policy measures that include a programme to reduce fertility and a far-reaching literacy campaign focused on the rural areas and women to achieve higher primary school enrolment. Skills training and increasing female labour participation will also be needed to reap a demographic dividend and turn the country’s human capital into an engine for economic growth.

Restoring internal security and order will require a holistic approach that deals with the multifaceted challenge of terrorism and violence. An overwhelming reliance on military means has distracted attention from the need to deal with the ideological and political aspects of the militant challenge and may even have dispersed rather than diminished the threat. Evolving a counter-narrative, forging a political consensus and mobilising public support against militancy must be part of the strategy to stop the flow of recruits to militant organisations in order to break the cycle of radicalisation. A multilayered, multi-pronged strategy is needed that includes efforts to engage in the battle of ideas and address the factors — including issues of governance and injustice — that create the breeding ground for militancy.

To promote its vital short and long term national objectives and regain lost strategic space, Pakistan needs to adjust its foreign policy and invigorate its diplomacy within the current and emerging political and economic environment.

Its priority goals should include promoting peace in Afghanistan through an inclusive political settlement based on that country’s realities while working to end terrorism and extremism within Pakistan and the region. A modus vivendi with India should be sought which maintains Pakistan’s policy independence including for Kashmir’s legitimate aspirations and preserves credible conventional and nuclear deterrence while exploiting the potential for mutually advantageous trade and economic relations.

Vastly expanded strategic and economic relations should be pursued with China which offer Pakistan the best hope for the realisation of its security and economic objectives. A balanced and stable relationship with the US should be built on mutual accommodation of legitimate national interests, respect for Pakistan’s sovereignty and expanded cooperation in areas of benefit to both sides.

Pakistan should also seek to revive historic and mutually supportive relationships with key Islamic nations especially Saudi Arabia, Turkey and the Gulf states, as well as Malaysia, Iran and Indonesia.

Excerpt — Pakistan: Beyond the ‘Crisis State’ 

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All is well… or is it?



LET me tell you the new consensus: Pakistan is a weak state and a strong society. The state — civil state — is weak insofar as it cannot adequately respond to crisis in its population (the floods of 2010, for example) or it is weak insofar as it cannot effectively govern (collect taxes, for example). The society is pluralistic, and open. It has a growing middle class, solid infrastructure, robust economic “fundamentals”. It faces crisis — terrorism, wars, inflation, scarcity of water and electricity, floods — but the combination of strong society and an organised military has kept Pakistan afoot.

This is the new consensus. You will find it in a number of recent books, but most prominently in Maleeha Lodhi’s edited volume, Pakistan: Beyond the ‘Crisis State’. The volume, she writes in the introduction, is meant as a set of policy responses which can guide a “capable leadership” in charting “a new course”. For this prescriptive dosage, Lodhi assembles experts in the fields of economics, human development, security, journalism and a solitary historian. Pakistan, the 17 chapters assert, is not a failed, or a failing state, and there are reasons for hope and optimism as well as concrete signs and steps which can even ensure progress.

Ayesha Jalal’s opening essay posits a Pakistan which gave up “credible history” for politics and ideological expediency and, as a result, is left with no historical consciousness and scant hope of defining any semblance of a national identity. Get more open-minded history, she counsels. An advice that I cannot help but endorse whole-heartedly.

These are followed by essays on economics (by Meekal Ahmed, Mudassar Mazhar Malik); on the army and politics (by Shuja Nawaz, Saeed Shafqat, Feroz Hasan Khan, Ahmed Rashid, Syed Rifaat Hussain) and on civil institutions (Ishrat Hussain, Ziad Alahdad, Shanza Khan and Mooed Yusuf). There is an almost obligatory essay by Akbar S. Ahmed, untiringly relating the relevance of M. A. Jinnah to the current state, and a discordantly cheerful note by novelist Mohsin Hamid. The overall themes of all the essays remains in sync with the central agenda — Pakistan is not about to fail. Lodhi in her essay, “Beyond the Crisis State”, argues that Pakistan’s political parties should tap into the growing middle class and their need for good governance and cast a new agenda of reforms for the future.

There is much to laud here — the effort to be positive, the effort to offer workable solutions, platforms, venues. Yet, the volume often fails to heed the basic call in that very first essay by Ayesha Jalal — a critical self-reflection, a grounding in historical complexity. Take the Hamid essay, “Why Pakistan Will Survive”. Hamid notes Pakistan’s vastness in size and population, it’s “diversity,” its spirit of “co-existence” and its “tolerance”. “What does make someone Pakistani then?” Hamid asks. “If you are from Pakistan, then you’re a Pakistani”. This tautological and ideological definition, argues Hamid, allows for great flexibility, and “relief”. It is also a shockingly blind statement. The Ahmadis who are “from Pakistan” are not considered by the state and the Constitution to be “Pakistani” with equal rights. A brutalised and marginalised Baloch minority is considered to be “Pakistani” by the state but they would rather not be “from Pakistan”. And those are merely the travails of the present day. The issue of who is “from Pakistan” and, hence, get a chance to “govern Pakistan”, has already fractured the state into two in 1971.

Hamid’s inability to critically address historical inequalities in Pakistan could possibly be excused as befitting such an essay with rose-coloured glasses. However, it should not.

Pakistan’s strengths and weaknesses, the crisis it faces and will face, and the paths one can recommend or solicit are all valid and needed venues for open dialogue and critical commentary. However, the first step must be of awareness of the realities that exist — not to bloom them into horrifying garlands of doom but to be clear-eyed, and honest to the everyday victims of the everyday atrocities committed by the state and the citizens of Pakistan against their own. This is not a matter of policy or practicality; it is a matter of the ethics which govern out public debates.

There are, of course, discordant notes in the volume: “Pakistan is at the crossroads of its political destiny” (p. 45); “Pakistan is a prisoner of its geography and history” (p. 79); “Pakistan today faces a growing threat from violent extremists and Islamic militants” (p. 131); “Pakistan’s energy sector is in crisis” (p. 231). Perhaps, the finest essay in the volume is journalist Zahid Hussain’s dissection of JUI’s militancy in “Battling Militancy”. A cautionary note, it highlights the collusion between the military, Islamic militants, the so-called moderates and the various sources which trace back to Kingdom of Saudi Arabia’s particularly sectarian interests in the region.

In the end, as befitting a project geared to be presented in handy power-point in conference rooms across Washington DC or London, there are the “Concluding Notes” — a distillation of the various expertise at display in the volume into bite-sized chunks. There is the call to prioritise Pakistan along the nexus of security and stability; a note to military leadership to heed the civilians; a call for better relationships with India and stability in Afghanistan. All sensible, and desirable, options, of course.

Yet, here again, there is a jarring presence of reality least understood: “Pakistan should also seek to revive historic and mutually supportive relationships with key Islamic nations especially Saudia Arabia…” This is mind-boggling. For one, there is no need to revive what has never flagged. More importantly, the one traceable source of both sectarian invective and willing militants in the region — the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia — needs to be resisted in the national interest and publicly exposed. The DC/Riyadh connection and the Islamabad/DC connection are just as important to understanding the current policy and security paradigms of the country as the other profiles sketched in the volume.

Pakistan, as a subject of critical analysis, is ill-served when realities are ignored for the sake of policy. The need to resist a crude stereotype of “failed state” is clear and present but to go “beyond the crisis state”, we must also look seriously to history, to narratives other than the state or military and admit the harsh truths: The Pakistani military is just as fallible as its civilian regime, though the latter needs the explicit support of the population as a legitimate government. The state structure incorporates within it gross injustices towards the minorities — defined religiously, ethnically or culturally. Redressing these injustices — against the Ahmadis, the Christians, the Hindus, the Baloch, the Swatis — is just as vital to the nation-state as the need to prioritise health or education or commercial sectors. This volume is but a hampered beginning in this long process of a national soul-searching.

"All is well… or is it?" Book Reviewed by Manan Ahmed. The reviewer is the author of Where the Wild Frontiers Are: Pakistan and the American Imagination
Pakistan: Beyond the ‘Crisis State’ . (Current Affairs). Edited by Maleeha Lodhi, Oxford University Press, Karachi,  ISBN 978-1849041355.




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The caliph dream

Being the products of the myopic narratives about Pakistani nationhood and religion in our textbooks and the populist media, quite a few young educated Pakistanis are struggling to find practical political, social and economic examples of the faith-driven Utopia that they were told Pakistan was to be. The problem with many among this generation of middle-class men and women is that quite unlike the earlier generations, they seem to have wholly bought into the farce of a religion-based Utopia they were told the founding founders conceptualised.

This is strange. In spite of the fact that they have more opportunities to acquire modern education and information today, this generation has somehow blocked alternative narratives that attempt to counter the one that defines Pakistan as some unique blob of religious, nationalist and political singularity. This is a reflection of a reactive strain of desperation, myopia and close-mindedness that have been creeping into the urban middle-class ethos.

A good part of this dilemma is also about how many young Pakistanis feel awkward when their modern lifestyles fail to relate and connect with the brutal ways of creatures like the Taliban and Al Qaeda. So, as if feeling guilty about this, they have concocted various social escape valves with the help of modern-looking and sounding Islamic televangelists through which they believe they can keep one of their feet in religion and the other in the modern material world.

On a more disturbing level, there are also some who have become venerable to what can be described as the modern and educated face of religious extremism: The Hizbut Tahrir (HT).

The HT was formed in 1953 in Jerusalem by a former Muslim Brotherhood member. His professed goal was to unite the Muslim world under a single political entity (Caliphate) and the Sharia (his ‘Salafi’ version of it). In the 1950s and 1960s the HT was mostly active in Arab countries. In the 1970s it got involved in various coup attempts in Jordan, Syria and Iraq. Planned with a handful of military men and political clerics, the moves were easily crushed.

The setback saw many HT leaders escaping to European countries, especially the UK. There the HT came onto contact with the second generation young Pakistanis, Muslim Indians and Bangladeshis. Though staunchly anti-West, the HT was tolerated there because it was more vocal against the Soviet Union.

It was during this period that it began reworking its idea of a world caliphate. And since it was now operating in Europe, its activists began dressing in western clothes, speaking English and using modern political symbolism to communicate what was otherwise a retrogressive, if not entirely Utopian, idea.

With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the HT began sending its well-dressed and articulate recruits to Central Asian countries, but more than ever, the focus was now on Pakistan. Being the country most affected by the Afghan civil war a number of extremist and sectarian organisations had emerged in Pakistan. The fallout of the war was also a state-sponsored ‘Islamisation’ and the confusion that set in at the end of the Cold War. This confusion engulfed the urban middle-class.

Facing a regenerated conservatism, this class reached out to ‘rediscover’ its Islamic roots (without letting go of modern material aspirations, of course). The same thing happened in certain sections of the military as well. The HT also began infiltrating modern university and college campuses (especially in Lahore) with the help of sympathetic professors and teachers. It began recruiting military officers too.

The HT bypassed terrorism and concentrated on building support among middle-class students, professionals and the military men. In the new millennium, its leadership was convinced that Pakistan was ready to become the launching pad for an international caliphate. And it planned to use elements within the army to achieve this. Violence was not far behind.

In 2003, the HT was accused of being involved in an assassination attempt against General Musharraf. An army captain was arrested for plotting a military coup. According to a former HT man, Majid Nawaz, the HT does not discount the use of violence through the converted military men in its goal of toppling the Pakistan government and the military’s top leadership to ‘establish a Khilafah state’. He adds that the second phase involves spreading the borders of such a state through jihad.

Though the HT is banned in Pakistan (not banned in the UK), a recent report suggests it still has sympathetic groups operating in the military and in various private universities. The HT has given the somewhat concocted and worn-out Maududiist notion of Islam’s ‘pristine political past’ a contemporary dimension. By using modern economic and political symbolism it has reconstructed this notion as a largely Utopian and farcical model for some sort of a golden, all-conquering future.
Smokers’ Corner: "The caliph dream"  by Nadeem F. Paracha 
http://www.dawn.com/2011/08/21/smokers-corner-the-caliph-dream.html

Hizb ut Tahrir the Global Islamic Political Party working for the reestablishment of Khilafah, Caliphate, Islamic state in the Muslim world ...

Monumental fraud, called Elections in Pakitan

While the nation celebrated the 64th birthday of Pakistan on Sunday, although there was nothing to celebrate as such except a forlorn hope in the eyes of the youth, at least one big myth must be shattered on this day so that we, the people, are not deceived and betrayed by crooks and gangsters any more. This myth is about elections and an elected leadership in the country.

We are told everytime there is any finger raised against loot, plunder and corruption of any of our leaders that the people of Pakistan will determine whether the leader is corrupt or not by voting or not voting for him, her or the party. At least this grand deception should stop now.

Elections, or what the people do or do not want, are one tool for accountability but it is restricted to a judgment on the programmes, manifestos, promises and performance of individuals and parties. The votes are used in no country of the world to determine whether a person is a thief, crook, gangster or a mafia Don. The local laws of the land determine that.

How this accountability by votes is conducted can be fully understood by just one example — of the United States.

In the US, elections do not mean just voting for the president or members of the two houses of Congress, as in Pakistan. Statistics show that in 1992, when the US population was just 257 million, or about 60 million more than the current population of Pakistan, there were a total of 510,500 elected officials at all levels of government, in states and counties and districts. Every party leader and every candidate is elected.

Data available on the Internet shows there are elected Governors, Lieutenant Governors, State Senators and Representatives and Assemblymen and Delegates. Plus some states have other elected officials like Attorney Generals or Comptrollers. And then there are local officials elected at the level of counties, cities, towns, villages, etc.

In New York alone, there are 62 counties and nearly 1,000 towns and cities. Within the towns, there are nearly 3,000 incorporated villages. Every one of these counties, cities, towns and villages has some form of elected government, depending on which kind of charter they have. Most villages have a mayor at the very least, and may have a village council. Every town has a town board and some have elected supervisors. All counties (except for those in NYC) have a county executive or county legislature. They all also have elected district attorneys. Every city has a mayor and district-based city council.

Then there are elected school boards, elected utility district boards of various types, elected library boards in some places, elected sheriffs, elected local and state judges (tons of those in NY) and finally, there’s the annual election of the Princess of the Mermaids on Coney Island.

According to one account, in one district of California a voter has to elect the following: President of the US; 2 senators from California; 1 representative in House of Representative from California District 13; 1 governor of California; 1 lieutenant governor; 1 secretary of state for California; 1 attorney general of state; 1 controller for state; 1 treasurer for state; 1 insurance commissioner for state; 1 superintendent of public instructions for state; 1 member of the California State Board of Equalisation; 1 representative in the state assembly; 1 representative in the state senate; 1 member of the Alameda County Board of Supervisors; 1 mayor of Dublin, California; 4 city councilpersons for Dublin, California; 1 member of the Alameda County Water District; 5 board members for the Dublin Unified School District; 3 board members of the Dublin-San Ramon Services District; 1 board member for East Bay Municipal Water District; 1 board member for Bay Area Rapid Transit District; 1 board member for East Bay Regional Park District; 69 judges for the Superior Court of Alameda County.

In Pennsylvania besides all the above, all judges are elected in partisan elections. Appellate judges (Supreme Court, Superior Court, & Commonwealth Court) serve 10-year terms, but incumbents are only subject to a retention vote. Court of Common Pleas judges also serve 10-year terms. 

At the local level, there are elected posts that are only part-time jobs. Small town mayors and city councils, school boards are elected. Some jurisdictions even elect drain inspectors or fire commissioners. There are elected hospital boards, elected water boards, elected community college boards. People vote directly for county officials such as sheriff, marshal, recorder of deeds, tax assessor, probate judge, public service commission and even clerk of the court.

This is the spirit of the elected system of governance and these polls are held every two years (members of House of Representatives), four years and some like senators for six years. Every one of these elected officials faces the public and runs on his/her record.

But the most important thing is that if any charge of corruption or misconduct is levelled against any of these elected people, they have to resign the moment it is levelled or, if they contest, proved in a court of law. They cannot hide their crimes behind the argument that the people will vote them out in the next polls.

Another important tool used in the US is a referendum on any big or small issue, which becomes controversial and whenever elections are held, either state or national, there are many subjects on which referenda are held simultaneously. 

Out of the 50 states in the US, 49 have laws to hold such local referendums. This is how people decide their local issues, whether it is running a train, building a dam or a park. The wishes of the people are respected.

So hiding behind accountability by the people in elections is just a huge fraud to protect corrupt elected people from crimes they have committed. In elections, people vote on policies not on whether anyone has Swiss accounts or not. This myth should be buried once for all. Note: Some of the data for this article has been picked from the Internet and blogs.

"Bury this monumental fraud, once for all Elections? What elections are you talking about?" By Shaheen Sehbai; http://www.thenews.com.pk/TodaysPrintDetail.aspx?ID=8155&Cat=13&dt=8/16/2011 


MUST also READ>> Present political arrangements  is trash left by military dictatorship. Elections-2008 were aimed to continue with the puppet rule under US patronage. How elections held with 35 million fake voters [45% of registered voters] can result in democratic government? So what we see now is jus an illusion of democracy... some reforms are suggested... read >>>http://t.co/nWDNNWN   & "Enduring shame: http://pakistan-posts.blogspot.com/2011/08/that-enduring-shame.html


Monumental fraud, called Elections in Pakistan, MUST end now: